Halduskultuur

Islamic Public Value in Southeast Asia

Wolfgang Drechsler, Eko Prasojo, Salah Chafik
Issue Editors

Contents

Introduction to the Special Issue

EKO PRASOJO, UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA, DEPOK, WEST JAVA, INDONESIA

This special issue of *Halduskultuur* addresses the practice of Islamic institutions and values in Public Administration (PA) in various Asian countries. Although it only covers four countries in Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, this depiction will provide a way to strengthen the study of Islamic Public Value as part of the effort to develop a new paradigm of Non-Western Public Administration (NWPA). The publication in this special issue is part of the "Islamic Public Value: Theory, Theology, and Practice of Indigenous Cooperative Governance Institutions" project supported by the John Templeton Foundation and hosted by the Institute of Innovation of Public Purpose, University College London.

As one of the projects results is to explore and introduce Islamic governance institutions and values in Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, this publication seeks to find Islamic public governance practices going back to the times before Western colonialism came to Asia. Muslim communities partly use these Islamic values and institutions to maintain the continuity of identity, as well as due the struggle against Western colonialism and anti-Islamic governments that developed in several countries in the past. The coexistence of Islamic values and institutions has also developed in several Southeast Asian countries, especially for public services in education, health, conflict resolution, and community economic development. The existence of these Islamic values and institutions greatly assists government and society in the practice of modern public governance today, even surpassing the ability and reach of formal bureaucracy to solve problems faced by society. This practice of Muslim public governance is often denied by Western academics and practitioners; it is also sometimes considered a fundamentalist Islamic practice that is contrary to Western and global values. However, local values and institutions strengthen the acceptability of the goals of the wider community (Mazzucato and Ryan-Collins 2019).

The initiative to publish some practices of Islamic values and institutions in four Southeast Asian countries in this journal issue aims to elucidate the existence of Islamic public governance that has been operating for hundreds of years in serving the interests of communities on a local scale, perhaps also on a national and regional one – covering areas in several countries. The paradigm and theory of PA currently dominated by the thinking and practice in Western countries potentially slowly eliminates the existence of Islamic values and institutions (Drechsler 2013). The modernization of PA, in many ways, is more of a form of westernization, which ignores the traditions, religious values, and Islamic culture that have long existed in other countries and nations.

Thus, it is undeniable that the global-Western values of PA practices are then considered exclusive only for the "suitability/appropriateness" of Western countries, and developing countries are forced to match this. Developing countries – in this publication, Southeast Asian countries – have the power of "their color," which has a characteristic that is classical, historical, and has been going on for a long time, as previously stated in PA (Confucianism) and Islamic PA. Existence of this power is proven by the fact that both have explanations

from various theoretical literature, PA practices that have been going on for centuries, and, of course, in practice-theoretical terms, they are concretely relevant to current conditions. Thus, the Islamic paradigm, besides the Confucian one, can be considered a core part of non-Western PA (Drechsler 2013).

Research results regarding the influence of Islamic institutions, values, beliefs, and spirituality on PA are still minimal. There are at least three reasons (Ongaro and Tantardini 2024): (1) narrow interpretation of secularization – the decreasing role of religion in modern society; (2) academics focus on secular and Western PA models, thus ignoring Islamic PA; and (3) methodological challenges in linking religion with specific approaches. Based on this third reason, strengthening "Islamic" practices in PA, represented by NWPA, can influence administrative phenomena under certain conditions.

The relationship between religion, spirituality, and belief is essential to NWPA research (Ongaro and Tantardini 2023). This can be clustered into at least three research agendas: micro, meso, and macro. At the micro level, NWPA studies focus on the influence of spirituality and religion in shaping individual personalities, which can be reflected in the behavior of officials or citizens. At the meso level, the analysis includes the relationship between religion and organizational behavior. However, the macro level discusses how these three elements affect the administrative activities of government and bureaucracy. Thus, these three classifications describe the level and scope of research from the narrowest to the widest.

Islamic PA has historically had great power in the PA paradigm in developing countries but is often overlooked in regional studies of PA in developing countries. So what appears on the surface is the incredible power of PA in Western countries. This condition is proven by one example of the practice of the Ottoman Empire, which is often denied its success in practicing PA modernization, and interestingly, this modernization resembles the current practice of Western PA. The concept of the ethics of the rulers that has existed since the Ottoman Empire has similarities with Confucianism, and similar practices are present in Western PA to this day. Notably, these three paradigms have different ways, mechanisms, and contexts to achieve different goals in moving their PA (Drechsler 2014). Islamic PA is now understood to be an appropriate alternative to the global-Western paradigm. Islamic PA is discussed by highlighting its position and significance within non-Western PA through analyses of normative practices in case studies such as in Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Morocco (Chafik and Drechsler 2022). Contextualization of PA is needed so that the role of Islamic PA becomes a visible-hidden form in the middle of the existing Western PA. The reality of Islamic PA, both visible and hidden, must be recognized by all parties. For example, it is specifically related to various policy practices influenced by the wave of globalization.

The practice of Islamic values and institutions operating in several Southeast Asian countries in this special issue is also a continuation of the study of Islamic governance that has been carried out in several countries, such as Mahalla and Aul in Central Asia, Sufi Shrines in South and Southeast Asia, Zawāya and Mahadhir in North and West Africa and Khanqah in Turkey and Iran (Chafik and Drechsler 2022; El Hamel 1999; Knysh 2010; Urinboyev 2014). The existing Islamic values and institutions are diverse in their forms; 1) some operate independently in the community, 2) semi-integrated part of the government, and 3) some become a kind of secondary government. The practice of Islamic public governance is community-based to support the community's needs in public services. This practice can be called Islamic

Indigenous Cooperative Governance Institutions and is a conceptualization that was successfully rediscovered to complement state administration practices in the 21st century. (Mazzucato et al. 2021).

The primary purpose of collecting various articles in this journal from the PA science perspective is to empirically understand public governance's fundamental thoughts and objectives in Islamic values and institutions. This effort will ultimately to non-Western values in PA and how they contribute to overcoming the significant challenges faced by humanity today and in the future, especially concerning increasingly massive globalization and the critical availability of environmental issues and natural resources challenges.

The Islamic values and institutions in this special edition are mainly from Indonesia, the largest democracy in Southeast Asia and a Muslim majority. From 840 to 1267, the first Islamic Kingdom was established in Indonesia: the Samudera Pasai Kingdom in Aceh. Until now, the province of Aceh has a special autonomy status granted by the Indonesian government based on Islamic sharia. Several regional regulations based on Islamic sharia have been formed and implemented there since 2001. This shows that Islamic values and institutions have lived sustainably since Islam entered Aceh until now. Likewise, Islam developed on the island of Java, including Yogyakarta, namely the Islamic Kingdom of Mataram, which was established in 1586 and has been granted the status of a special region by the Indonesian government. The formal institutional structure in the province of Yogyakarta is still based on Islamic traditions that have developed since the Islamic Kingdom of Mataram; the Sultan was the Governor and the King. The existence of the Sultan in the official government of the province of Yogyakarta influences the forming of the traditional obedience of the community and civil servants.

Several other Islamic values and institutions currently exist in Indonesia, namely, Islamic Boarding Schools (Pesantren), which have developed in almost all regions of Indonesia and several countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and the Philippines, and the Nagari tradition in West Sumatra. Pesantren is one of the traditional Islamic educational institutions established in the early 12th century in Aceh called Dayah. They were developed in the early 15th century on the island of Java, along with the spread of Islam by the Wali Songo. Pesantren has developed not only as an Islamic educational institution but also in the fields of economics and the environment, contributing socially to society. One of the core values of Pesantren is Bahtsul Masail, a discussion and deliberation forum for making decisions. Pesantren play a role in public services in society, especially in education and the community economy. Even now, it is expanding programs and activities related to efforts to prevent climate change and environmental crises (Sobirin and Khasanah 2023).

In West Sumatra, Indonesia, Islamic values have developed and continue to serve as the fundamental values guiding the life of the Nagari community, namely, adat basandi syarak, syarak basan kitabullah. From the beginning until now, these fundamental values are based on Islamic law written in the *Al-Qur'an*. The decision-making process in the Nagari customs follows the principle of the three-pointed furnace, involving three groups: intellectuals, religious scholars, and traditional leaders. A core Islamic value in the decision-making process is deliberation aimed at achieving consensus (deliberation and consensus). This value has been adopted as a fundamental principle of Indonesia's national and state ideology, as reflected in the Pancasila State Foundation.

The Islamic value of deliberation also developed in Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and it was also taught in Pesantren-like institutions in these countries. Although different in the process, the focus of deliberation in Islamic values that have developed until now in community life is the decision-making process based on the values contained in the *Al-Qur'an* and the *As-Sunnah* and involves religious scholars and intellectuals. Even in the city of Santos, Mindanao, Philippines, the value of *shura* (deliberation) has been used as an institution for conflict resolution that occurs in society, including in cases of family disputes and divorce.

Islamic values and institutions in Southeast Asia, written about in this special issue, pave the way for its rediscovery and use in PA practice. It can be an alternative option that can co-exist with Western PA values and institutions. As this is a pioneering publication, other studies and writings are needed to complement the practice of Islamic values and institutions to strengthen NWPA studies..

References

Chafik, Salah and Wolfgang Drechsler 2022. "In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan zawāyā as Good Public Administration." Public Administration Review 82(4), 747-755. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13475

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2013. "Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic." Society and Economy 35(3), 319-342. doi: https://doi.org/10.1556/socec.35.2013.3.3

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2014. "What is Islamic Public Administration and Why Should We Study It in the "Second World?." Halduskultuur 15(2), 123-142.El Hamel, C. 1999. "The Transmission of Islamic Knowledge in Moorish Society from the Rise of the Almoravids to the 19th Century." Journal of Religion in Africa 29(1), 62-87. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1581787

Mazzucato, Mariana, Rainer Kattel, Gulio Quaggiotto and Milica Begovic. 2021. "COVID-19 and the Need for Dynamic State Capabilities: An International Comparison." Development Futures Series Working Papers, 30. doi: https://doi.org/10.18356/30053307-9

Mazzucato, Mariana and Josh Ryan-Collins. 2019. "Putting Value Creation Back into Public Value: From Market Fixing to Market Shaping." UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, Working Paper Series (IIPP WP 2019-05).

Ongaro, Edoardo and Michele Tantardini. 2023. "Religion, Spirituality, Faith, and Public Administration: A Literature Review and Outlook." Public Policy and Administration 39(4), 531-555. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767221146866

Ongaro, Edoardo and Michele Tantardini. 2024. "Why Has The Religious Factor Been Forgotten in PA Studies? (And How to Remedy It)." Public Money & Management 4, 7-8. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2023.2264054

Sobirin, Mohamad and Karimatul Khasanah. 2023. "The Pesantren Scholars' Fatwa on Global Warming and Climate Change: An Integrative Analysis of Islamic Law, Theology, and Environmental Sciences on the Practice of Multidisciplinary Ijtihad." Cogent Arts and Humanities 10, 1-16. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2023.2193023

Urinboyev, Rustamjon. 2014. "Is There an Islamic Public Administration Legacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia? An Ethnographic Study." Halduskultuur 15(2), 157-178. http://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/125/123

Eko Prasojo is a professor of public administration and former dean of Faculty of Administrative Science at Universitas Indonesia. He is now the executive secretary of Steering Committee for National Bureaucratic Reform the Republic of Indonesia and President of Asian Group of Public Administration (AGPA). He served as vice minister of administrative reform from 2011 to 2014 and member of the United Nations Committee of Experts in Public Administration. Email: prasojo1@ui.ac.id

Indigenous Islamic Conflict Resolution: The Case of General Santos City, Mindanao, Philippines

BONN JUEGO, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ, FINLAND

MUSS LIDASAN, AL QALAM INSTITUTE, ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY, PHILIPPINES

Abstract

This article examines the Shari'a Atas Bitiara (SAB) program implemented by the City Government of General Santos in Mindanao, Philippines. Recognized with the Galing Pook Award in 2023 for excellence in local governance, SAB integrates indigenous Islamic conflict resolution practices into public administration. It addresses the absence of dedicated Shari'a courts for the city's Muslim constituents by offering culturally relevant, efficient, and cost-effective alternative dispute mechanisms. Through documentary research and expert interviews, this study highlights SAB's notable accomplishments and innovations in creating value for the improvement of the quality of life in a multicultural society. Although the narrative of success often points to SAB's satisfactory results, such accounts may obscure the indigenous Bangsamoro roots of the practice and the Islamic foundation of the principles underpinning it. SAB emphasizes the community's sensibility for restorative justice, healing, and reconciliation over punitive measures. These are reinforced by Islam's concepts of *shura* (consultation), *sulh* (conciliation), and *tahkim* (arbitration). By institutionalizing a tradition of public service delivery with deep cultural alignment, yet adaptable to modern elements such as human rights considerations and gender sensitivity, SAB has effectively resolved numerous disputes, ranging from marital issues to land conflicts. In both its practical performance and theoretical grounding, the SAB case exhibits a promising faith-based, non-Western framework of governance that can further enhance conditions for mutual understanding, communal bonds, and social cohesion.

Keywords: indigenous Islamic conflict resolution; Shari'a Atas Bitiara; Bangsamoro; Muslim Mindanao; non-Western public administration

1. Introduction

The Philippines, home to a predominantly Catholic population of 115 million, is one of the few countries still grappling with persistent armed conflicts, stemming from both communist insurgency and Islamist militancy. Approximately 6.4% of Filipinos are Muslims, primarily residing in the southern island of Mindanao. Since the establishment of the post-colonial Philippine nation-state in the 1940s – whether despite or because of it – the region of Muslim Mindanao has become a hotspot of varied conflicts, wars, resistance, rebellion, and armed insurgency with ethnic, religious, political, and socio-economic dimensions.

The concept of "Bangsamoro" represents the shared identity of various Muslim communities in southwestern Mindanao, including the Sulu archipelago, and their aspiration for self-determination against the colonizing notions of the Filipino nation and the modern Philippine state (Alonto 2016). From the early 1970s, local Muslim rebel groups – initially the Moro National Liberation Front and later the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – have been engaged in cultural, ideological, and military confrontation with the central government's assertion of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The violent process of constructing a unitary Philippine state entailed the gradual annexation of the Moros, who were independent and sovereign sultanates that resisted Spanish and American colonization (Canuday and Sescon 2022). This state-building formation, part of the modernization project, has also resulted in the minoritization and marginalization of Muslims (Abinales 2020).

While resolving sovereign-based conflict in the historical relationship between the Bangsamoro communities and the national state authorities remains the ultimate governance objective over the long term, it is equally significant to address the everyday intra-communal conflicts between Muslim individuals and groups (Lara 2014). Although less visible on the international stage, community-level conflicts have profound impacts on the daily lives of people and can exacerbate larger issues. If left unresolved, the various sources of communal conflicts – ranging from personal grievances and marital disputes to family feuds and clan rivalries – can escalate the cycle of violence implicating the broader society. There have been instances when the local "rido" phenomenon (i.e., feuding, retaliatory violence, vendetta, or intertribal warfare between families and kinship groups) triggered large-scale conflicts involving Muslim separatist groups and the military (Torres 2014). *Rido* refers to blood feuds, or chains of killings provoked by an affront to family's honor, including violent disputes over politics, land, and other material resources. Bloody rido, in which a tit-for-tat clan war is dealt with through armed violence in the name of family pride and honor, is a manifestation of a weak state's failure in governance and its inefficient justice system against a backdrop of prevalent informal economic activities and shadow economies (Durante et al. 2014; Torres, 2014; Lara and Schoofs 2016). In the context of persistent and interrelated causes of conflicts, conflict resolution is a critical function of governance. An exploration of indigenous and culturally informed approaches is necessary due to the apparent shortcomings of conventional mechanisms in governing conflictive relationships.

Public administrators often deal with societal, organizational, institutional, and ethnic conflicts – highlighting the importance of enhancing scholarship and skills in the governance of conflict resolution, not least in non-Western societies (Lan 1997; Esman 1997; Drechsler 2013, 2025; Juego 2023). This article reflects on the success story of the Shari'a Atas Bitiara (SAB) program of the City Government of General Santos (GenSan) in the island of Mindanao as a promising example of how indigenous Islamic practices have been – and can be – incorporated into public administration to manage conflicts and create public value. As such, the aim is to contribute to an emerging research agenda to build an empirically grounded theory of "Islamic public value" by examining a real-life case of "non-Western public administration" in Southeast Asia against a global backdrop of a "pluriverse" of good governance practices and a diversity of administrative cultures of human living-together (Drechsler 2015; Kothari et al. 2019; Drechsler et al. 2024; Juego 2023). Through documentary research and expert interviews, this study showcases SAB's significant achievements and innovative approaches

in enhancing the quality of life within a multicultural society. It advances the argument that while SAB's success in service delivery is often highlighted, it is crucial to recognize the indigenous origins and Islamic principles that form its foundation. SAB prioritizes restorative justice, healing, and reconciliation over punitive measures, drawing on Islamic concepts such as *shura* (consultation), *sulh* (conciliation), and *tahkim* (arbitration). By institutionalizing a culturally aligned program that also adapts to modern considerations like human rights and gender sensitivity, SAB has successfully resolved numerous disputes, from marital issues to land conflicts, thereby strengthening communal bonds and social cohesion among the city's diverse population.

2. General Santos City: Governance for Harmonious Coexistence

About 10% of GenSan's 700,000 inhabitants identify Islam as their religious affiliation (Philippine Statistics Authority 2023). GenSan, a highly urbanized coastal city situated in the province of South Cotabato in Southern Mindanao, is often referred to as the "Boom City of the South" and the "Tuna Capital of the World" due to its booming economy, especially in agriculture and fishing. Like much of Mindanao, GenSan's history is marked by colonial land grabs and dispossession, displacing indigenous inhabitants from their ancestral domains. The *Lumads* (meaning "natives"), specifically the B'laan and T'Boli ethnic groups who practiced animism, along with the Muslim Moros, were significantly affected by colonization (World Bank 2017).

Originally called Dadiangas, the area saw waves of migration during the 1930s when Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas arrived as part of the American colonial Commonwealth government's migration program to populate and "develop" parts of Mindanao. This socio-economic development process, including the state-orchestrated enforcement of land titling and privatization, entailed a cultural shift toward Christianization (Villano-Campado 2007). In 1954, a decade after the Japanese occupation and a few years after Philippine independence from the United States, the area – then known as the Municipality of Buayan – was renamed General Santos, in honor of General Paulino Santos, the former chief of the national army who led the establishment of settlements in the region. In 1968, the municipality was elevated to city status and is now viewed as an interactive "melting pot" of Christians, Muslims, and Lumads (Hall 2010).

In a multicultural environment, conflicts – arising from differences in opinions, beliefs, interests, goals, or values – are inevitable and integral to community life and societal evolution. Their outcomes, whether positive or negative, depend on their management. Effective conflict management, which promotes tolerance, dialogue, and diverse interest accommodation, can lead to increased understanding, collaboration, and economic development.

Across Mindanao, Muslim communities have cultivated indigenous conflict resolution methods over generations. Their cultural beliefs and traditional practices are regarded as tacit knowledge and community wisdom in dealing with conflicts. These approaches may be more effective than conventional ones as they consider the distinct socio-cultural fabric of the communities involved. Particularly in sensitive cases and challenging instances, indigenous methods of conflict resolution have proven indispensable in averting conflict

intensification (Durante et al. 2014; Macabuac-Ferolin and Constantino 2014). Such success stories of governing entities institutionalizing local ways of conflict management serve as governance templates for lesson drawing for any modernizing city government like GenSan.

For many decades throughout Mindanao, families of different ethnic groups have learned to coexist peacefully. This is notable in GenSan, where diverse groups such as the Maranaws, Maguindanaos, Tausugs, and other ethnicities have built close relationships and mutuality. However, despite the best intentions of everyone, misunderstandings can arise over time. Conflicts over land, resources, personal relations, or other issues may escalate into longstanding feuds that can affect not only the concerned individuals but also the entire community. In such situations, an essential task of governance is to promote dialogue and understanding to prevent the exacerbation of conflicts and to find peaceful solutions that benefit the common good.

3. The Shari'a Atas Bitiara Program: Galing Pook Awardee 2023

GenSan's SAB initiative is a winner of the prestigious Galing Pook Awards 2023, specifically cited for being a "comprehensive and balanced conflict resolution mechanism for Muslims." Since 1993, the Galing Pook Awards have annually recognized excellent programs of local government units through a multilevel selection process and competitive national search (Carizo et al. 2024). On 16 September 2023, SAB was one of the 10 awardees from a pool of 17 finalists. At this 30th anniversary of the Galing Pook Awards, there were 166 nominees from across the Philippines, commendable for several dominant themes (notably, agriculture, food security, environment, climate change adaptation, health, and social welfare). All of them showcase "the enduring spirit of innovation and community-driven solutions," as well as "the remarkable evolution and resilience of local governance" (Galing Pook 2023).

SAB was created by virtue of City Ordinance number 55, series of 2018, through a consultative process among stakeholders, designating the Office of the Mayor's Integrated Cultural Communities Affairs Division (CMO-ICCAD) as its main implementer. The ordinance's rationale is premised on the collective observation that there has been an absence of a dedicated Shari'a court for adjudicating legal disputes between the city's Muslim constituency. As a result, whenever there was a need to mediate disputes, Muslims would resort to non-formal means of arbitration, which are costly and time-consuming. They would first turn to the *Kadatuan* (traditional Moro leaders), whose services come at a cost. As fees are levied for facilitation work, the aggrieved parties were often left with a portion of the settlement. If the party disagreed with the arbitrator's decision, they sought redress from other avenues, such as religious authorities or other instrumentalities. Cases related to personal and civil laws were lodged with Islamic scholars, who provided resolutions based on their interpretation of the teachings of Islam in the Holy Qur'an and the Hadith. However, the scope of this channel is limited and overlooks certain matters – including those related to marital, family, household, and land issues – which require formal court scrutiny, decision, and action.

To address these existing shortcomings, the SAB program has been designed as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism. Guided by Islamic Jurisprudence, the Code of Muslim Personal

Laws, and Moro customs and traditions, it is geared to satisfy the actual governance needs for justice in the day-to-day life of the Muslim community in the city. Parties that need mediation may seek SAB's services cost-free, without any financial burden on them. SAB resolves disputes through amicable settlement, considering specific circumstances and the perspectives of clients to find the most feasible and acceptable solutions. It provides a platform for open dialogue to attain peace within households and communities, covering various social issues, including those related to marriage, divorce, claims for dower (*mahr*), betrothal, property relations between husband and wife, as well as conflicts over land and community leadership. A key objective is to fairly and promptly resolve conflicts affecting the social lives of individuals and the well-being of the community to prevent escalation into violence.

4. SAB's Notable Accomplishments and Promising Innovations[1]

The SAB program has made significant strides in creating public value through its innovative and culturally appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms. Its notable accomplishments and promising innovations excel in five key criteria: effectiveness with a view to results and impacts; promotion of people's empowerment and participation; legal alignment, organizational innovation, and local adaptation; sustainability of the program and resiliency of the office infrastructure; and efficiency of service delivery and transferability. These defining characteristics and compelling features of SAB were also noted in the Galing Pook recognition

4.1 Effectiveness: Results and Impacts

The effectiveness of SAB has been demonstrated not only in terms of expenditure for the government and cost for individual citizens, but also in its practical resolution of conflicts within GenSan's Muslim community. As of 20 May 2023, it had successfully settled 352 cases. Through effective organization and communication, SAB is achieving desired outcomes, producing results with invaluable societal impacts without costing a lot of money for the city government.

Since its inception on 1 July 2019 with an initial budget of PHP 454,800, the SAB has been proactive in addressing cases as soon as they are brought forward. The project coordinator prioritizes cases requiring immediate intervention. In contrast to the Shari'a courts, where filing a simple case can cost clients between PHP 40,000 and PHP 60,000, SAB resolves cases free of charge. This substantial cost-saving aspect is a major benefit for the community. For instance, with 423 cases filed, the total amount saved by clients, who would otherwise spend PHP 40,000 per case in formal courts, amounts to PHP 16,920,000. The government's spending on the program is roughly PHP 5 million over five years, yet the value of services provided translates to PHP 14,080,000, reflecting a return on investment of 281.6%.[2]

1　Notes and data from this section are sourced from documents provided by General Santos City's CMO-ICCAD and from expert interviews.

2　Currency conversion: 1 Euro is around 60 Philippine pesos (PHP).

More than the value that SAB generates from optimizing resources in delivering results, its effectiveness and success can be largely attributed to its organizational configuration that inspires public trust. For every case accepted, it conscientiously mobilizes a mediation team composed of a Shari'a counselor, an Islamic scholar, and a *Kadatuan*. Led by the Shari'a Action Officer, the team is carefully selected to competently advise and work with disputants through the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, Islamic Jurisprudence, and Moro customary law. The team's optimal composition paves the way for efficient management. Dialogues are often scheduled within a week after filing, unlike the lengthy waits in formal courts.

Before mediation, clients undergo counseling sessions to understand the root causes of their problems and the relevant laws. During mediation, efforts are made to diffuse tensions and restore relationships among disputants, a process not typically emphasized in court settlements. Recognizing that most cases involve marital conflicts, SAB ensures the protection of Muslim women's rights, financial support for children of divorced couples, observance of visitation rights, and fair property division according to Islamic or customary law.

Having a marriage certificate is one basic right that married Muslim couples have often been denied. An additional service of SAB is in response to this problem by facilitating the registration of marriages. From 2021 to 2023, it has assisted in the processing of delayed registrations for 827 couples and 347 conversions.

To enlarge its reach and maintain public's trust in quality service, SAB strategically communicates stories of successful mediation through its Facebook page, the most used social media platform in the country. Occasionally, the Facebook posts of resolved cases, often using the hashtag #ShariaInAction, include relevant reminders on the pillars and teachings of Islam (Shari'a Atas Bitiara Program n.d.). To illustrate the effectiveness of the SAB program, consider examples or scenarios of pragmatic and faith-based actions on prominent cases related to marital and land issues.

In one instance, a marriage problem may involve a wife seeking SAB's help due to her husband's neglect and failure to provide financial support. The mediation team could guide the couple through the process, resulting in the husband agreeing to provide regular financial support. Such resolution cares for the well-being of the wife and children, restoring stability and hope for the family.

A distressed beneficiary of SAB activity might express relief and gratitude for the support received. In a case of separation or divorce, women – particularly mothers – could feel a sense of compassion and professionalism from the counselors and mediators, who guide them through the process with respect for their customs. As a result, they could have some peace knowing their rights are upheld and their children's welfare is protected, such as through co-parenting and visitation arrangements for fathers to improve the father–child relationship.

Another case may involve two families in conflict over a piece of land that both claimed as their ancestral property. Due to intense anger between the parties, SAB mediators may resort to shuttle mediation by communicating separately with each family. Through careful negotiation and reference to Moro customary law, the team may facilitate an agreement to respect new boundaries where the land would be divided equitably. By this way of resolution,

the escalation of conflict into violence can be prevented, and a notion of fairness and reciprocity is enabled.

A family feud involving two brothers disputing over their late father's estate provides another illustration. The SAB team can offer counseling to help them understand the applicable laws and the importance of family unity. Through mediation, the brothers can reach an agreement on the division of the estate that honors their father's wishes and maintains family relations. Such resolution settles a legal dispute, heals the rift between the brothers, and allows them to support each other moving forward.

Timely resolution of a land dispute that causes tremendous stress would be appreciated by conflicting parties and valuable for the larger community. SAB's intervention is capable of not only resolving conflicts but also restoring harmony within the community, demonstrating the program's effectiveness in keeping social cohesion.

4.2 Promotion of People's Empowerment and Participation

The establishment of SAB was done through the city council's legislation and policy-making procedure. The democratic process followed comprehensive public hearings that included consultations with Muslim religious and community leaders. Their reflections and suggestions were incorporated into the ordinance. Hence, SAB's legislative basis is well-aligned with the lived experiences, needs, and expectations of the community.

Muslim constituents actively participate in the workings of SAB by encouraging disputing parties, especially those who feel aggrieved, within their communities to bring their cases forward. This grassroots involvement has greatly contributed to the program's growing popularity and commendation. The SAB Consultative Body has been particularly effective in resolving or helping to settle differences among conflicting parties, leading to wider acceptance and support within the Muslim community.

Influential figures from the city's masjids, communities, and civil society organizations are credible messengers for information dissemination about SAB's activities. Their collective efforts are aimed at sustaining peace within Muslim communities. Moreover, the GenSan office of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) has also been endorsing cases filed in their office to the SAB. The NCMF is an attached government agency with regional offices under the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) with a mandate to preserve and cultivate the culture, traditions, and institutions of Muslim Filipinos. The cooperation of SAB with the NCMF-GenSan and other partners broadens the program's reach, making services more accessible to everyone, regardless of their status in life. Whether a party is the complainant or respondent, their mutual rights are respected, and their obligations are justly set.

4.3 Legal Alignment, Organizational Innovation, and Local Adaptation

The SAB program exemplifies a blending of innovative organizational practices with legal compliance and local adaptation. It complies with Section 16 of Republic Act (RA) 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, which mandates that local government units exercise powers necessary for efficient and effective governance and the promotion of general welfare. It also complements RA 9285, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, which promotes party autonomy in dispute resolution and encourages the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to achieve speedy and impartial justice and reduce court dockets. In accordance with these statutes, the GenSan city government passed the SAB Ordinance, establishing the program as an innovative project. By aligning with national laws, SAB's operations are legally sound and supportive of broader governance goals.

At the same time, SAB introduces unique elements that are sensitive to social dimensions of culture and gender, thus distinguishing it from other conflict resolution mechanisms. Building on its tacit cultural instinct, SAB integrates key personalities in its mediation processes. Although there may be similarities in other local governments, GenSan's SAB uniquely brings together three groups – *Kadatuan*, Shari'a Lawyers, and Islamic Scholars – to help settle conflicts. Disputes in Muslim communities are often settled by Moro traditional leaders (*Kadatuan*), who apply arbitration based on Moro customary law. SAB enhances this approach by also applying Presidential Decree (PD) 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Shari'a law in the Philippines), which governs the affairs of Muslim Filipinos. SAB has facilitated advocacy on PD 1083 in Muslim communities and among barangay chairpersons, helping them understand Islamic institutions and the legal system of Muslims as part of Philippine law.

A refreshing and peculiar characteristic of SAB's organizational structure and relations is its apparent regard for gender inclusion, particularly women's representation. Traditionally, mediators are usually men; however, in SAB, the Shari'a Action Officer is a woman, and there are other women mediators to make sure that all rights are protected.

Related to the need for professional counseling on marriage issues and community support to family life is the recognition that many Muslim clients need to be more knowledgeable about Islamic jurisprudence. For example, it has been observed that incorrect divorce procedures are sometimes applied by other arbitral bodies. SAB addresses these inadequacies and tendencies by conducting follow-up activities such as *kumustahan* (check-ins) and *da'wah* or moral values lectures, especially if one of the parties is not complying with the signed agreement. SAB has also become an avenue for fathers to hand over support to their children, which proves convenient for former spouses residing far away from each other. Likewise, the SAB Consultative Body contemplates a plan to encourage all Imams and Solemnizing Officers to require would-be-married Muslim men and women to undergo pre-marriage counsel based on Islamic law. This orientation would provide knowledge about marriage in Islam, the rights of husbands and wives, and how to avoid family disintegration.

No other local government unit has implemented a project of this kind with such coherence in legal, cultural, social, and organizational aspects of service delivery. Among its many noteworthy features in effective local governance, it can be said that the GenSan city's

SAB program observes both needs-based and rights-based approaches to development programming.

4.4 Sustainability of the Program and Resiliency of the Office Infrastructure

Having been institutionalized through an ordinance, SAB has become a key division of the city mayor's office. The ordinance provides a stable foundation for SAB, in which the structure of CMO-ICCAD includes the IP (Indigenous Peoples) Development Program and the Moro Development Program. This institutionalization process increases the certainty of the program's continuity, regardless of changes in mayoral leadership, unless it is repealed by another democratically scrutinized policy.

All cases filed with SAB are meticulously documented, with complaint forms, attached documents, settlement agreements, and promissory notes compiled and kept intact. The thorough documentation procedure warrants transparency and accountability. Given its successful implementation and contribution to the overall peaceful situation in the city, it is highly unlikely that local officials would abrogate the program.

In compliance with the local government's Quality Management System, SAB operates within an established process flow that guides CMO-ICCAD personnel and clients. As a major project component of CMO-ICCAD, second only to the Madaris for Peace Project, SAB receives an annual budget appropriation. This budget covers operational costs, including provisional fees for the members of the SAB Consultative Body, as stipulated in the ordinance. The program is included in the Program, Projects, and Activities and the Annual Investment Plan, thus with the assurance of adequate funding each year.

The 13 members of the SAB Consultative Body, who regularly receive monetary honorariums, constantly reflect on ways to facilitate a more efficient budget liquidation. SAB's financial stability supports ongoing operations and its ability to provide free services to the community.

Furthermore, the built environment of the SAB office, including the hardy infrastructure supporting it, is vital for sustainability in a calamity-prone area. The CMO-ICCAD office, a newly constructed two-storey building, is engineered to withstand earthquakes and is located in a flood-free area. All staff are trained to respond to fires and other disasters with the safety of clients during emergencies in mind. In the event of an epidemic recurrence, SAB can continue its operations by utilizing larger facilities, such as the gymnasium behind the CMO-ICCAD building, to allow for physical distancing. During the COVID-19 pandemic, SAB adapted by offering online consultations and counseling, providing uninterrupted services through phone calls and online chats. The building's design, with glass windows allowing natural ventilation and light, also supports operations whenever power outages occur.

During mediation sessions at the office, a safe environment for conflict resolution is ensured with the presence of security personnel. This is to manage the risk and potential of violent confrontations between conflicting parties. If a dialogue cannot be completed in one sitting, additional meetings are scheduled promptly, with up to three attempts before referring the case to an appropriate agency.

The predictability of SAB's sustainability can also be ascertained in cultural and political spheres. Culturally, SAB addresses concerns about the preservation of Moro customs and traditions by including *Kadatuan* in the consultative body. This inclusion suggests that customary practices are respected and integrated into conflict resolution processes, provided they align with public welfare. Politically, SAB enjoys support across different administrations because of its proven importance for local peace and order. It operates independently of political influences, initiated by the previous administration (Mayor Ronnel Rivera) and sustained by the incumbent administration (Mayor Lorelie Pacquiao).

In summary, the resilience of the infrastructure and sustainability of the SAB program are evident in its well-designed facilities, adaptive operational strategies, and strong cultural and political foundations. These elements collectively signify that the program can continue to provide vital conflict resolution services under various challenging circumstances.

4.5 Efficiency of Service Delivery and Transferability

SAB's organizational structure is well-defined to deliver services efficiently and effectively. The program is headed by the Shari'a Action Officer, supported by two technical staff members who handle client interactions, record complaints, schedule mediation sessions, document proceedings, prepare agreements, and maintain records for safekeeping. Unlike the perennial delays and red tape in trial courts, SAB tries to immediately intervene in conflicts, as early as a week after a case is filed.

Mediators facilitate the mediation sessions, providing counseling and ensuring that the parties understand and comply with the agreements reached. Compliance is monitored by the staff, who provide clients with contact numbers to report any violations. If a party fails to comply with the agreement, SAB will summon the violating party for further action.

The performance of the SAB program is evaluated annually. The members of the consultative body convene at the end of each year to review cases, identify challenges, gather feedback, and develop action plans to address any issues encountered. This systematic evaluation process ensures continuous improvement and adaptation.

The success of the SAB program has inspired other communities and local government units to adopt similar initiatives. For instance, the Muslim community leaders of Barangay Siguel in GenSan have requested a copy of the Shari'a Atas Bitiara Ordinance and localized the project in their barangay, calling it *Walay na Bitiara*. Similarly, Barangay Fatima has adopted a conflict resolution mechanism through its own Muslim Affairs Office and submits their accomplishments to the SAB.

Since 2020, various local government offices and officials from provinces, cities, and municipalities in Mindanao – such as Sultan Kudarat, Davao Oriental, Cotabato, and Sarangani – have visited, contacted, and consulted with SAB. Their goal was to study, learn, and benchmark the SAB program and other initiatives for Muslims in GenSan, with the intention of lesson-drawing and replicating good practices in their respective localities. In

Glan, Sarangani Province, a Shari'a settlement under its Office on Muslim Affairs is being implemented, initiated by SAB's former member, a Shari'a Counselor.

When SAB received the Galing Pook Award in 2023, its popularity attracted attention and interest from national and international organizations. It has been featured in the media, and university managers, teachers, and students have shown interest in studying it through visits, research, and interviews. The SAB program was also presented by GenSan city officials at a workshop organized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a model for preventing and countering violent extremism. The CMO-ICCAD has welcomed study visits and accepted invitations from other local government units, extending their willingness to guide and support those interested in learning about SAB and its potential for emulation in other communities.

The efficiency in service delivery and transferability of the SAB program is evident. These are manifested in its structured approach, systematic evaluation, and the interest it has garnered from several sectors and locales. SAB has been both efficient and effective, proving its capacity to serve as a model for conflict resolution and community empowerment.

5. Indigenous Bangsamoro Traditions in Resolving Disputes

In the usual way, storytelling from mainstream news and public appreciation tend to depict SAB's excellence vis-à-vis the criteria of the Galing Pook Award. Yet, beyond and beneath the narratives of success based on SAB's effectiveness, innovation, resiliency, sustainability, efficiency, and transferability is the program's indigenous Islamic foundation.

The ideas of the SAB program are deeply rooted in Bangsamoro traditions of dispute resolution. The mechanisms that underpin SAB today are path-dependent and have a long history within Mindanao's Muslim population, often predating colonial or external legal systems. In comparison with "Western" liberal philosophy in the administration of justice, SAB is characterized by several distinctive features.

First, the principles of SAB are embedded in cultural and spiritual beliefs that are perceived as fair, just, and effective. Unlike punitive systems, SAB focuses on healing and reconciliation rather than punishment and retribution. This restorative justice approach aims to repair harm and restore relationships between individuals and within the community. SAB promotes the goal of peace through social cohesion while maintaining cultural identity and autonomy. Punitive measures such as imprisonment and fines are secondary to reconciliation and community well-being. Although in some instances an imposition of penalty may entail monetary indemnification such as "blood money" for damages, harm, or loss, these can be construed not merely as material compensation but as a deeper symbolic and religious act toward the path to forgiveness, mercy, and moving on in life (Torres 2014).

Moreover, SAB addresses the broader social, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of conflicts, aiming to rebuild interpersonal relationships and uproot systemic injustices. The program recognizes the interconnectedness of individuals, families, communities, and the natural

world. There is often a deep connection to land, sacred sites, natural resources, and the ecology, which is integral to the Bangsamoro way of life. In essence, SAB's approach is holistic, considering the entire context of the conflict and the well-being of the community. This method not only resolves disputes but also strengthens the social fabric. At the same time, justice is served in a manner that is culturally and spiritually fulfilling.

5.1 Historical Context and Cultural Practices

SAB's mechanisms are organic to the cultural traditions, customs, and values of GenSan's Muslim community. In general, various indigenous communities in the Philippines have passed down traditional dispute settlement methods to future generations as part of their cultural heritage (Ragandang 2017). In Muslim Mindanao, peaceful conflict resolution processes are known by different names, yet a common feature is the important role played by leadership and the council of elders (Datumanong et al. 2013).

The community elders or members of the *Bitiara*, who mediate disputes and form decision-making bodies, are selected based on their lineage and experience in resolving conflict. They are perceived as wise and impartial authorities. Traditional leaders exercise authority and possess knowledge of customary laws to facilitate reconciliation and prevent escalation. The work of these trusted leaders and elders emphasizes dialogue and mutual understanding to restore community harmony. Founded on the community's cultural and spiritual beliefs, the communication process through consensus guarantees that resolutions are respected and upheld by all parties involved.

Although indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms may seem rigid, the SAB experience demonstrates adaptability to changing social, political, and environmental contexts. The actions and decisions of SAB mediators are grounded in local customs and Islamic teachings; hence, they are culturally appropriate and spiritually accepted. The involvement of elders lends credibility and legitimacy to the process to foster trust and cooperation among disputing parties.

5.2 Integration of Modern Elements

The City of General Santos is one of the more recent local government units that integrated indigenous Islamic tradition into its formal governance institution. Particularly in the Muslim Mindanao region, hybrid mechanisms that institutionalize Moro customary methods in municipal policies, combining traditional and mainstream approaches to resolving conflicts and providing spaces for peace, have already been in place. These can be observed, for example, in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, and Sulu (Torres 2014).

Operating against the background of the country's liberal-democratic constitution and statutes, the city's SAB program has integrated modern socio-legal elements without compromising cultural integrity. This includes embedding human rights and gender sensitivity in decision-making processes, alongside the utilization of technology in its public relations.

For instance, women mediators are included to ensure that the rights of all parties, especially women and children, are protected. The prominence of women mediators and beneficiaries is also observable in SAB's online communication.

The inclusion of women as managers and mediators is a substantive innovation in Muslim community governance. Perspectives and rights of women are recognized, increasing guarantees for a more representative and equitable resolution. In marital disputes, the presence of a female mediator would help the wife to feel more comfortable and supported. In land dispute cases, mediators enforce property rights in accordance with both Islamic principles and liberal standards.

6. Islamic Concepts: Shura, Sulh, and Tahkim

In contemporary law studies and practice, the SAB program can be categorized as an ADR mechanism, focused on the civil justice system where compromise is preferred over litigation. Although the success and increasing legitimacy of SAB are attributable to the efficiency, simplicity, and cost-effectiveness of similar ADRs globally, it is important to recognize that the guiding principles of SAB's existence and operation take inspiration from Islamic civilization, which predates Western colonialism of Asian and African legal systems (Hassan 2006; Rashid 2012). From its conception and formation to implementation and evaluation, SAB has embodied and exhibited key concepts from Islam – notably, consultation (*shura*), conciliation (*sulh*), and arbitration (*tahkim*).

6.1 Shura (Consultation)

Mutual consultation, or *shura*, in a participatory manner has been integral to the planning, formulation, and promotion of SAB as a trustworthy institution. Established through the city government's legislative branch based on an actual need and demand to solve a social problem involving Muslim communities, it has undergone a thorough public hearing process. The program's primary stakeholders, especially the Muslim religious and community leaders, were duly consulted. Their invaluable participation and Islam-informed suggestions shape the spirit and letter of the ordinance.

The SAB processes of institution-building and trust-building are inclusive and consultative efforts. Part of SAB's takeoff involved a series of collaborative reflection and visioning activities of the city government with civil society organizations and other concerned groups. In its first month, the city's CMO-ICCAD organized the "Forum on Traditional Justice System," which, inter alia, led to the formation of an advisory body, the "Muslim Religious Council," composed of *Ulamas* or scholars who graduated from local and foreign Islamic educational institutions (Kinjiyo 2019).

The capability of SAB's Consultative Body to effectively resolve conflicts and settle differences is credited for its growing acceptance. Rather than being perceived as an intimidating venue, SAB is promoted as a welcoming and encouraging space for prospective clients. Word of mouth from the network of groups who partook in its institutionalization contributed to the legitimation of this mechanism. Imams from local masjids, Moro traditional leaders, non-governmental organizations, and voluntary associations and civic activists all play crucial roles in disseminating information about the services offered by SAB in line with their common goal to sustain peace and harmony within Muslim communities.

Knowledge about SAB, as well as its scope and jurisdiction, is expanded by its links to other government units and agencies. The NCMF and the *Lupong Tagapamayapa* of Muslim-dominated barangays in GenSan endorse cases they deem appropriate for SAB to hear. The NCMF, formerly under the supervision of the Cabinet Secretary of the Office of the President before it was relegated to department-level bureaucracy, has a statutory mandate to promote the rights and welfare of Muslim Filipinos as citizens of the republic. The *Lupong Tagapamayapa*, or Pacification Committee, is a village council of citizens established to reduce the caseload of lower courts by effecting extrajudicial settlement of minor cases between neighbors and community residents. There is a conciliation body in each *lupon* (committee) whose main function is to bring together in dialogue opposing parties and effect amicable settlement of differences. While said committee does not have a punitive mandate, its decision is binding.

To further enhance outreach, SAB maintains an active social media presence. Its Facebook page posts regular updates on conducted mediations and relevant news. This communication strategy promotes greater awareness and participation in the program, reaching out to potential clients, especially the needy and indigent persons.

6.2 Sulh (Conciliation) and Tahkim (Arbitration)

The communication materials used by CMO-ICCAD to introduce SAB to the public emphasize SAB's mission consistent with Islamic teachings on the virtues of conciliation and arbitration (Shari'a Atas Bitiara n.d.). First, "Islam teaches that there is an excellent reward for those who facilitate reconciliation between disputing parties." Second, "The best among you are those who bring the most benefit to others."

For Muslims, reconciling people is a virtue. Reconciliation means resolving disputes, mending relationships, and restoring harmony among individuals or groups. It is about finding a middle ground and encouraging conflicting parties to compromise for the sake of unity. This is considered a virtue in Islam because it aligns with the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet on the importance of unity and brotherhood among Muslims.

There is a connection between reconciliation and the broader principles of faith in Islam (Othman 2007; Al-Ramahi 2008). These principles include sincerity, honesty, and goodwill. Sincerity refers to the purity of intention in one's actions, honesty involves speaking the truth and being trustworthy, while goodwill is about wishing and doing well for others. These

principles are not only virtuous in themselves but they also guide Muslims in their interactions with others and with Allah.

The Prophet is quoted as saying, "Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise." This *hadith* underlines the value of honesty, which is seen as a pathway to righteousness and ultimately, to Paradise. In the context of reconciliation, honesty could involve admission of mistakes, being truthful in dealings, and upholding justice. In other words, the act of reconciling conflicting people is not only about resolving disputes but also about living with the values of sincerity, honesty, and goodwill, and striving for righteousness and unity in conformity with the teachings of Islam.

SAB is also informed by the Islamic concept of arbitration, known as *tahkim*. SAB's conflict resolution mechanism involves a third party taking responsibility for evaluating a dispute and deciding upon the correct outcome. This ensures an impartial decision-making process coherent with the principles of good governance, fairness, and justice (Jamal 2018). Consistent with *tahkim*, SAB aims for both efficiency and effectiveness, resolving conflicts in a timely manner and thus contributing to society's cohesiveness. Moreover, the process of *tahkim* in SAB helps build trust and confidence among the public. The credibility of the administration is enhanced when disputes are resolved fairly and transparently. By adopting the concepts of *sulh* and *tahkim* in the SAB program, this increases the social legitimacy of GenSan's justice system for Muslim communities, where these Islamic principles and jurisprudence are highly regarded.

7. Conclusion

The rationale and performance of the SAB program in General Santos City exemplify how indigenous Islamic practices can be effectively integrated into public value creation through conflict resolution (Drechsler 2013, 2025; Juego 2023). Rooted in the rich cultural and spiritual traditions of the Bangsamoro people, SAB has demonstrated remarkable success in promoting social cohesion and enhancing the well-being of the community. The SAB case exhibits an actuality – and a further potentiality – of a non-Western paradigm of local governance, specifically an Islamic public administration in practice, with its distinct ways of effective service delivery and legitimate goals in addressing social needs (Drechsler and Chafik 2022; Drechsler et al. 2024).

Through its emphasis on consultation (*shura*), conciliation (*sulh*), and arbitration (*tahkim*), SAB has established a conflict resolution mechanism that is not only operationally efficient and pragmatically effective but also culturally relevant and widely accepted. The program's focus on restorative justice, healing, and reconciliation over punitive measures underscores its commitment to attaining social peace and community harmony.

SAB's notable accomplishments in conflict resolution, cultural relevance, inclusivity, sustainability, and societal impact highlight the administrative capacity and transformative power of a religion-based innovative institution of local governance. By targeting the underlying causes of conflicts and forging dialogue, SAB has been able to prevent the escalation of

disputes and promote a sense of justice and mutual respect among the city's multicultural communities. The integration of modern elements, such as human rights considerations, gender sensitivity, and the use of technology, has further enhanced SAB's effectiveness and relevance. These innovations demonstrate SAB's adaptability and its potential to serve as a model for other local government units seeking to implement similar initiatives. The adaptiveness and resiliency of SAB also signify that it possesses "agile stability," a dynamic yet stable program, whose robust management capability and future sustainability draw from its competent organizational configuration that enjoys broad socio-cultural legitimacy (Kattel et al. 2019).

Indeed, the SAB program stands as a testament to the enduring value of indigenous conflict resolution practices in contemporary governance. Its success story offers valuable lessons for public administrators and policymakers on the importance of culturally sensitive approaches to conflict management. Founded on the Islamic concepts of *shura*, *sulh*, and *tahkim*, and integrating traditional practices with modern elements, SAB has not only resolved conflicts but also strengthened communal bonds, promoted social justice, and contributed to the condition of peace in GenSan. As such, it serves as an inspiring example of how indigenous Islamic principles can be harnessed within an institutional governance framework to create public value and enhance the quality of life for all community members.

The SAB template may launch a positive ripple effect on identical contexts. Like other effective service delivery programs of Muslim Filipino communities based on indigenous Islamic cooperative institutions, SAB remains to be a small bright patch in the conflict-ridden landscape and underdeveloped region of Mindanao, let alone in the periphery of the Philippines' historical structure of maldevelopment. Still, the SAB experience of the City Government of General Santos offers a compelling lesson for the responsive local governance of a multi-ethnic constituency: There cannot be meaningful peaceful coexistence, cultural flourishing, economic development, and social change without good public administration.

Acknowledgments

References

Abinales, Patricio, N. 2020. *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Alonto, Roberto M. 2016. "Deconstructing the Concept of "Nation-State" from the Perspective of the Bangsamoro." *Philippine Sociological Review* 64, 169–186. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45014293

Al-Ramahi, Aseel. 2008. *Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration*. LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2008.

Canuday, Jose Jowel and Joselito Sescon. 2022. *Transfiguring Mindanao: A Mindanao Reader*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Carizo, Jay A., Georgina Ann Hernandez-Yang and Ador R. Torneo. 2024. *Locating the Models of Good Governance: A Tracer Study on the Galing Pook Awardees and their LCEs*. Manila: Galing Pook Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and De La Salle University.

Datumanong, Abubakar Mastura et al. 2013. *Resolving Conflict in Muslim Mindanao: Showcasing Four Traditional Methods*. Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. https://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/publications/browse/resolving-conflict-in-muslim-mindanao-showcasing-four-traditional-methods/

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2025. "Rebuilding with Care: Keys for Good Post-Conflict Public Administration." *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy* 18(1).

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2015. "Paradigms of Non-Western Public Administration and Governance." In Massey, Andrew and Karen Johnston (eds.). *The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 104-132.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2013. "Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic." S*ociety and Economy* 35(3), 319-342. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43773764

Drechsler, Wolfgang and Salah Chafik. 2022. "Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice." *The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy* 15(2), 52-70. doi: https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2022-0013

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Rainer Kattel and Salah Chafik. 2024. "Islamic Public Administration and Islamic Public Value: Towards a Research Agenda." *Public Policy and Administration* 39(4), 608-624. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767231201799

Durante, Ofelia et al. 2014. "Management of Clan Conflict and Rido Among the Tausug, Magindanao, Maranao, Sama, and Yakan Tribes." In Torres, W. (ed.) *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 90-117.

Esman, Milton J. 1997. "Public Administration, Ethnic Conflict, and Economic Development." Public Administration Review 57(6), 527-533. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/976964

Galing Pook. 2023. *Finalists Unveiled for the 2023 Galing Pook Awards: Spotlight on Leveling Up Local Governance Innovations Towards Building Resilient Communities.* Galing Pook Foundation. Retrieved on 16 May 2024, from https://www.galingpook.org/blog/finalists-unveiled-for-the-2023-galing-pook-awards-spotlight-on-leveling-up-local-governance-innovations-towards-building-resilient-communities/

Hassan, Kamal H. 2006. "Employment Dispute Resolution Mechanism from the Islamic Perspective." *Arab Law Quarterly* 20(2), 181-207. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/026805506777585658

Jamal, Arif A. 2018. "ADR and Islamic Law: The Cases of the UK and Singapore." In Hosen, Nadirsyah (ed.). *Research Handbook on Islamic Law and Society*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 120-138.

Juego, Bonn. 2023. "The Task of History. Contribution to GTI Forum 'Big History and Great Transition'." *Great Transition Initiative.* Retrieved on 20 September 2024, from https://greattransition.org/gti-forum/big-history-juego

Kattel, Rainer, Wolfgang Drechsler and Erkki Karo. 2019. *"Innovation Bureaucracies: How Agile Stability Creates the Entrepreneurial State."* UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, Working Paper Series (IIPP WP 2019-12). https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/wp2019-12

Kinjiyo, Gandhi. 2019, July 24. "Muslim Religious Council Formed in Gensan." Luwaran. Retrieved on 5 May 2024 from https://www.luwaran.com/news/article/1856/muslim-religious-council-formed-in-gensan

Kothari, Ashish et al. (eds). 2019. *Pluriverse: A Post-Development Dictionary*. New Delhi: Tulika Books.

Lan, Zhiyong. 1997. "A Conflict Resolution Approach to Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 57(1), 27-35. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/976689

Lara, Francisco J. 2014. *Insurgents, Clans, and States: Political Legitimacy and Resurgent Conflict in Muslim Mindanao, Philippines*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Lara, Francisco and Steven Schoofs (eds). 2016. *Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Macabuac-Ferolin, Maria Cecilia and Norma V. Constantino. 2014. "Localizing Transformation: Addressing Clan Feuds in Mindanao Through PCIA." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 9(1), 10-25. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2014.894404

Othman, Aida. 2007. "And Amicable Settlement Is Best ': Sulḥ and Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law." *Arab Law Quarterly* 21(1), 64-90. doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27650573

Philippine Statistics Authority. 2023. "*Religious Affiliation in the Philippines (2020 Census of Population and Housing).*" Retrieved on 16 May 2024, from https://psa.gov.ph/content/religious-affiliation-philippines-2020-census-population-and-housing

Ragandang, Primitivo. 2017. "Philippines: The Indigenous Conflict Resolution Practices of the Higaunon Tribe." *Conflict Studies Quarterly* 19, 65-84. doi: https://doi.org/10.24193/csq.23.4

Rashid, Syed Khalid. 2004. "Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Context of Islamic Law." *The Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration* 8(1), 95-118. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149550

Shari'a Atas Bitiara Program. (n.d.). *Home [Shari'a Atas Bitiara Program]*. Facebook. Retrieved on 19 November 2024, from https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064698188355

Torres, Wilfredo M. (ed). 2014. *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Villano-Campado, Andrea. 2007. *The Tuna Country at the Southern Edge of Mindanao: General Santos City 1939-2000*. Cotabato City: Notre Dame University.

World Bank. 2017. *Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity*. A report submitted by the WB-IOM technical team to the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), World Bank.

Bonn Juego (bonn.juego@jyu.fi) is a Senior Lecturer in International Development Studies at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He is the current Chair of the Finnish Society for Development Research. Before joining academia, he worked for civil society organizations; he also served the Philippine government as a researcher and later as Director II – Chief of the Legislative Staff – of the Office of the Deputy Speaker for Mindanao in the House of Representatives, addressing peace and development issues for Muslim Filipinos.

Muss Lidasan (mslidasan@addu.edu.ph) is the Executive Director of the Al Qalam Institute at the Ateneo de Davao University in Mindanao, Philippines. A former Member of Parliament of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (2019–2022), he also served as Commissioner of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (2017–2019). He is a columnist and contributor to several media outlets, notably SunStar Davao and MindaNews.

Islamic Public Values in Action: Learning from Nagari Minangkabau's Approach to Public Governance

RIO YUSRI MAULANA AND MOH. ARIEF RAKHMAN, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITAS JAMBI, JAMBI, INDONESIA

MHD. ALFAHJRI SUKRI, DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT, MAHMUD YUNUS ISLAMIC STATE UNIVERSITY BATUSANGKAR, WEST SUMATRA, INDONESIA

Abstract

This study explores the *Nagari* as an indigenous institution within the Minangkabau culture of West Sumatra, Indonesia, emphasizing its role in governance and decision-making processes. Characterized by unique customs and autonomy, the Nagari functions as a self-governing entity that harmonizes traditional Minangkabau customs with Islamic values. Through ethnographic fieldwork conducted from July to November 2023 in three Nagari – Sumpur, Taram, and Pasilihan – data were gathered through observations and interviews with community leaders. The findings reveal that decision-making is primarily achieved through *musyawarah* (consensus deliberation), ensuring inclusive participation and reflecting the community's values. The leadership structure, comprising kinship leaders, Islamic scholars, and knowledgeable individuals, fosters a balance between tradition and religion. This research highlights the significance of the Nagari as a model of effective governance that prioritizes community engagement and cultural identity, suggesting its resilience and adaptability in the face of contemporary challenges while providing insights into indigenous governance systems.

Keywords: Non-Western Public Administration (NWPA), Public Governance, Islamic Public Value, Indigenous Cooperative Institutions, Minangkabau.

Introduction

Indonesia is an archipelagic state, home to a multitude of ethnic groups, each with unique customs and cultural practices. These diverse communities are distributed across thousands of islands, both large and small, along the equatorial line from Sabang to Merauke. Among these ethnicities is the Minangkabau. The Minangkabau ethnic group is one of the largest in Indonesia, significantly dominating the West Sumatra region. According to the 2020 Indonesian Population Census, the Minangkabau population reached approximately 4,777,438 individuals in West Sumatra. Their cultural uniqueness has persisted for centuries, with the earliest references to the name "Minangkabau" appearing in a list from the Majapahit kingdom in Java in 1365 AD, which detailed the main Malay rulers. This name reemerges in the Ming

Chronicles of 1405 and in the Nagarakartagama, a work by Mpu Prapanca in the Desawarna section (Robson 1995). This historical context suggests that the Minangkabau have been recognized as a highland community for over 600 years.

Characterized by a rich tapestry of customs and linguistic unity, the Minangkabau culture extends from the heart of the highland villages, known as Nagari-Nagari, in the Darek region to expansive territories across the island. In the eastern part of Sumatra, Minangkabau culture interacts and intertwines with that of the coastal Malay world, while to the south, the Minangkabau engage with the communities of Bengkulu and Jambi, influencing local politics and customs (Znoj 2001). Historically, the Minangkabau have garnered recognition for their democratic way of life, which emphasizes consensus-based decision-making and community engagement in resolving societal issues. The *Nagari*, as an institution, is not only a territorial entity but also a vital aspect of the Minangkabau's genealogical and cultural identity. It serves as both a governmental body and a principal social institution, often described as a "mini republic" due to its clear territorial boundaries and autonomous governance structures that regulate the lives of its members (Manan 1995). As a confederation of regions within the Minangkabau governance framework, the Nagari possesses the authority to manage its own affairs (Kato 1982).

In contemporary times, the Nagari system, rooted in Minangkabau customary law, has adapted to various political regimes in Indonesia, yet the core principles of governance and the integration of democratic values remain integral to the cultural fabric of Minangkabau society. Hasan (2004) discovered that the social capital embedded in Minangkabau culture, particularly democratic values, remains preserved within the structure of Nagari culture. However, certain governance challenges persist, namely: (1) Nagari bureaucrats issuing regulations that contradict traditional democratic principles, both in terms of institutional structures and decision-making processes and (2) the low economic status and educational level of the community, which often hinder participation in Nagari governance.

Theoretical Framework: Decision-Making in Non-Western Public Administration

Decision-making is a critical process in public governance, encompassing the selection of a behavioral alternative from multiple options. Terry (1971) defines decision-making as a conscious response to various alternatives, involving an analysis of their potential outcomes. Similarly, Siagian (2005) describes it as the process of gathering relevant data to inform a choice among available alternatives. This indicates that decision-making is intentional and requires careful consideration rather than arbitrary choice; it necessitates clear identification of the problem at hand and analysis of the best alternatives available.

The decision-making process serves several essential functions within the framework of public governance:

1. It marks the starting point for all directed human activities, whether undertaken individually or collectively.

2. It is inherently future-oriented, as decisions relate to anticipated outcomes and can have long-lasting effects.

Incorporating the decision-making processes grounded in consensus deliberation, as exemplified in the Minangkabau Nagari, enriches the understanding of non-Western public administration (NWPA). These processes underscore the integration of cultural values, ethical considerations, and communal engagement in public governance. By emphasizing deliberative decision-making as a fundamental aspect of governance, NWPA highlights the potential for diverse models that foster inclusive and contextually relevant practices in public administration, ultimately contributing to a more pluralistic understanding of governance in a global context.

Methods

In this research, we conducted ethnographic fieldwork in three Nagari – Sumpur, Taram, and Pasilihan – important traditional centers in the Minangkabau community of West Sumatra, Indonesia. We gathered data through observations, interviews, and external sources, as suggested by Sangasubana (2011). The data were then analyzed as case studies within their specific contexts (Hancock et al. 2021), and we examined how these Nagari shape Islamic public values through Minangkabau customs (Denzin 2015, 2017). The fieldwork lasted from July to November 2023, beginning with preliminary observations and followed by interviews with 13 community leaders, including *ninik mamak*, *cadiak pandai*, and *alim ulama* from the three Nagari (see chapter bibliography). We also held follow-up discussions via phone throughout the research period. Our focus was on the daily rituals and practices of the indigenous Minangkabau communities, which allowed us to understand the roles and responsibilities of community leaders. We explored how these communities blend traditional customs with Islamic values in their local governance. A key finding was the decision-making process through *musyawarah*, or consensus deliberation. This practice involves community members engaging in open discussions to reach collective agreements, ensuring that decisions reflect the community's values and needs. In summary, we found a harmonious integration of indigenous public values and Islamic teachings within the Nagari. Despite the usual research limitations, our study serves as an important first step in understanding indigenous institutions in West Sumatra and contributes to discussions about governance structures. We acknowledge these limitations and hope future research will build on our initial findings.

Results and Discussion

Nagari: Indigenous Institution with Special Recognition

"Cupak salingka batuang, adat salingka nagari; diasaknyo layua, kok dicabuiknyo mati; lain padang lain bilalang, lain lubuak lain ikannyo." [The customs of each Nagari are unique; if exchanged, they no longer hold, different grasslands, different locusts, different ponds, different fish]. The Nagari is governed by a centralized authority within the Nagari itself.

The introduction of Islam to Minangkabau has had a significant impact on various aspects of society, including public governance. Nagari represents the embodiment of the Minangkabau customary community structure, which is shaped by both blood relations (genealogical) and territorial similarities (Latief 2004). Sasmita (2010) defined Nagari as a self-governing institution with its own government, encompassing a unified community governed by comprehensive customary laws and regulations that oversee community life. Each Nagari possesses its own unique characteristics, including its customs and traditions, which cannot be imposed upon other Nagari. This concept is known as *Adat Salingka Nagari* (Asrinaldi and Yoserizal 2020). This is further reinforced by Effendi (2003), who emphasized that each Nagari has its own authority, independent of other Nagari. This autonomy is underscored by the expression "*lain lubuak lain ikannyo, lain ladang, lain bilalang; lain nagari, lain adaiknyo*" [different ponds have different fish, different fields, different locusts; different Nagari, different customs]. The conditions for the establishment of a Nagari include having four *suku* (clans), a mosque, a community hall, a burial ground, and so on.

Figure 1. Nagari organizational structure by key actors. Source: Own elaboration (2024).

In addition, Azwar et al. (2018) the lowest-level government institution in West Sumatra, serves as the foundation of governance for the Minangkabau ethnic group, granting them customary rights and autonomy. As illustrated in Figure 1, each actor within the Nagari structure holds distinct functions while working collaboratively to uphold and preserve Minangkabau traditions. Nagari is a traditional name and political unit of the Minangkabau socio-political organization (Asrinaldi and Yoserizal 2020; F. V. Benda-Beckmann and V. Benda-Beckmann 2012) and currently serves as the lowest level of government in West Sumatra. As a political entity, Nagari should be seen as a political institution that undergoes institutional dualism during its transformation; apart from being governed by plural regulations and laws (K. V.

Benda-Beckmann and V. Benda-Beckmann 2021), this transformation has led to an ambiguous division of responsibilities between the state and the Nagari, such as in the determination of inheritance and resource ownership.

The influence of Adat, Basandi Syarak, and Syarak, Basandi Kitabullah (ABS-SBK) on the structure of the Nagari is evident through the presence of the *Kerapatan Adat Nagari* (KAN), which includes several institutional elements,[1] namely *alim ulama* and *cadiak pandai*. These institutional elements generally function to absorb the aspirations of the community and convey them to the Nagari government. In addition, they have programs aligned with their respective functions. Apart from the Nagari government and KAN, some Nagari have another institution known as *Majelis Ulama Nagari* (MUNA). The existence of the *Majelis Ulama Nagari* results in its own interpretation of *Tungku Tigo Sajarangan*, where in Nagari Pasilihan and Taram, they interpret KAN as *Niniak Mamak*, MUNA as *Alim Ulama*, and Wali Nagari as *Cadiak Pandai*. In fulfilling their roles, all these institutions are based on the values of ABS-SBK.

In terms of social leadership within the Minangkabau community, the influence of Islam is evident in the structure of the *Tungku Tigo Sajarangan*, which consists of *Niniak Mamak* (kinship leaders), *Alim Ulama* (Islamic scholars), and *Cadiak Pandai* (intelligent and wise individuals). The leadership of *Niniak Mamak* is related to customs, represented by the proverb "*tinggi tampak jauah, gadang tampak dakek, ba padang laeh ba alam leba, nan tinggi dek dianjuang, nan gadang dek diambak*" [the tall can be seen from afar, the large can be seen from nearby, when high it is sought, when large it is supported]. The role of *Alim Ulama* is to guide and safeguard the community in their worldly and afterlife affairs according to Islamic teachings, symbolized by the proverb "*suluah dalam nagari, palito nan indak panah padam, nan manunjuak mengajari untuk bajalan luruih, bakato bana*" [in every village, a teacher who never fades, one who points out the right path, the guide]. The leadership of *Cadiak Pandai* is related to individuals who can solve problems together with *Niniak Mamak* and *Alim Ulama*. They are intelligent and clever in resolving community issues (Chlaudina 2021).

Decision-Making Process in Nagari

The concept of Nagari in Minangkabau culture, as described by various scholars, is a unique institution that serves both as a territorial and genealogical entity. According to Naim (1990), the Nagari is a microcosmic symbol of a broader macrocosmic order, functioning as a system that fulfills the embryonic requirements of a "state" in miniature form. This self-sustaining and autonomous system has often been referred to as "small republics" by foreign writers, given its ability to govern itself independently.

The Nagari is not merely a territorial unit but also a major social and governmental institution. It embodies the three main elements of governance – legislative, executive, and judicial – and serves as a holistic unity for various socio-cultural structures. The Nagari system, as an autonomous public entity, is likened to a mini-republic with clear territorial boundaries and its own government and customs that regulate the lives of its members (Manan 1995). Furthermore, it operates as a confederation of regions within the Minangkabau governance structure, with the authority to manage its own affairs (Kato 1982).

---

1   Not all KAN (*Kerapatan Adat Nagari*) in the Nagari have the same institutional elements. This is because each Nagari has its own customs according to the mutual customs of the Nagari. For example, in Nagari Taram, there is a KAN with its own independent structure comprising *Tuanku 21* (the head of the assembly), *Pegawai Adat* (customary officers), and *Dubalang* (village head).

Historically, the bond of Nagari in Minangkabau was not only primordial and consanguineal, rooted in regional and customary kinship ties, but also structurally functional in terms of effective territorial governance. Over time, the Nagari system, which is grounded in Minangkabau customary law, has undergone various modifications in response to the political regimes governing Indonesia. Despite these changes, the fundamental principles of the Nagari, such as its autonomous nature and the integration of democratic values, remain preserved within the broader cultural framework of Minangkabau society

The legal foundation of Minangkabau originates from the Marapalam Agreement, which took place in 1837 following the Padri War. In this agreement, *all adat* (customary law) leaders were gathered. They unanimously agreed that the Minangkabau ideology is *adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah*, which means that *adat* (custom) must conform to Islamic principles, signified by the phrase *syarak mangato, adat mamakai* (the law dictates, and the custom follows). This implies that if a custom is not aligned with Islamic law, the custom must adapt to Islamic concepts.

To execute activities within the Nagari (village community), Minangkabau has its own set of rules encapsulated in the legal framework known as *hukum adat salingka nagari* (translation in English). This legal framework is supported by several facilities, such as mosques and *balai* (council halls), which serve as decision-making venues in each Nagari. Before a legal decision is made in the *balairung* (council chamber), a deliberation process is conducted in the mosque or *surau* (prayer house), as reflected in the traditional saying: "*bulek kato dek mufakat, bulek aia dek pambuluah*" (consensus shapes words, as bamboo shapes water).

If the issue cannot be resolved in the *surau*, it is then brought to the *balai-balai*, and if no solution is found there, the case proceeds to court. These two places, the mosque and the *balairung*, are the main symbols of justice enforcement in a Nagari, often described with the phrase: "*camin nan tidak kabuah, palito nan tidak padam*" (a mirror that does not break, a flame that does not extinguish).

Furthermore, both institutions, especially the *surau*, play a crucial role in fostering a morally upright society in accordance with Islamic law. The *surau* serves not only as a place of worship but also as a center for conflict resolution. In the decision-making process, *adat* leaders or *penghulu* (chieftains) refer to the *adat* law, which is a set of regulations derived from the primary legal source of "*adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah.*" This *adat* law governs several areas, including:

    a. Relationships between Nagari, luhak (territories), and rantau (outlying regions).

    b. The security and prosperity of the Nagari community.

    c. The jihad nan ampekor collaboration between the urang nan ampek jinih (the four groups of leaders) who manage leadership responsibilities.

    d. The relationship between penghulu and their kinship network.

    e. In cases of disputes, resolutions are sought through a hierarchical decision-making principle known as bajanjang naiak batanggo turun (ascending steps and descending ladders).

Musyawarah, Mufakat: Deliberation for Concession

Musyawarah mufakat, or consensus-based deliberation, is a defining characteristic of Minangkabau society. This process is fundamental in the selection of the Karapatan Adat Nagari (Customary Council) leader and various community representatives, facilitated through collective discussions (Bahari et al. 2022). It is essential to note that direct elections are exclusively reserved for the appointment of the *Wali Nagari* (village head). In scholarly literature, *musyawarah* is depicted as a traditional Minangkabau practice characterized by consensus-building through extensive discussions. This approach involves gathering community members, including respected figures such as *Ninik Mamak* and other elders, to engage in dialogue and reach a collective agreement on significant community matters (Firdaus 2017). *Musyawarah* serves as an inclusive forum for open discussions, ensuring that diverse perspectives and opinions are acknowledged and considered. This practice reflects the principles of inclusivity, active participation, and mutual respect within the Minangkabau community, fostering consensus and unity for decisions made in the best interest of the community as a whole. The values of cooperation and communal decision-making are deeply embedded in Minangkabau culture (Abdullah 1966).

Leadership Selection through Musyawarah

The selection process for the Karapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) leader in Nagari Sumpur exemplifies the practice of *musyawarah* among the *datuak* (local leaders or respected elders) (S1). This traditional method of decision-making highlights the Minangkabau commitment to inclusivity and consensus-building. Similar *musyawarah* practices are observed in Nagari Taram and Pasilihan for selecting the KAN leader, emphasizing community participation in decision-making (T1, P1).

In Nagari Taram, a selection committee is formed by the 24 *Ninik mamak* before the incumbent KAN leader's term expires. These *Ninik Mamak* play a crucial role in various community affairs, including leadership selection (T1). Potential candidates for the KAN leader position are identified based on their experience, wisdom, and standing within the community. The final decision is made through a *musyawarah*, where the merits and qualifications of each candidate are discussed openly. The emphasis is on inclusivity and respect, ensuring that all voices are considered in the collective decision-making process (T1).

Collective Decision-Making and Community Engagement

The leadership selection process based on *musyawarah* underscores the Minangkabau commitment to preserving cultural traditions and ensuring collective decision-making that respects the perspectives of all community members. This practice fosters unity and harmony while promoting community engagement and participation. *Musyawarah* is also applied in the leadership selection processes of other constituent institutions, such as *Alim Ulama* (Islamic scholars), *Cadiak Pandai* (intellectuals), and *Bundo Kanduang* (female elders). In these contexts, voting is not utilized (S2) (S4) (P4) (T4), with the members of these institutions selected by the Karapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) and subsequently engaging in *musyawarah* to choose their leaders (S2).

Consensus and Community Regulation

Decisions made within the KAN framework stem from *musyawarah* and do not involve voting (S1) (T1). Issues are addressed through consensus-building, and if consensus cannot be reached, discussions are postponed until agreement is achieved. Lobbying may also occur to facilitate consensus (T1) (P1). This approach extends to community-level decisions, where *musyawarah* guides the establishment of regulations, such as those related to fishing rights, ensuring they are aligned with community interests and environmental protection (S6).

For instance, in Nagari Pasilihan, regulations allow fishing in designated areas on specific days while prohibiting harmful methods such as using bombs or poison (P1). In Nagari Sumpur, community feedback led to a reduction in the amount of meat allowed for wedding feasts, illustrating responsiveness to community aspirations (S1).

The *musyawarah* process involves listening to the opinions of each participating institution, with aspirations communicated by the Ninik Mamak of each clan (S1). In Nagari Taram, tiered discussions culminate in meetings with *Ninik Mamak*, ensuring a comprehensive decision-making approach (T6).

Resolving Community Issues

One notable instance of *musyawarah* in action is the resolution of issues surrounding *nikah siri* (informal marriage) in Nagari Taram. Although discussions began with the *Wali Nagari* (village chief), the ultimate resolution emerged from deliberations among the *Ninik Mamak* (T1). Two specific venues facilitate this dialogue: the *balai koto*, where all *Ninik Mamak* gather, and the *Balai Tangah*, designated for particularly challenging discussions (T1).

In addressing family-related issues within the Nagari, traditional leaders from the affected clan are initially consulted (S1) (T1) (P1). If necessary, the issue escalates to the KAN, particularly for matters related to *adat* (customary law) (S1) (T1) (P1). Community matters are addressed within the Nagari itself, with ongoing communication between the *Wali Nagari* and the KAN (T1).

During larger forums like *Musrembang* or when addressing Nagari issues, all institutions have opportunities to share their perspectives. Disagreements may arise, but input is sought from various community layers, including institutions such as *Bundo Kanduang*, whose suggestions can influence decisions, such as identifying recipients of financial aid (BLT) (P4).

Elaboration on Nagari as an Indigenous Institution

The concept of *Nagari* as an indigenous institution within Minangkabau culture carries profound significance, representing a complex system of governance and social organization that has evolved over centuries. The aphorism "*Cupak salingka batuang, adat salingka nagari*" [translation in English] captures the essence of this institution, emphasizing the uniqueness of each Nagari's customs and practices. This reflects the deeply rooted belief that each Nagari is distinct, governed by its own set of traditions and laws, which are inseparable from its identity and existence.

Central to the governance of Nagari is the notion of *Adat Salingka Nagari*, which recognizes the autonomy and individual character of each Nagari, as articulated by scholars such as Asrinaldi and Yoserizal (2020). This autonomy allows each Nagari to establish its own regulations, ensuring that the customs are tailored to the specific needs and values of the local community. Moreover, the assertion that "*lain lubuak lain ikannyo*" reinforces the idea that the practices of one Nagari cannot be imposed on another, further highlighting the cultural diversity within the Minangkabau society (Azwar et al, 2018).

The structural organization of Nagari, encompassing elements such as kinship ties and territorial integrity, fosters a sense of unity among its members. As Sasmita (2010) noted, the Nagari serves as a self-governing entity, embodying a comprehensive set of customary laws that dictate communal life. This self-governance is exemplified through various institutions, including the *Kerapatan Adat Nagari* (KAN) and *Majelis Ulama Nagari* (MUNA), which play crucial roles in articulating community aspirations and facilitating governance based on the values of ABS-SBK (*Adat*, *Basandi Syarak*, and *Syarak*, *Basandi Kitabullah*).

The intertwining of Islamic principles with local customs further influences the governance of Nagari. The *Tungku Tigo Sajarangan* model illustrates the tripartite leadership structure comprising *Niniak Mamak*, *Alim Ulama*, and *Cadiak Pandai*. Each of these leaders contributes to the decision-making process by addressing both social and spiritual matters, reinforcing the integration of Islamic values into traditional governance.

Conclusion

Nagari serves as a vital institution within the Minangkabau community, reflecting a unique blend of customary law and Islamic principles that governs public life. Its structure fosters a robust decision-making process grounded in *musyawarah*, promoting collective deliberation and consensus-building among community members. This approach not only reinforces the cultural identity of each Nagari but also ensures that governance aligns with the needs and aspirations of its people. The evolution of Nagari governance, particularly in the context of institutional dualism, highlights the adaptability of this indigenous institution amid changing political landscapes. The foundational principles established in the Marapalam Agreement, emphasizing the compatibility of *adat* and Islamic law, remain a guiding force in the administration of community affairs. Despite the challenges posed by contemporary governance structures, the Nagari's enduring principles of autonomy and communal participation serve as a model for effective governance. By upholding the values of *musyawarah*, the Nagari exemplifies how traditional institutions can continue to thrive and maintain their relevance in modern society, contributing significantly to the broader discourse on governance and cultural preservation in West Sumatra. Future research may build upon these insights, exploring the dynamics of Nagari governance in the context of globalization and its implications for the Minangkabau community.

References

Abdullah, Taufik. 1966. "Adat and Islam: An examination of conflict in Minangkabau." *Indonesia* 2(1), 1-24. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3350753

Asrinaldi, Asrinaldi and Yoserizal Yoserizal. 2020. "Problems with the Implementation of Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah Philosophy." *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan Dan Politik* 33(2), 162. doi: https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.v33i22020.162-173

Azwar, Welhendri et al. 2018. "Nagari minangkabau: The Study of Indigenous Institutions in West Sumatra, Indonesia." *Jurnal Bina Praja: Journal of Home Affairs Governance* 10(2), 231-239. doi: https://doi.org/10.21787/jbp.10.2018.231-239

Bahari, Asniati et al. 2022. "Pengembangan Metode Pemasaran Melalui Digital Marketing Bagi Produk Umkm Di Nagari Kamang Mudiak Kecamatan Kamang Magek Kabupaten Agam." *Jurnal Hilirisasi IPTEKS* 5(1), 23-31. doi: https://doi.org/10.25077/jhi.v5i1.592

Chlaudina, Dyan. 2021. *Etika Minangkabau (Telaah Terhadap Tungku Tigo Sajarangan)*. Indonesia: Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah.

Denzin, Norman. 2015. "Triangulation." In George Ritzer (ed.). *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518. wbeost050.pub2

Denzin, Norman. 2017. "Critical Qualitative Inquiry." *Qualitative Inquiry* 23(1), 8-16. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800416681864

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2019. "14 After Public Administration Scholarship." *A Research Agenda for Public Administration,* 220-234. doi: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788117258.00019

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2013. "Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic." *Society and Economy* 35(3), 319-342. doi: https://doi.org/10.1556/SocEc.35.2013.3.3

Effendi, Syafnil. 2003. "Profil Sumber Daya Manusia Pada Lembaga Eksekutif Nagari di Sumatera Barat." *Jurnal Demokrasi* 2 (1).

Feldman, Noah. 2012. *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://books.google.si/books?id=N_ORKS49yk4C

Firdaus, Firdaus. 2017. "The Effort to Splitting Nagari Post-Implementation of Village Law 2014 in West Sumatra, Indonesia." *2nd International Conference on Sociology Education* 1, 371-375. doi: https://doi.org/10.5220/0007098603710375

Hancock, Dawson, Bob Algozzine and Jae Hoon Lim. 2021. *Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning Researchers*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Hasan, Helmi. 2004. *Demokrasi Adat di Minangkabau (sebagai modal sosial lokal dan kendala yang dihadapi dalam pelaksanaannya Suatu Studi di Kanagarian Situjuh Gadang Kabupaten Lima Puluh Kota.* Tesis. Program Pasca Sarjana Padang: Universitas Negeri Padang.

Kalogirou, Victoria, Antonis Stasis and Yannis Charalabidis. 2022. "Assessing and improving the National Interoperability Frameworks of European Union Member States: The case of Greece." *Government Information Quarterly* 39(3), 101716. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101716

Kato, Tsuyoshi. 1982. *Matriliny and Migration: Envolving Minangkabau Traditions in Indonesia.* London: Cornell University Press.

Latief, Datuk. 2004. *Minangkabau yang Gelisah: Mencari Strategi Sosialisasi Pewarisan Adat dan Budaya Minangkabau untuk Generasi Muda.* Bandung: CV Lubuk Agung Bandung: Bandung.

Manan, Imran. 1995. *Birokrasi moderen dan otoritas tradisional di Minangkabau (nagari dan desa di Minangkabau)*. Padang: Yayasan Pengkajian Kebudayaan Minangkabau.

Margariti, Vasiliki et al. 2022. "A Holistic Model for Assessing Organizational Interoperability in Public Administration." *Government Information Quarterly* 39(3), 101712. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101712

Matin-Asgari, Afshin. 2004. "Islamic studies and the spirit of Max Weber: A critique of cultural essentialism." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13(3), 293–312. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1066992042000300666

Naim, Mochtar. 1990. *Nagari versus Desa. Sebuah Kerancuan Struktural" dalam Edi Utama. Nagari, Desa dan Pembangunan di Sumatera Barat*. Padang: Genta Budaya.

Navis, Ali Akbar. 1984. *Alam Terkembang Jadi Guru dan Kebudayaan Minangkabau*. Indonesia: Grafiti Press.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2015. "Towards a New World: Some Inconvenient Truths for Anglosphere Public Administration: The IIAS Braibant Lecture 2014." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 81(1), 3–17. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852314544069

Robson, Stuart. 1995. *Desawarnana (Nägarakĕrtägama) by Mpu Prapanca*. Leiden: KITLV Press [Verhandelingen 169.].

Sangasubana, Nisaratana. 2011. "How to Conduct Ethnographic Research." *Qualitative Report* 16(2), 567–573. doi: https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2011.1071

Sasmita, Siska. 2010. *Pemerintahan Nagari: Sebuah Realitas Partisipasi Lokal di Sumatera Barat*. Indonesia: Perpustakaan Universitas Negeri Padang.

Von Benda-Beckmann, Franz and Keebet Von. Benda-Beckmann. 2012. "Identity in Dispute: Law, Religion, and Identity in Minangkabau." *Asian Ethnicity* 13(4), 341–358. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2012.710073

Von. Benda-Beckmann, Keebet and Franz Von. Benda-Beckmann. 2021. *Transformasi Politik dan Hukum: Nagari di Sumatra Barat dari Kolonisasi ke Desentralisasi*. Indonesia: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. https://books.google.si/books?id=6oVUEAAAQBAJ

Znoj, Heinzpeter. 2001. *Heterarchy and Domination in Highland Jambi. The Contest for Community in a Matrilinear Society*. Switzerland: Universität Bern.

Rio Yusri Maulana is the Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Jambi, Indonesia, where he also serves as a Lecturer in the Government Study Program. He is an Expert Staff member for the Government Affairs Commission at the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) of Jambi Province. Rio's work focuses on governance, political science, and public administration in regional contexts.

Moh. Arief Rakhman is a lecturer and researcher at the Political Science Study Program, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Jambi, Indonesia. His areas of expertise include politics and government, international relations, and strategic political issues. His research interests span a wide range of topics, including comparative politics and governance, democratic systems in theory and practice, climate change and defence, as well as foreign relations and diplomacy. Currently, he is pursuing a Doctoral degree in International Relations at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia.

Mhd. Alfahjri Sukri is a lecturer and researcher specializing in Islamic political thought. He serves at the Faculty of Ushuluddin, Adab, and Da'wah, Mahmud Yunus State Islamic University, Batusangkar, West Sumatra, Indonesia. His academic expertise centers on political philosophy, with a focus on Indonesian perspectives, particularly within local contexts. Through his teaching and research, he actively contributes to the discourse on how Islamic political principles intersect with cultural, social, and governmental structures in Indonesia, enriching both the academic community and broader societal understanding in Indonesia.

Beyond Religious Boundaries: Advancing Non-Western Public Administration through Principal-Agent Dynamics in Inclusive Youth Community Services

NURUL JAMILA HARIANI AND AGIE NUGROHO SOEGIONO, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA, SURABAYA, INDONESIA. AIRLANGGA INSTITUTE FOR LEARNING AND GROWTH (AILG), UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA, SURABAYA, INDONESIA

Abstract

This study aims to examine Islamic Public Administration (IPA) as a non-Western governance paradigm, focusing on its implementation through inclusive youth community services. Based on Islamic values of justice, compassion, and social responsibility, we examine IPA through a principal-agent theory in which faith-based groups behave as agents answerable to both God and society. By applying these principles, faith communities' social provision has effectively become supplements to government social services. These collective efforts occur particularly at the neighborhood level, where vulnerable people can be reached easier by non-state social service providers within such communities. These inclusive social services show that faith-often Sufi-based networks do not encourage extremism but instead support justice and inclusion for everyone regardless of their religion. This study argues for IPA as a morally sound and bureaucratically legitimate model for public administration as an alternative to secular government, particularly in multicultural and multireligious settings.

Keywords: Islamic Public Administration, Youth, Faith-based Community, Inclusive Social Service, Non-Western Paradigm.

1. Introduction

Rooted in early Islamic communities, before many European administrative systems, Islamic Public Administration (IPA) has developed as a unique governance paradigm. IPA is profoundly inspired by Islamic teachings and sources, which emphasize social welfare, responsibility, and individual growth as central to public administration (Samier 2017; Drechsler 2014). Historically, the Ottoman Empire's administrative system had a significant impact on IPA, giving a functional model that continues to affect public administration in many Islamic countries today (Drechsler 2014; Chafik and Drechsler 2022). IPA ideas have evolved to fit into

current governance models, combining traditional values with modern public administration notions like performance, ethics, and accountability (Zuraidi et al. 2020; Alfian et al. 2022; Kay 2024). As public administration in Muslim-majority countries searches for conformity with cultural and religious values, IPA emerges as a framework that balances Islamic teachings and values with the demands of modern government to promote well-being.

As one of three primary governance paradigms, alongside Chinese and Western models, IPA offers a distinct viewpoint that prioritizes both spiritual and ethical components of public sector governance (Drechsler 2014; Chafik and Drechsler 2022). Through its dependence on faith-based principles, IPA supports a governance model that incorporates ethical accountability and social responsibility (Samier 2017; Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021; Ongaro 2021), contributing to the area of public administration as an alternative framework rooted in sacred values that resonate with non-Western contexts (Drechsler et al. 2023; Ongaro 2021), especially when state influence may be limited. Academics contend that deviating from these values risks societal and governmental issues, emphasizing the importance of an Islamic framework for maintaining social cohesion and accountability (Alfian et al. 2022).

The evolution of IPA has become more important in public administration discussions worldwide, particularly as the debate continues over alternative governance models outside of the Western paradigm. Although IPA remains important in areas with a majority of Muslims, academics still argue on whether it represents a clearly Islamic model or a modification of current systems (Drechsler 2014). Practices rooted in historical and cultural traditions, such as the mahalla system in Uzbekistan, which stresses localized, community-based governance (Urinboyev 2014), and Sufi (or the aspect of Islam that encourages self-refinement via service) approaches that include spiritual values into decision-making processes (Bidabad 2019), clearly show there is something genuinely within IPA. In Malaysia, IPA has been modified under a modern state framework, therefore demonstrating the relevance of Islamic administrative ideas to modern government (Noh 2014). Furthermore, the Quran and Sunnah provide instructions for flexible governing frameworks that can respond to modern circumstances (Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021).

Important Islamic ideas, including self-accountability (*muraqabah*) as a kind of worship, the integration of Islamic ethics with professional leadership practices, and *maqasid shari'ah* – objectives of Islamic law – offer public administration and leadership great insight (Nor et al. 2012; Mordhah 2012; ElKaleh and Samier 2013). These notions that prioritize the community's well-being over individual gains encourage people to stick with the organization's commitment, which increases work motivation and productivity (Yunus et al 2012). Moreover, the Islamic governance settings place these ideas as fundamental ideals for developing governance frameworks (Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021; Samier 2017; Putra 2021; Mussagulova and van der Wal 2020). Applying these ideas to public administration and management has been effective in Muslim-majority countries (Suharto and Pribadi 2023; Moghimi 2018).

As IPA grows as a discipline, studies have highlighted its ability to connect Islamic teachings with modern public governance principles, particularly in the areas of public service motivation and Islamic work ethics (Lohani et al. 2021; Wibowo 2020). These findings highlight the importance of IPA in fostering ethical and service-oriented public sector management in Muslim-majority countries. However, the application of IPA faces unpleasant facts; for example,

the low governance index in member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) indicates the need for a more adaptable IPA framework that considers historical and contextual elements (Wibowo 2020; Kay 2024). This conversation is part of a larger movement in non-Western public administration that recognizes the need for religion in handling public sector issues, therefore enhancing the field with sensitive models of governance (Chafik and Drechsler 2022; Drechsler et al. 2023).

The impact of religious principles on governmental procedures has been the subject of recent studies in public administration. Religious principles such as honesty, openness, and responsibility are essential for the efficient management of public funds and the provision of public services (Ansoriyah et al. 2023; Kirat 2015). These ideals are frequently associated with Islamic public finance, where *zakat* (almsgiving), *waqf* (endowment), *sodaqoh* (voluntary charity), and *infaq* (spending in Allah's way) are important sources of revenue for social programs (Huda 2018), reducing reliance on government resources. An illustration of this is Islamic banking, which prioritizes ethical commitment and trust over purely financial considerations (Javed et al. 2016). This management strategy is founded on Quranic and Hadith principles, which establish ethical behaviors that promote accountability and public welfare across businesses (Ogunbado 2013).

Notwithstanding these revelations, IPA is still under-represented in mainstream public administration studies where Western models predominate the discussions. This disparity inhibits the field's capacity to value how faith-based government models, including IPA, provide special insights into efficient administration. What is further understudied is the possible contributions of IPA, especially its inclusive attitude to community service – where Islamic young organizations serve all people in need, regardless of religious affiliation. This inclusiveness in Islamic government fits the ideas of equity and social responsibility; it offers best practices for public administration dealing with cultural and religious diversity (Alfian et al. 2022; Samier 2019). Thus, IPA could be a valuable tool in non-Western public administration research (Drechsler 2014; Samier 2019; Chafik and Drechsler 2022).

This study aims to close this gap by examining how the young Muslim population represents the inclusive values of IPA through public service, thereby providing a non-Western perspective that compromises between faith-based values and societal well-being. Through examining how these young-led groups support public administration policies in Muslim-majority nations, this study positions IPA as a model that spans conventional values with modern governance needs, thus broadening the field of public administration to include ethically grounded and culturally sensitive frameworks. Furthermore, this research confronts the majority of conservative thoughts that believe the people's involvement in faith-based groups always leads to extremism, even terrorism.

2. Literature Review

Unlike many faith-based organizations, which solely serve people in their own religious communities, Islamic – may include youth – organizations adhere to universal service values and assist everyone in need (Ansoriyah et al. 2023). In keeping with Islamic beliefs that emphasize social responsibility, the commitment to including everyone is consistent with

assisting all disadvantaged groups. This distinct approach to IPA serves as a moral model for inclusive, service-oriented governance (Alfian et al. 2022; Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021; Ongaro 2021; Ansoriyah et al. 2023). In this case, IPA provides a paradigm that may be utilized to teach public administration practices in multicultural and multireligious societies.

Youth in Islamic Communities

Drawing much from Quranic teachings and the Sunnah, which assist underprivileged populations, including the impoverished, orphaned, and disadvantaged first priority, Islamic youth engagement is highly promoted within this paradigm; young people typically participate actively in community service as a statement of religion and social duty (Samier 2017; Drechsler 2014). Islamic teachings instill in adolescents a sense of justice, compassion, and inclusion, integrating their personal growth with communal welfare activities (Urinboyev 2014; Mussagulova and van der Wal 2020; Putra 2021; Drechsler et al. 2023). In this case, Islamic youth groups contribute to the IPA's greater aims by participating in community service, which emphasizes not only ethical governance but also the formation of young people as public-spirited citizens.

Service to marginalized populations, such as those living in poverty, is consistent with the Islamic mandate for justice and compassion for the underprivileged (Huda 2018; Alfian et al. 2022). Youth-led activities frequently address crucial social concerns, reflecting IPA's overall commitment to promoting social fairness via community participation. These activities are inspired by Islamic social justice principles, which contribute to a type of public service that prioritizes inclusion and equal treatment for all people, regardless of religion (Noh 2014; Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021). Thus, Islamic youth organizations play an essential role in promoting social fairness, which is a basic value of the IPA.

The establishment of inclusive service models poses a challenge for Islamic youth organizations, particularly in contexts where religious exclusivity is still perceived. Societal attitudes and budget constraints might restrict the scope of these activities, while the governance framework can influence the amount to which policies are implemented. However, these obstacles provide an opportunity to illustrate the importance of inclusive, faith-based service models in creating community resilience and social harmony (Farhana et al. 2021; Wibowo 2020).

As youth-led Islamic services grow, they contribute to the ongoing discussion about the role of faith in public administration, particularly in non-Western frameworks that value cultural and ethical responsiveness (Kay 2024; Ansoriyah et al. 2023; Massey and Johnston 2015). By incorporating Islamic teachings into youth service models, IPA develops young leaders who are led by faith-based principles with a professional ethic that prioritizes social welfare and inclusion (Nor 2012; ElKaleh and Samier 2013). This will promote culturally rooted and morally sound public service, which will establish a model for faith-driven governance that meets current social demands (Suharto and Pribadi 2023; Ongaro 2021).

Principal-Agent in Islamic Communities

To see how Islam-devoted organizations work, principal-agent theory offers a useful framework for illustrating how religious values shape their operation and governance (see Tuszynski and Block 2014). Adherents of Islam, whether as individuals or groups, should be seen as the "agents" who follow ethical standards and objectives from the Islamic teachings and values in which they act as the "principals" (Chiwamba 2022, 30).

In the context of IPA, religious values, such as *taqwa* (God-consciousness) and *amanah* (trustworthiness), represent both the governing body and the divine values determined in Islamic teachings. Although it is debatable that the religious teachings and values can be seen as agents, they are indeed, as Shamsuddin and Ismail (2013) say, a force that propels individuals to act accordingly. Meanwhile, the agents are believers entrusted to fulfill their duties according to Islamic principles as central elements of their missions (Zainuldin et al. 2018, 302). From this perspective, Islamic communities are accountable not only to the state or society but also to God, considered the supreme authority. This dual accountability – both to God and to the social context – creates a dynamic where the actions of the Islamic communities should align with the moral expectations of the faith while also meeting the needs and responsibilities toward others in the broader society. In this way, Islamic values serve as foundations, influencing both individual actions and collective practices and endeavors in achieving communal welfare, such as addressing poverty and inequality.

As the agents of Islamic teachings, Islamic communities play an essential role in promoting social welfare through charities, such as *zakat* and *waqf*, as their collective efforts despite the absence of formal organization structure. These contributions are all integral to fulfilling the social and economic obligations prescribed in Islam. From the perspective of IPA, the Islamic communities' role highlights the wealth distribution mechanisms that are organized and managed effectively and justly to assist those in need (Mohd Thas Thaker 2018; Hudaefi et al. 2021). In addition, accountability is addressed to not only religious entities but also to the broader society.

The essence of Islamic communities as agents underscores that they are responsible for managing charitable mechanisms that provide continuous financial support for public goods in terms of education, healthcare, and social services (Habibullah and Haron 2024). By administering these social contributions and aids, the Islamic communities have reflected their duties aligned with Islamic teachings and values. The principal-agent theory here depicts Islamic communities playing a vital role as intermediaries who are accountable to both religious principles and to societal needs. This will reinforce and strengthen the commitments of justice, equity, and compassion in governance. These contributions demonstrate practical application of how religious values are critical assets for governance and administration.

3. Methods

This study adopts a thematic qualitative approach to examine the role of Islamic youth communities in delivering inclusive social services. The data were gathered via in-depth interviews, observations, documentation, and studies of relevant literature by combining

several ways to offer a holistic approach (Creswell and Poth 2017; Patton 2015) in understanding Islamic values and principles in practice. The thematic analysis is useful for identifying patterns within textual collected data (Braun and Clarke 2006), which is helpful in providing insights into how Islamic values inform public administration at the community level, especially in non-Western contexts where cultural and religious values are key.

The primary data were collected between June and September 2024 through in-depth interviews with 20 members of the Islamic youth community from both urban and rural settings to capture a wider perspective on Islamic-based community services delivered by youths. This is useful to give insights from different settings for better and more comprehensive coverage in understanding complex and religious value-driven social phenomena. To provide an overview of the demographic and contextual diversity among informants while maintaining ethical standards in research practices to protect their anonymity, the list of interview participants can be found in Table 1.

Table 1. List of Informants

Informant Code	Location Type	Role in Organization
I.1	Urban	Leader
I.2	Rural	Member
I.3	Rural	Leader
I.4	Urban	Secretary
I.5	Urban	Leader
I.6	Sub-urban	Member
I.7	Rural	Member
I.8	Rural	Member
I.9	Rural	New Member
I.10	Sub-urban	Leader
I.11	Sub-urban	Member
I.12	Sub-urban	Treasury
I.13	Rural	Member
I.14	Rural	Member
I.15	Rural	Member
I.16	Urban	Leader
I.17	Urban	Treasury
I.18	Rural	Member
I.19	Urban	Member
I.20	Urban	Member

In addition to in-depth interviews, observations were conducted simultaneously to gain complementary contextual insights into how Islamic values operate within youth groups. This includes *zakat* (almsgiving), *waqf* (endowment), *sodaqoh* (voluntary charity), *infaq* (spending in Allah's way) administration, *qurban* (sacrifice) organization, and charitable aid distribution. Documentations and literature reviews were reviewed to support and validate

information gained from the primary sources to strengthen the data through triangulation (Patton 2015). The collected data were coded to be classified into themes relevant to this study's objectives, including "inclusive community services," "Islamic values," and "youth communities." The thematic analysis allowed the study to systematically explore how Islamic youth organizations operationalize Islamic values in their activities both in urban and rural areas, reflecting the role of Islamic youth organizations in advancing IPA and providing frameworks that can effectively solve the complex issues of social services.

4. Findings

Community Services by Youth Agent

This study reveals that Islamic youth communities serve not only as a study group (*pengajian*) but also as a devoted organization to serve those people in need aligned with Islamic teachings and principles. In a predominantly religious country such as Indonesia, Islamic youth communities can usually be found at the neighborhood level (*kampung*) where a mosque is located. They were normally formed by the locals to manage religious activities held there.

Culturally, Islamic mosques hold a central operation for informal administrative, educational, and social purposes. For instance, the mosque committees produce records for residents who need social assistance as recipients of charitable donations (*zakat*, *infaq*, and *sadaqah*). The Islamic youth communities utilize mosques as community gatherings, hubs, classrooms for knowledge transfer, and meetings for community development programs or aids. In this context, the communities, particularly youth, play an important role in undertaking charitable works within their neighborhoods.

In serving communities, youth groups orient themselves with religious parameters to ensure they really assist underprivileged individuals. This virtue aligns with the Islamic principle of universal compassion, which asserts that priority beneficiaries receive attention regardless of their religious affiliation. One of the adolescent members in the sub-urban area articulates this inclusive philosophy:

> "We are taught that as Muslims, we have a responsibility to all who need help, especially the poor and orphaned. Christian, Catholic, Buddhist, Hindu, we serve all religions. For us, charity is not just about our community but about humanity." (I.9)

The principle of inclusivity is equally prominent in urban areas, with youth communities actively demonstrating their commitment to serving diverse populations. To make their efforts accountable, there are various stages involved, including registration, verification, and confirmation to match the priority targets. Two volunteers in an urban neighborhood said:

> "When we give out food or help, we focus on the elderly, single parents, and people who are having a hard time financially. Our goal is to help those who really need it, whether they are Muslim or not." (I.4)

> "This is for everyone in need, for all communities, no matter who they are… as long as they meet the requirements and pass our verification process." (I.11)

This knowledge of putting humanity first, above the religious matter, corresponds with Islamic ideals that inspire individuals to give those suffering first priority; thereby, IPA helps to promote community welfare (Drechsler 2014; Samier 2017). Hence, the initiatives of Islamic youth groups in their communities contribute to the improvement of social cohesion.

In addition to fairness, inclusivity fosters mutual respect within the broader community. Although based on Islamic teachings and principles, the Islamic communities welcome diverse funding sources. The donation mechanism is open to anyone, allowing all individuals, regardless of their various backgrounds, to benefit from community support initiatives. As a member from a rural mosque noted:

> "People in the community, including non-Muslims, respect what we do. They see that we are here to help everyone, and they also help us by giving donations and their hands sometimes; this brings us closer together." (I.13)

Such actions promote social harmony, which is central to the Islamic approach to public administration. By fostering positive relationships with non-Muslim community members, these youth organizations embody the IPA values of unity and social integration (Ongaro 2021). This service ethos, which seeks to bridge social divides, serves as a model for inclusive public administration (Massey and Johnston 2015).

The focus on vulnerable groups, including the elderly and orphans, demonstrates a dedication to fair resource allocation, a principle highlighted in Islamic teachings as essential to *zakat* and social justice (Wibowo 2020). It reflects the Islamic concept of *maqasid al-shariah* (the objectives of Islamic law), which seeks to safeguard and enhance the well-being of society (Nor et al. 2012). However, sometimes they also face difficult times because it is not easy to make decisions regarding who they need to help. A volunteer at Baitul Ilmi Mosque shared:

> "At times, we receive more visitors than our resources can accommodate. It's hard to tell people we can't help everyone, but we have to prioritise based on need. If they are deserving recipient groups, like the poor, orphans, and the destitute, or people who are struggling in Allah's cause, we will distribute the resources equally." (I.5)

This balancing act reflects the principle of equity within IPA, emphasizing the prioritization of resources based on need and social benefit, especially when resources are limited (Alfian et al. 2022). The principle of fairness in resource distribution within Islamic teachings is thus woven into the operational framework of these youth communities, reflecting IPA's focus on communal responsibility and equity (Chafik and Drechsler 2022).

Furthermore, faith plays a crucial role in inspiring these young volunteers. In the youth community, many of them dedicate themselves fully, not for monetary gain but for the promise of heavenly reward in their afterlife. One youth leader articulated:

> "Assisting others is a sunnah (prophetic practice) that we are encouraged to embrace, irrespective of gender, religion, ethnicity, or culture." (I.10)

> "We believe that helping those who are poor or struggling is what Islam asks of us. This isn't just about charity; it's about creating fairness in society." (I.18)

> "In this mosque community, many of us serve everyone wholeheartedly, not for payment but for heaven as the reward for us in the afterlife." (I.3)

This inherent drive to assist others without the anticipation of financial reward showcases a work ethic rooted in faith, prioritizing spiritual fulfillment above material benefits. This approach is consistent with Islamic work ethics that promote community service as a means of worship, highlighting IPA's commitment to ethical governance rooted in religious principles (Samier 2017; Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021).

Faith-based Social Service Mechanism

In organizing social services, our findings indicate how Islamic youth communities have demonstrated effective governance as well as managerial and administrative skills, despite being mostly informal organizations. With these skills, the communities are able to create their own decent mechanism to distribute social aid. This highlights the advancement of professionalism in charitable efforts among these faith-based organizations. A mosque teenagers' member in urban area mentioned this well-established mechanism:

> "We have established a process where each member has a specific role—some conduct surveys with the recipients, some manage logistics, and others supervise finances." (I.1)

Not only guarantee that all individuals are aware of their roles, but these groups maintain accountability and transparency, which are important values in IPA that create public trust. There are several ways to obtain trust sustainably from the donors. First, a mechanism to classify the priority recipients. A member of the community explains the need to be honest about the limitations of resources:

> "It's important to be transparent. We explain that our resources are limited and that our focus is on the most vulnerable—like single mothers or the elderly, so it's clear why our recipient lists are mostly the vulnerable." (I.20)

Second, organizing aid vouchers as a way to ensure accurate distribution. Vouchers could be used as a tool to prevent misuse or misallocation. This mechanism not only assists the social aid organizers to maintain transparency and accountability but also reduces possible disputes among recipients. An organizer highlights:

> "Using pre-distributed vouchers helps us make sure that only those in genuine need receive the aid when we distribute it. It's our way of being fair and avoiding unnecessary disputes." (I.7)

The voucher system showcases a methodical approach to charity that emphasizes fairness in accordance with Islamic principles regarding equitable distribution (Huda 2018). This emphasis on responsibility through clearly defined obligations reflects the Islamic ideal of *amanah* (trustworthiness), which governs ethical behavior in public service (ElKaleh and Samier 2013).

Third, disseminating donation receipts for donors and volunteers, which are distributed periodically. An Islamic community in Surabaya utilized a group chat to provide a list of beneficiaries to the donors. This level of transparency is in harmony with Islamic values of honesty and trustworthiness (*amanah*), which are crucial for ensuring that resources are viewed as being utilized equitably and properly (Ansoriyah et al. 2023), thus promoting ethical governance.

Alongside social missions, it is also revealed that serving the community (in Islam) is a way of honoring God. This is where the Islamic community respects dual accountability – both to God and to society. In this sense, members are seen as responsible not only for fulfilling their obligations as human beings but also for serving God's values of justice, compassion, and integrity. A member of mosque teenagers mentioned the enormous value of incentives grounded in faith:

> "Our religion teaches us that helping others is a form of worship. When we serve the community, we are fulfilling our duty to God." (I.19)

The idea of dual accountability is deeply rooted in Islamic teachings, which illustrate the interconnectedness between serving the people and adhering to Islamic principles (Mohd Thas Thaker 2018). When communities engage in acts of charity, social services, and the dissemination of Islamic teachings, they reinforce the idea to fulfill social obligation and a spiritual purpose to answer both human and divine expectations. A community leader of an Islamic study group reflects:

> "It is certain that if there is a relationship with humanity, there must be a relationship with Islamic norms and also Islamic religion, so… it will automatically be included, okay." (I.17)

Social aid and charity efforts apparently are essential supplements to government support. The importance of becoming an additional aid program is critical, especially in areas where resources are limited to cover aid distribution at the neighborhood level. These gaps are filled by the Islamic communities who are volunteers, particularly among young people. This reflects a deep spiritual as well as social commitment to assisting others. A volunteer of *Eid Qurban* describes:

> "Of course, we see that what the government does is never quite enough; our communities will always need other people to step up. So, even though we don't get paid, many of us in the youth community serve wholeheartedly, driven by the desire for *pahala* (spiritual reward) and seeking *ridho* Allah (the approval of Allah)." (I.16)

This notion of providing service to society as a kind of worship highlights the profound religious inspiration that motivates their efforts, which is consistent with the IPA's concept that helping others is a responsibility to both society and God (Ongaro 2021). According to Chafik and Drechsler (2002), this strategy helps to enhance the ethical foundation of their social service programs by integrating the provision of tangible assistance with the attainment of spiritual satisfaction.

Not only do these events serve as a platform for charitable endeavors, but they also give educational benefits to the young people who participate in them. A mosque volunteer highlighted the educational advantages of these initiatives:

> "But here we also do more than just give alms; we want to set an example for the community so that they can do the same thing at home, too, whether it's at the mosque or nearby, for example, by giving help to others or their neighbours." (I.14)

How Islamic communities conduct the learning process within mosques, although informal, is deeply impactful and multifaceted through hands-on participation. When religious or social activities occur, individuals, particularly youth, gain the values of empathy, responsibility, and cooperation rooted in Islamic teachings as well as organizational skills for financing, managing, and communicating. A member of Sidoarjo states:

> "This activity is providing us with valuable insights; wouldn't you agree? It is more than just helping people and being of service; there is a greater life philosophy involved. Additionally, practical skills such as transparent financial management, organisation, and understanding management are incredibly valuable for our lives." (I.12)

This practical knowledge supports IPA's objective of developing ethical and skilled administrators who make a positive impact on society (Moghimi 2018; Drechsler 2014). Through the development of these skills, community initiatives act as nurturing grounds for future leaders capable of embodying Islamic values within public administration settings (Suharto and Pribadi 2023). In essence, the informal learning processes within mosques are integral to shaping individuals who are not only spiritually grounded but also socially responsible. These experiences bridge the gap between religious teachings and real-world applications that foster an integrated approach to personal and communal development.

5. Discussion

Islamic Value Incubator and Extremism Misconceptions of Faith-based Community

IPA depends much on faith-based young groups, as they are a necessary incubator for Islamic values. People who share IPA's values of inclusion, social justice, and ethical responsibility abound in communities that give social welfare and communal solidarity top importance. As Samier (2017) explained, concepts such as *muraqabah* (self-accountability) and *amanah* (trust) are critical components of IPA, supporting ethical governance practices that are consistent with Islamic doctrine. Such value systems are consistent with IPA's wider goals of moral and social accountability, fostering an atmosphere in which adolescents internalize these ideas as part of their civic obligations (Ashraf-Khan and Hossain 2021; Putra 2021).

From the perspective of principal-agent theory, Islamic youth communities can be seen as agents dedicated to embodying and promoting the values and teachings of Islam, which serve as the principal (Chiwamba 2022). These principles, derived from the holy Quran as well as Sunnah, articulate virtues, benevolence, and compassion to serve humanity as their missions. Islamic young groups make a unique contribution through their dedication to inclusive service that transcends religious boundaries. Driven by ideas of social responsibility, this focus on universal service captures the ethical ethos of IPA and acts as a model of inclusive

government (Alfian et al. 2022; Drechsler 2014). As agents, Islamic youth communities embed these values into their operations, such as administrating, prioritizing, and delivering social assistance justly (Hudaefi et al. 2021). This commitment is evident in their inclusive approach, where the focus remains on addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, irrespective of their religious or cultural backgrounds.

Drechsler and Chafik (2022) argued that such frameworks serve as ethical underpinnings for tackling social difficulties, particularly in non-Western countries where community and faith-based values frequently drive public service projects. Islamic youth organizations offer settings where ideals of equality, justice, and compassion are actively practiced, educating young people for future leadership roles in both religious and public institutions (Nor et al. 2012; ElKaleh and Samier 2013).

Youth-led projects' success in advancing social justice and tackling inequities reflects IPA's emphasis on ethical leadership and responsibility. These initiatives coincide with the *maqasid al-shari'ah* (objectives of Islamic law), which underline the need for community welfare, therefore stressing how Islamic teachings on justice and equality may be operationalized inside a modern government structure (Mordhah 2012; Ongaro 2021). According to Drechsler (2014), Islamic PA offers distinct, culturally relevant avenues for community participation, making it an important foundation for non-Western governance models that value inclusion and ethical public service. By adopting these qualities, Islamic youth communities contribute to overall social well-being and serve as custodians of Islamic public-service ethics.

One important thing this study does is question the idea that faith-based youth groups automatically lead to radicalism or tendencies to be exclusive. Instead, research shows that these groups often show kindness, compassion, and a dedication to public service that goes beyond faith differences. Research shows that faith-driven service models may bring people together instead of dividing them; for example, Islamic youth groups make helping the neediest a priority, regardless of participants' religious beliefs.

Justice, social welfare, and inclusion are fundamental to Islamic administration (Drechsler 2014; Samier 2017), which is supported by our study and the larger research on IPA. Youth groups based on faith in Islamic communities are more likely to bring communities together rather than divide them. Islamic governance systems place a premium on equitable treatment and reciprocal respect, as evidenced by *maqasid al-shariah* values such as life, intellect, and dignity (Nor et al. 2012; Alfian et al. 2022).

Narratives of extremism are contradicted by the function of Islamic youth communities as incubators of ethics. These organizations teach young people to be responsible, honest, and unselfish by having them participate in organized community service. For instance, the participants' consistent invocation of helping mankind as a sacred obligation serves to illustrate the profound spirituality that inspired them to take part in this study. This spiritual way of life supports the idea of *taqwa*, which means "God-consciousness." It also makes people feel more responsible for their actions both locally and globally (Ongaro 2021; Chafik and Drechsler 2022).

By showing faith-based service as an act of moral and ethical leadership, these teen groups help get rid of stereotypes and make non-Western public administration models that are

sensitive to morals and cultures. This point of view also backs up Drechsler's (2020) claim that non-Western models, such as IPA, are important on a cultural and international level, providing useful alternatives to largely secular Western frameworks.

Non-Western (Islamic) PA and Its Global Relevance

The findings of the study indicate that IPA can be used as a model for government in non-Western countries, particularly in cases when Western systems fail to fit the local culture. Drechsler (2014) said that IPA is an important way of running a country that goes along with Chinese and Western methods. It conforms to the religious and cultural values of nations with a majority of Muslims. This study supports the idea that the double obligation of the IPA – to God and to society – increases its moral authority, therefore distinguishing it from secular government structures that might not always reflect such ethical responsibility standards (Massey and Johnston 2015; Samier 2019).

The fact that IPA is increasingly being employed in non-Western public administration is evident from the way it is being modified to address cultural and moral challenges in such countries, particularly through community-led initiatives. According to Chafik and Drechsler (2022), non-Western public administration models such as the IPA contribute to global public administration by incorporating cultural characteristics into operations. Based on Islamic values of justice, openness, and public welfare, IPA's ethical orientation addresses social concerns in ways that might be more suitable and effective in some settings than secular Western models (Haque et al. 2021; Mussagulova and van der Wal 2020). This is consistent with Ongaro's (2021) recommendation for a global public administration system that recognizes and combines multiple governance models, hence increasing the relevance and applicability of the profession.

Moreover, the way the IPA emphasizes social responsibility – by means of *zakat*, *sadaqah*, and *waqf* – highlights the model's contribution to socio-economic welfare, most especially in terms of poverty and inequality avoidance (Huda 2018; Zuraidi et al. 2020). These faith-based financial systems show IPA's potential as a governance model that reduces dependency on state resources while enhancing community cohesiveness by providing long-term funding for public goods such as healthcare and education (Ansoriyah et al. 2023; Kirat 2015). This study implies that the flexible and culturally relevant framework of the IPA can inspire different approaches to governance in multireligious and multicultural environments, improving public administration's capacity to meet local needs while keeping sensitive to cultural values (Drechsler et al. 2023; Drechsler and Karo 2017).

This article questions the prevalence of Western public administration theories, which may ignore the ethical components and community emphasis prevalent in non-Western methods (Welch and Wong 1998; Mussagulova and van der Wal 2020) and thus push IPA as a non-Western governance model. Drechsler (2013) highlighted the ethical foundations of IPA, providing a nuanced examination of governance, particularly in areas where secular models may lack cultural appropriateness. Emphasizing communal welfare, adherence to sacred values, and a commitment to social justice, IPA serves as a robust alternative that could enhance the global discourse on public administration and facilitate the development of culturally responsive government policies (Ongaro 2021; Kay 2024).

This article argues that the open-minded and socially orientated perspective of the IPA could enhance non-Western public administration and offer valuable insights into multicultural governance models. The integration of Islamic principles such as justice, compassion, and social responsibility into public service enables the IPA to maintain an administration that is suitable for the region and advantageous in other contexts. This supports Drechsler's (2020) claim that non-Western theories, including IPA, enhance global public administration through governance frameworks rooted in moral and cultural foundations. This illustrates the continued value of IPA in addressing public sector challenges today.

6. Conclusion

This study addresses the multifaceted role of Islamic youth communities as an example of the transforming potential of IPA. From the perspective of a non-Western governance model, Islamic youth communities operate in light of inclusive commitment to serving those in need, guided by Islamic teachings and principles. Their collective efforts as agents of religious principles effectively become supplements for government social services and illustrate how the IPA model can strengthen unity, social integration, and communal well-being.

Despite their informal nature, Islamic youth companies' services are aligned with IPA's governance model, which promotes accountability, transparency, and fairness. This challenges the conventional view that faith-based movements are either extreme or exclusionary. Rather, Islamic young people show how ethical and efficient government can result from double responsibility to God and community. Where government aid and resources are limited, their supplementary aid and charity efforts effectively fill critical gaps. This collective movement particularly occurs at the neighborhood level, where underserved populations are way more reachable.

To gain an in-depth understanding of how social assistance mechanisms are run by non-state actors, further study is required to explore the potential of alternative social financing within IPA. This suggestive topic could include an in-depth examination of Islamic financing, including *zakat* (almsginving), *waqf* (endowment), *sodaqoh* (voluntary charity), and *infaq* (spending in Allah's way). Investigating how these alternative financing mechanisms would be valuable to assess how Islamic communities address contemporary social challenges as well as foster financial inclusion for marginalized groups.

References

Alfian, Endang L. S., Kismartini, and Tri Y. 2022. "Islamic Bureaucracy in the Philosophy of Public Administration: A Narrative Literature Review." *Open Access Indonesia Journal of Social Sciences* 5(6), 846-851. doi: https://doi.org/10.37275/oaijss.v5i6.139

Ansoriyah, Faizatul, Hartuti P., Retno S. A., and Son H. 2023. "Identifying Public Value of Zakat Management Organisations: A Review of Muzaki's Perception." *DINIKA: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies* 8(1), 1-21. doi: https://doi.org/10.22515/dinika.v8i1.6664

Ashraf-Khan, Mohammed Veqar and Mohammad Shahadat Hossain. 2021. "Governance: Exploring the Islamic Approach and its Relevance for the Modern Context." *International Journal of Islamic Khazanah* 11(1), 29-40. doi: https://doi.org/10.15575/ijik.v11i1.10433

Bidabad, Bijan. 2019. "Public Administration: An Islamic Sufi Approach." *International Journal of Shari'ah and Corporate Governance Research* 2(2), 22-40. doi: https://doi.org/10.46281/ijscgr.v2i2.318

Braun, Virginia and Victoria Clarke. 2006. "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology." *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3(2), 77-101. doi: https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Chafik, Salah and Wolfgang Drechsler. 2022. "In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan Zawāyā as Good Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 82(4), 747-755. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13475

Chiwamba, VC. 2022. "Religiosity and Ubuntu Contexts for Critique of the Agency Framework." *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives* 7(2), 21-35. doi: https://doi.org/10.55190/wbyj3702

Creswell, John and Cheryl Poth. 2017. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (International Student Edition): Choosing Among Five Approaches*. 2nd edn. London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, Incorporated.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2014. "Debate: Islamic PA—Does It Exist, What Is It, and Why and How Should We Study It?" *Public Money & Management* 35(1), 63-64. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2015.986885

Drechsler, Wolfgang and Erkki Karo. 2017. Confucian Public Administration and Innovation Policy: A Conceptual Perspective - Mencius, Max Weber and the Mandate of Heaven. *3rd International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP3), Singapore,* 1-30.

Drechsler, Wolfgang and Salah Chafik. 2022. "Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice." *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy* 15(2), 52-70. doi: https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2022-0013

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Rainer Kattel and Salah Chafik. 2023. "Islamic Public Administration and Islamic Public Value: Towards a Research Agenda." *Public Policy and Administration* 39(4), 608-624. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767231201799

ElKaleh, Eman and Eugenie Samier. 2013. "The Ethics of Islamic Leadership: A Cross-Cultural Approach for Public Administration." *Halduskultuur (Administrative Culture)* 14(2), 188-211. https://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/96/85

Farhana, Intan, Clare Markham and Hasan Basri. 2021. "Implementing Islamic Principles and Values in Public Budgeting: A Battle of Mindsets." *Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research* 13(3), 444-463. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/jiabr-01-2021-0015

Habibullah, Mohammad and Razali Haron. 2024. "Sustainable Finance: How Does Zakat Management Matter?" In Mohd Ma'Sum Billah, Rusni Hassan, Razali Haron, and Nor Razinah Mohd Zain. (eds). *Islamic Sustainable Finance: Policy, Risk, and Regulation*. New York: Routledge, 160-169.

Haque, Shamsul, Zeger van der Waal and Caspar van der Berg. 2021. "Comparative Studies

in Public Administration: Intellectual Challenges and Alternative Perspectives." *Public Administration Review* 81(2), 344-348. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13349

Huda, Miftahul. 2018. "Prinsip-Prinsip Keuangan Publik Islam." *Al-Intaj: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Perbankan Syariah* 4(1), 1-20. doi: https://doi.org/10.29300/aij.v4i1.1198

Hudaefi, Fahmi Ali, Rezzy Eko Caraka and Hairunnizam Wahid. 2021. "Zakat Administration in Times of COVID-19 Pandemic in Indonesia: A Knowledge Discovery via Text Mining." *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 15(2), 271-286. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/imefm-05-2020-0250

Javed, Amna, Youji Kohda and Hisashi Masuda. 2016. "Co-creation of Socio-economic Values in Islamic Banking Service: Case Study Research in Pakistan." *Journal of Creating Value* 2(1), 109-123. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/2394964315627252

Kay, Adrian. 2024. "The Changing Traditions of Islamic Public Administration: Observing Processes of Collision, Absorption, and Adaptation." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 46(1), 13-30. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2023.2275283

Kirat, Mohamed. 2015. "The Islamic Roots of Modern Public Relations and Corporate Social Responsibility." *International Journal of Islamic Marketing and Branding* 1(1), 97-112. doi: https://doi.org/10.1504/ijimb.2015.068144

Lohani, Atika, Aamir Abbas and Muhammad Shahid Sultan Watto. 2021. "Islamic Work Ethics, Public Service Motivation, and Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 in the Context." *Global Legal Studies Review* VI, 26-32. doi: https://doi.org/10.31703/glsr.2021(vi-iii).04

Massey, Andrew and Karen Johnston (eds). 2015. *The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Moghimi, Seyed Mohammad. 2018. *Principles and Fundamentals of Islamic Management*. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited.

Mohd Thas Thaker, Mohamed Asmy Bin. 2018. "A Qualitative Inquiry into Cash waqf Model as a Source of Financing for Micro Enterprises." *ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance* 10(1), 19-35. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/ijif-07-2017-0013

Mordhah, Najwa. 2012. "Self-Accountability: The Link between Self-Accountability and Accountability in Islam." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2(5), 240-245. http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_5_March_2012/29.pdf

Mussagulova, Assel and Zeger van der Wal. 2020. "All Still Quiet on the Non-Western Front?" Non-Western Public Service Motivation Scholarship: 2015–2020." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 43(1), 23-46. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2020.1836977

Noh, Abdillah. 2014. "Islam, Public Policy and Public Administration in Malaysia: Negotiating Complexities." *Halduskultuur (Administrative Culture)* 15(2), 204-221. https://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/126/121

Nor, Amir Husin Mohd, Muhammad N. A., Mohd A. S., Anwar F. O., Ibnor A. I., Hayatullah L., Abdel W. M. M. E., Ahmad M. H., and Norhoneydayatie A. M. 2012. "Application of the Principles of Maqasid Shari'ah in Administration of the Islamic Countries." *Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences* 6(6), 847-851. http://www.aensiweb.com/old/anas/2012/847-851.pdf

Ogunbado, Ahamad Faosiy. 2013. "Is Quality Management an Islamic Value?" *IOSR Journal of Business and Management* 8(3), 6-13. doi: https://doi.org/10.9790/487x-0830613

Ongaro, Edoardo. 2021. "Non-Western philosophies and public administration." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 43(1), 6–10. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2020.1844027

Patton, Michael Quinn. 2015. *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Putra, Nanda Herijal., 2021. "Administrasi Publik Dalam Perspektif Islam: Kajian Pada Sistem Pemerintahan Umar Bin Khattab." *Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam* 8(2), 17-24. doi: https://doi.org/10.32505/politica.v8i2.3541

Samier, Eugenie. 2017. "Islamic Public Administration Tradition: Historical, Theoretical, and Practical Dimensions." *Halduskultuur (Administrative Culture)* 18(1), 53-71. https://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/171/150

Samier E. 2019. "The humanist roots of Islamic administration and leadership for education: philosophical foundations for intercultural and transcultural teaching." In: Samier EA, Elkaleh ES (eds) Teaching Educational Leadership in Muslim Countries. Singapore: Springer, pp. 23–38

Shamsuddin, Zelhuda and Abdul Ghafar Ismail. 2013. "Agency Theory in Explaining Islamic Financial Contracts." *Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research* 15(4), 530-545. doi: https://doi.org/10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2013.15.4.2361

Suharto, Nugraha and Luthfi Audia Pribadi. 2023. "Administrative and Management Theory Development and its Application in Islamic Education." *International Journal of Multidisciplinary: Applied Business and Education Research* 4(8), 2920-2932. doi: https://doi.org/10.11594/ijmaber.04.08.29

Tuszynski, Nicholas and Walter E. Block, 2014. "The Principal-Agent Problem Between the Pope and God: How the Printing Press Saved the Papacy." *Humanomics* 30(3), 275-284. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/h-07-2013-0044

Urinboyev, Rustamjon. 2014. "Is There an Islamic Public Administration Legacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia? An Ethnographic Study of Everyday Mahalla Life in Rural Ferghana, Uzbekistan." *Halduskultuur (Administrative Culture)* 15(2), 157-178. https://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/125/123

Welch, Eric and Wilson Wong. 1998. "Public Administration in a Global Context: Bridging the Gaps of Theory and Practice Between Western and Non-Western Nations." *Public Administration Review* 58(1), 40-49. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/976888

Wibowo, Muhammad Ghafur. 2020. "Good Public Governance in Islamic Perspective: An Analysis on the World Governance Indicator in OIC Member Countries." *Ihtifaz: Journal of Islamic Economics, Finance, and Banking* 3(1), 51-66. doi: https://doi.org/10.12928/ijiefb.v3i1.1718

Yunus, Othman Mohd., Munira M., Abdul R. A. R., and Alwi B. S. 2012. "Islamic Work Values and Organisational Commitment: A Case Study Among Employees in the Broadcasting Industry." *China-USA Business Review* 11(2), 161-172. doi: https://doi.org/10.17265/1537-1514/2012.02.001

Zainuldin, Mohd Haniff, Tze Kiat Lui and Kwang Jing Yii. 2018. "Principal-Agent Relationship Issues in Islamic Banks: A View of the Islamic Ethical System." *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 11(2), 297-311.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/imefm-08-2017-0212

Zuraidi, Evalina, Irin Caisarina and Z Fuady. 2020. "The Islamic Public Space Concept in the Southeast Asia Region as a Friendly Urban Design and Planning Enlightening." *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science* 452(1), 012146.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/452/1/012146

Nurul Jamila Hariani is a lecturer in the Public Administration Department at Universitas Airlangga. She graduated from the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose at University College London, where she developed a strong foundation in public innovation and transformative policy. Her academic interests include public value, governance and innovation, areas to which she has actively contributed through both research and teaching. Email: nurul.hariani@fisip.unair.ac.id.

Agie Nugroho Soegiono is a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration, Universitas Airlangga. His teaching and research focus include public policy and comparative public administration, with particular interest in how cultural and institutional contexts shape policy outcomes.

Islamic Public Administration in Indonesia: Eco-Pesantren as a Nexus of Education and Sustainability

JULYAN FERDIANSYAH, DEBIE PUSPASARI, EKO PRASOJO, ZULIANSYAH P. ZULKARNAIN, DEFNY HOLIDIN

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA, DEPOK, INDONESIA

Abstract

The existence of local values in administrative systems and public services has been widely recognized and practiced. Islamic values and institutions in the study of public administration are also increasingly gaining interest in scholarship, with both theoretical and empirical studies being conducted in several countries on the coexistence of Islamic values with public administration to strengthen public services. *Pesantren*, Islamic education institutions in Indonesia that have long played a role in various social services, have become a community driving force in the context of environmental activism, for example, for waste processing and sustainable use of water resources. This paper explores the role of *pesantren* in environmentally friendly waste and water management. Our findings reveal that Islamic values cultivated within pesantren effectively guide communities toward sustainable waste and water management.

Keywords: Education, Sustainability, Environmental Challenges, Waste Management, Community Engagement.

Introduction

Islamic public administration (PA) is a burgeoning field that is gaining scholarly recognition and prominence within administrative science. The recognition of Islam's legitimacy, and thereby Western-style administration's lack of monopoly, is not solely due to the alignment of Islam's fundamental values with universal principles. It is also attributed to the deconstruction of the synthesized terminology of good governance, which is based on perceived global standards rooted in PA norms and practices prevalent in Western countries. The essence is in the delineation and criteria used to define the concept of good governance. Despite the formulation and endorsement of its implementation by international organizations in several countries, including advanced industrial nations and emerging economies, the manifestation of good governance remains profoundly embedded in the historical determinants of each country. The existence of many interpretations and manifestations has led to many faces of public management reform (Wescott et al. 2009; Haque 2022), particularly in Eastern and Southern European countries (Randma-Liiv and Drechsler 2017; Drechsler and Randma-Liiv 2015, 2016; Drechsler 2005, 2009)[1] as well as in their Asian counterparts, specifically in East and Southeast Asia (Berman 2011; Berman and Prasojo 2018; Cheung 2013; Haque et al. 2023; Haque

---

1 See also: Bouckaert et al. 2011; Kostadinova and Neshkova 2013; Meyer-Sahling 2010.

2007, 2013; Nakamura 2021). Regardless, the concurrent growth of multicultural traditions as a determining factor also contributes to advancing a discourse that leads to the recognition of Islamic PA in administrative science (Drechsler et al. 2023).

The recent emergence of Islamic PA has garnered a growing interest due to at least two notable factors. In contrast to Chinese PA, Islamic PA is not inherently associated with certain ethnic identities or entities, a distinction that has been acknowledged in the scholarly debate on PA (Drechsler 2013). Despite Chinese PA and Islamic PA originating from institutionalization on an imperial level, it can be argued that Islamic PA possesses a historical foundation of systematic legal codification and has emerged as a definitive point of reference (Kay 2023; Samier 2017). This is noteworthy, considering that many, if not most, countries with a predominantly Muslim population – that is, Muslim countries – presently operate under secular political systems and laws.

Furthermore, according to Chafik and Drechsler (2022), the presence of Islamic ideals inside the institutional framework of Muslim nations does not automatically imply that the administrative system may be classified as non-Western. The historical context of colonialism and the practice of sending a portion of the population to Western countries for education in PA has resulted in the adoption of Western systems and styles in administrative development, both in poorer and wealthier countries. However, this adoption has not prevented the existing Islamic value system and formal institutions from infusing the established administrative system, or in continuing to exist in parallel with them.

Similarly, the question of acknowledging Islamic PA needs to provide a solution for integrating the Islamic value system within the established Western-style administrative structure (Kay 2023). The inquiry at hand assumes particular significance when considering Muslim nations beyond the confines of the Middle East, wherein Islam is often accorded primacy within societal structures and even governmental systems, albeit in some cases without formal designation as the official state religion.

In recognizing Islamic PA as both a paradigm and a practice, this paper seeks to explore its role in fostering co-creation in public service. We examine how Islamic values and institutions contribute to building trust, fostering community partnerships, and enhancing the responsiveness of PA systems. By situating Islamic PA within the broader discourse on public service innovation and co-creation, the discussion highlights its potential to address the complex challenges of governance in diverse and rapidly changing societies.

Our geographical focus is on Indonesia, a country that presents three salient situational considerations:

> 1. Indonesia's status as one of the world's most populous countries, and at the same time it is predominantly Muslim;

> 2. its geographical location is far outside the Middle East area; and

> 3. its emphasis on Islam as one of the primary sources of moral and ethical norms even without its Muslim citizens speaking Arabic or being immersed in the Middle Eastern culture.

The primary aspect of societal and governmental affairs is the absence of Islam formalization as the official legal framework of the state. The Islamic boarding school educational institution – referred to as *Pesantren* in Indonesia – is often regarded as a pivotal institution in bridging Islamic principles with PA practices, particularly with respect to its connections with policy processes and public service delivery.

A great number of *pesantren* in Indonesia have and continue to contribute to the common good, whether the role of a contributor to public services such as education, healthcare, and disaster relief; an initiator of sustainable development; a propeller of local economic potential; or a producer of school graduates with vocational expertise (Hudaefi and Heryani 2019). Their deep integration into local communities, coupled with their influence as centers of Islamic learning, positions *pesantren* as pivotal actors for addressing societal challenges. This paper will explore the evolving role of *pesantren* in climate change mitigation, emphasizing their potential to align religious teachings with sustainable practices. By leveraging their community influence and moral authority, *pesantren* emerge as key contributors to environmental conservation and resilience efforts.

Public Administration in Indonesian Islam: How Long Can You Go?

The scholarly pursuit of Islamic PA stems from examinations of the fundamental values, beliefs, and traditional norms that underpin public sector management (Yesilkagit 2010). Incorporation of values into a conventional ethical framework is not only limited to emerging economies but is evident in Western countries – think of, for instance, the embodiment of Protestant ethics from the Weberian perspective (Ebner 2010; Eisenstadt 1967; Weber 2005). Nevertheless, the actualization of PA in Western nations has, or so it is still often argued, undergone a process of modernization, which is influenced by factors such as viewpoint, legitimacy, and the establishment of a legal and rational framework (Ongaro 2021; Rosenbloom 1983; Sterling and Moore 1987). In contrast, this comprehensive modernization is not entirely realized in the second and third-world countries, particularly within Muslim-majority countries – the Islamic world. Neoliberalism, New Public Management, and the subsequent development of PA, which was more derived from democratic and market governance principles, have influenced PA globally (Drechsler 2020; Haque et al. 2021; Painter and Peters 2010).

Globalization has imposed intellectual imperialism on Arab and Islamic regimes across the Middle East, exacerbating the Islam-government divide (Hummel 2019; Moloney et al. 2022). Islamic and industrialized societies vary because Islamic beliefs seem to conflict with classically modern managerial practices, resulting in an unproductive workforce (Kuran 2011). Private sector and government administrations use the Western management style notwithstanding its incompatibility with Islam. Broadly speaking, Western philosophy promotes independence and profit, whereas Islamic thought emphasizes collaboration and societal good (Ongaro 2021; Samier 2017).

Moreover, the Islamic World in the aftermath of decolonization diverges from Western nations' modernization and democratization trajectories (Kuru 2014). The phenomenon in this context pertains to the alignment between establishing and advancing administrative systems and practices upon different levels of government and the approaches adopted by Western

nations and endorsed by international organizations advocating such reforms – the perceived global-Western PA. This institutional isomorphism arises from one or more factors, including coercion, normative influence, and explicit imitation. Notwithstanding these realms, it can be observed that while PA strives to adhere to isomorphism, there is a simultaneous tendency of divergence in its development, which is determined by the socio-cultural landscapes of diverging values and cultures (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2017; Jackson and Medvedev 2024; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Given the wide array of diverse cultures of Muslim nations, plural interpretations and manifestations of the global Western PA in the Islamic world are inevitable.

Despite their differences, non-Muslim and Islamic leadership styles are comparable, as the two share universal values as part of their worldview. Islamic leadership focuses on service, protection, and administration (ElKaleh 2023; Hassan and Ahmad 2021). Honesty, justice, compassion, consultation, tolerance, kindness, empathy, and patience underpin these tasks, which are also prominent in Western nations. The manifestation of such shared universal values in the Islamic world does not necessarily make its PA non-Western. However, Western models alone cannot solve work quality issues in many management contexts, especially in the public sector in the Islamic world. From a normative viewpoint, Islamic work ethics boost the quality of work and organizational performance (Daneefard and Azar 2021). These variables support social progress, stability, and economic prosperity.

The essential principles of Islam and people's cultural origins must be linked to those shared notions of virtues to make them effective, relevant, and applicable. The Islamic educational paradigm may improve work practices undermining development in Muslim nations. Right at this point, the educational institutions known as *pesantren* in Indonesia might play crucial roles (Dhofier 1982; Lukens-Bull 2019). *Pesantren* take the Islamic educational tradition of *madrasa* to the next level, in which they integrate conventional training comprising cognitive, affective, and psychomotor aspects alongside an applied ethical upbringing (i.e., character development or *tarbiya*) throughout students' daily lives within a nurtured socio-cultural environment (Herdiansyah et al. 2018; Saputro and Anwar 2021).

Pesantren, as an educational institution, is not exclusive to Indonesia. It has also been established as a fully institutionalized educational institution in adjacent countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand (Lukens-Bull 2010). *Pesantren* in Indonesia possess historically rooted modalities to effectively engage their graduates in addressing the socio-economic challenges faced by society. This involvement can occur at the individual level and within Islamic religious organizations, particularly those associated with the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (Bruinessen 2013). These organizations have played a significant role in the nation's development since its uprising against colonial rule and subsequent post-independence development (Azra 2013; Ricklefs 2012; Steenbrink 2014).

The considerable importance of *pesantren* institutions in Indonesia since its independence until the present may be attributed to at least two primary reasons. The first reason entails the capacity to establish a bond and incorporate Islamic principles with the cultivation of nationalism. However, the essence of resistance, characterized by the concept of *jihad fi sabilillah* – equivalent to outward physical struggle in Western terminology – against colonialism, is deeply ingrained as a fundamental value throughout the institutionalization of *pesantren* and the organized involvement of their graduates in societal and governmental

matters. The concrete manifestation of this has reached an advanced stage, materializing the national consensus as the philosophy of the five principles called *Pancasila* including (i) belief in God, (ii) just and civilized humanity, (iii) the unity of Indonesia, (iv) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, and (v) social justice for all the people of Indonesia (Khamdan and Wiharyani 2018). *Pancasila* bears a closer resemblance to Rousseau's social contract than the gradual process of modernization leading to the establishment of civil religion in Europe following the adoption of the Westphalian-style modern state system (Holidin 2022).

Eco-Pesantren: Foundations and Applications

Pesantren, increasingly aware of global environmental challenges, have actively contributed to addressing issues such as climate change and global warming by incorporating environmental *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence on the environment) into their practices (Turnbull 2021). This was solidified in 1994 during Nahdlatul Ulama's 29th Congress in Cipasung, where polluting the environment was declared *haram* (forbidden) and a criminal act (*jarimah*) (Mufid 2020). Following the 2007 Bali Action Plan, the Lajnah Bahtsul Masail (LBM), a central institution in Nahdlatul Ulama, began taking a more active role in responding to environmental issues. Through *halaqah* (intellectual forums), Islamic scholars and environmental experts came together to develop *green fatwas*, which not only addressed specific environmental concerns but also emphasized Islamic principles such as *amanah* (responsibility), *hifz al-bi'ah* (protection of the environment), and *rahmat lil 'alamin* (mercy and compassion for the universe) (Sobirin and Khasanah 2023). These *fatwas* stressed that environmental conservation is a duty for all Muslims, advocating for practices such as reducing carbon emissions and endorsing carbon trading as permissible under Islamic law.

The practical impact of these *green fatwas* has been far-reaching, particularly in *pesantren*, where environmental education and conservation efforts have become central to their mission. *Pesantren*, as traditional Islamic educational institutions, are increasingly integrating environmental sustainability into their programs. They promote initiatives like reforestation, sustainable land use, and waste management, transforming themselves into hubs for environmental conservation and public education on climate change. These efforts have been further supported through collaborations with the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and Environment, which recognizes *pesantren* as strategic partners in environmental conservation (Herdiansyah et al. 2018). The involvement of *pesantren* in these initiatives reflects a broader commitment to aligning Islamic principles with modern environmental challenges, positioning them as important contributors to both religious and national efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change (Habibi et al. 2022).

This partnership has led to the concept of *eco-pesantren*, rewarding *pesantren* for innovative practices in environmental development. Aulia et al. (2017) highlighted the *eco-pesantren* initiative as an environmentally conscious educational institution aiming to contribute to nature protection and environmental preservation. The approach combines Islamic principles of environmental protection with traditional conservation methods (Mangunjaya and McKay 2012). It is a collaborative effort involving *pesantren* and various stakeholders to implement programs such as waste banks, environmental cleanliness campaigns, sustainable land

use, increased cultivation of medicinal plants, and integrating environmental education into the curriculum (Herdiansyah et al. 2018). Among the most impactful initiatives are waste management and water recycling, which have become central to the *eco-pesantren* model.

Waste Bank

The Indonesia Ministry of Environment reports that almost 50% of waste sources are dominated by household waste (Media Indonesia 2022). *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) have become one of the entities that contribute to producing household waste in Indonesia. The activities of *pesantren* residents, which begin from waking up until returning to rest, involve a fairly busy routine, supported by a very large human resource base, and facilities that remain inadequate (El Madaniya 2024). This implies that *pesantren* produce a considerable amount of waste with insufficient waste management. Furthermore, the public often perceives that *pesantren* are still not effectively managing their household waste.

A rough assumption made by the environmental observers is that every day each person contributes 0.6 kg of waste (Ulinnuha 2023). If we multiply this by the total number of students in *pesantren*, which is estimated to reach 4.85 million people in 2023 (detik.com 2024), the daily waste produced by *pesantren* in Indonesia amounts to 82.5 tons. However, *pesantren* are a potential partner in expanding waste banks to address current environmental issues. It has been highlighted in various studies that waste banks are an effective way for communities to tackle the waste accumulation and production which is increasing.

One of the waste banks that has been developed at the Pesantren Al-Ihya in Cilacap Regency started in 2012 and is still a profitable business unit for *pesantren*. The initiative to establish the waste bank was catalyzed by the increasing volume of waste accumulation and the insufficient landfill space to accommodate the growing waste. The waste bank uses the concept of waste segregation between organic and inorganic waste, allowing the waste to be reused to minimize pollution, disease, and environmental issues caused by waste accumulation.

Figure 1: Sorting inorganic and organic waste. Source: PP Al Ihya, 2024.

According to data, Al-Ihya Islamic Boarding School itself produces 1.2 to 2 tons of waste per day (Lutfiani 2022). The waste generated is collected as savings for the *pesantren*'s residents

(See Figure 1). The management of inorganic waste is processed into handicraft products (See Figure 2), which can be used by the *pesantren* residents or given to the surrounding residents. These handicrafts can even be sold. Certainly, this is not only done by Al-Ihya Islamic Boarding School but also by other *pesantren*, for example, Darusallam Islamic Boarding School and Annuqayah Lubangsa Islamic Boarding School.

Figure 2 : Processing waste into craft goods. Source: opop.jatimprov.go.id, 2021 (left) and lubangsa, 2021 (right).

Meanwhile, organic waste (food waste) such as vegetables, rice, and other leftovers becomes the main source for maggot farming (See Figure 3). Al-Ihya Islamic Boarding School cultivates maggots that feed on food waste, and the maggots are harvested once a week, producing more or less 50 kg (Lutfiani 2022). The harvested maggots are used as livestock feed for the *pesantren*'s animals farm and eventually for market selling.

Figure 3: Waste management into maggots for animal feed and selling. Source: PP Al Ihya, 2024.

Other than providing social and environmental benefits, such as a clean and comfortable living environment, the waste bank also provides economic benefits from the sale of waste that has been processed by the Pesantren Al-Ihya Waste Bank. The proceeds are returned to the depositors and the *pesantren*. The depositors use the earnings to meet their daily needs while at the *pesantren*, while the funds returned to the *pesantren* are managed to assist less fortunate students and the surrounding community, for example, by providing free food donations. Since 2020, the utilization of waste for this purpose has been carried out and is referred to as "waste charity" generated by the depositors. The benefits of this initiative are not only felt by Al-Ihya Pesantren but also by the surrounding community, such as residents of Kesugihan Kidul Village in Kesugihan District, Cilacap Regency (Pcnucilacap 2023).

(Ablution) Water

In general, *pesantren* in Indonesia rely on groundwater for daily needs such as bathing, washing, drinking, and performing ablution (Akhmaddhian et al. 2023). This demand is not balanced by the availability and quality of water. As of 2023, there exists a clean water crisis that is still being experienced by hundreds of *pesantren* across Indonesia (Asianpost.id 2024). The water crisis that they experience starts from groundwater that tends to become turbid during high rainfall and from water shortages during the dry season (Beritajateng 2024). To address this issue, *pesantren* have started recycling wastewater, particularly after the use of ablution water.

An estimated calculation of the daily water needed for each student during ablution is about 2 liters, if multiplied by the five daily prayers and the total number of students, the amount of water wasted after ablution quickly adds up to a non-trivial amount (Citarum.jabarprov.go.id 2024). For example, the number of students in 2017 in Garut was 68,000. Therefore, 2 liters × 5 × 68,000 results in 680,000 liters of water being wasted every day. This estimate applies to *pesantren* in a single city or district. Now, consider the total number of *pesantren* in Indonesia, which reached 30,494 in 2021.

The potential for clean water generated through the recycling of ablution water is substantial and can be continuously utilized for other needs such as bathing, washing, greening, irrigating rice fields, and fish farming. In addition to providing clean water, it is important to maintain the water channels to ensure that water flows smoothly without blockages, preventing stagnant, dirty water from accumulating around the *pesantren*. The benefits of recycled ablution water, when the flow channels are properly maintained, can extend to agricultural irrigation, making farming systems cleaner and healthier. This agricultural concept has been implemented by various *pesantren*, including Pesantren Ath-Thaariq in Garut, West Java (Muhardi et al. 2020).

The process of recycling ablution water is simply performed by using a filtration system to turn the used water into reusable and non-consumable water (See Figure 4). Ablution water is categorized as water that is free from chemical contamination (Viva.co.id 2016), making it suitable for simple filtration to manage the used water. There are three main infrastructures in the filtration process: (1) a pond with a base of river stones, (2) a filtration device that is made

out of stones and sand, and (3) a tank where the water is collected after passing through the filtration system (Malik and Nafi 2019). Of course, this filtration process is not as simple as it seems. Proper water management requires careful planning, research, appropriate governance, technology adaptation, and also long-term evaluation and maintenance of the system filtration infrastructure.

Figure 4: Water filtration pool. Source: Irmawanty and Syam, 2024.

The *pesantren* have made efforts to embody Islamic teachings with a spirit of building an ecological culture, one of which is by conserving water (Maula 2022). Certainly, this aligns with the interpretation of the Prophet's (p.b.u.h) saying, which teaches that humans are beings who not only interact with themselves and others but also with the environment. Therefore, the concept of Pesantren Ath-Thaariq demonstrates that the role of students who care for ecology is equally important as caring for themselves and the natural world.

Figure 5: Water ablution (used) for fish ponds. Source: detik.com, 2022 (left); mihidayatulislam, 2024 (right).

The recycled ablution water at Pesantren Ath-Thaariq is also used to support animal habitats, such as tilapia and catfish ponds (see Figure 5). The fish are not only harvested, but the pond water is also managed for irrigating plants. The fish are fed with snails cultivated in the pond, and these snails are also consumable. The fish produced can be consumed by the Pesantren residents, and any surplus is sold to the local community at more affordable prices (Detik. com 2022).

The efforts for water efficiency by this *pesantren* certainly have a positive impact for the local community, and if this practice is consistently and sustainably implemented by all *pesantren*, it is very likely to help maintain clean water availability for future generations. In fact, the proactive role of *pesantren* in managing clean water usage could potentially prevent the clean water crisis in Indonesia, which, according to the World Water Forum (Asianpost.id 2024), will start being felt in 2025 and 2040. Then, by positioning themselves as leaders in environmental education and sustainability, *eco-pesantren* are helping to cultivate a new generation of environmentally conscious Muslims who can contribute to both religious and environmental causes (Herdiansyah et al. 2018).

Conclusion

Pesantren in Indonesia have emerged as a critical nexus of education and sustainability, showcasing their ability to align Islamic principles with contemporary environmental challenges. The concept of *eco-pesantren* reflects a transformative approach where traditional Islamic boarding schools integrate environmental stewardship into their educational framework. By adopting innovative practices such as waste banks and ablution water recycling, *eco-pesantren* demonstrate how faith-based institutions can contribute to global efforts in climate change mitigation and sustainability.

As centers of education, *pesantren* play a dual role: nurturing spiritual and moral values while equipping students with practical knowledge and skills to address real-world challenges. The *eco-pesantren* model bridges these dimensions by embedding sustainability into both curricula and daily practices. Waste bank initiatives illustrate how *pesantren* can transform waste management into opportunities for environmental education, economic empowerment, and community development. Similarly, the recycling of ablution water represents an innovative and symbolic practice that emphasizes resource conservation, reinforcing the Islamic teaching of avoiding wastefulness (*israf*) and promoting ecological mindfulness.

The role of *eco-pesantren* extends beyond their community, influencing local communities and contributing to national sustainability goals. Collaborations with government agencies, local communities, non-government organizations, and private sector entities have further amplified their impact, providing technical support, funding, and scalability. Through these efforts, *eco-pesantren* have positioned themselves as leaders in fostering environmental awareness, building community resilience, and addressing climate change.

Eco-pesantren embody the idea that education is about knowledge transmission and shaping behaviors and attitudes. They provide a living example of how religious institutions can evolve to address the pressing needs of modern society, aligning spiritual teachings with sustainable practices. By serving as a nexus of education and sustainability, *eco-pesantren* inspire a generation of environmentally conscious individuals who are equipped to contribute to both their faith and the planet.

References

Akhmaddhian, Suwari et al. 2023. "Sosialisasi dan Pelatihan Pengelolaan Air Bersih di Pondok Pesantren Binaul Ummah Kuningan." *Empowerment: Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat* 6(03), 256-261. doi: https://doi.org/10.25134/empowerment.v6i03.8764

Asianpost.id. 2024. "Gawat Tahun 2024 Indonesia Krisis Air Bersih Dimulai dari Pesantren." Available online: https://asianpost.id/gawat-tahun-2024-indonesia-krisis-air-bersih-dimulai-dari-pesantren/ (Last accessed 1/11/2024).

Aulia, Rihlah Nur, Nanda Isnaini and Umi Khumairoh. 2017. "Pengelolaan Lingkunga Berbasis Pesantren (Studi Kasus di Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim Lombok NTB)." *Hayula* 1(2), 229-244. doi: https://doi.org/10.21009/hayula.001.2.06

Azra, Azyumardi. 2013. *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*. Bandung: Mizan Pustaka.

Azzahra, Nadia Fairuza. 2020. "Effects of the Pesantren Law on Indonesia's Education System – A Projection." *Discussion Paper, No. 9, Center for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS), Jakarta.*

Basyaruddin, Ali and Arif Khoiruddin. 2020. "Peran Pembina Asrama dalam Pembelajaran di Pondok Pesantren." *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 4(1), 1-10.

Beritajateng. 2024. "Krisis Air Bersih Santri terpaksa Jarang Mandi." Available online: https://beritajateng.id/berita/krisis-air-bersih-santri-di-winong-pati-terpaksa-jarang-mandi/ (Last accessed 18/11/2024).

Berman, Evan (ed.). 2011. *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao.* Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Berman, Evan and Eko Prasojo. 2018. *Leadership and Public Sector Reform in Asia*. London: Emerald Group Publishing.

Bouckaert, Geert, Vitalis Nakrošis and Juraj Nemec. 2011. "Public Administration and Management Reforms in CEE: Main Trajectories and Results." *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy* 4(1), 9-29. doi: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10110-011-0001-9

Boxenbaum, Eva and Stefan Jonsson. 2017. "Isomorphism, Diffusion, and Decoupling: Concept Evolution and Theoretical Challenges." In Royston Greenworod et al. (eds). *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. 2nd ed*. London: Sage Publications, 77-101.

Bruinessen, Martin. 2013. "Overview of Muslim Organizations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia." In Martin van Bruinessen (ed.). *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn".* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 21-59.

Chafik, Salah and Wolfgang Drechsler. 2022. "In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan *zawāyā* as Good Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 82(4), 747-755. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13475

Cheung, Anthony. 2013. "Can There Be An Asian Model of Public Administration?" *Public Policy and Development* 33(4), 249-261. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1660

Citarum.jabarprov.co.id. 2024. "Memanfaatkan Air Bekas Wudhu." Available online: https://citarumharum.jabarprov.go.id/memanfaatkan-air-bekas-wudhu/ (Last accessed 18/11/2024).

Daneefard, Hassan and Morteza Javanali Azar. 2021. "Islamic Public Administration." In Ali Farazmand (ed.). *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 1-18.

Detik.com. 2022. "Ath-Thaariq Pesantren Ekologi yang Dilirik PBB." Available online: 2024. https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-6402253/ath-thaariq-pesantren-ekologi-dari-garut-yang-dilirik-pbb (Last accessed 1/11/2024).

Detik.com. 2024. "Asa Indonesia Bersih Sampah dari Pesantren." Available online: https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-7524217/asa-indonesia-bersih-sampah-dari-pesantren (last accessed 18/11/2024).

Dhofier, Zamakhsyari. 1982. *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi pandangan hidup kyai dan visinya mengenai masa depan Indonesia*. Jakarta: LP3ES.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2005. "The Re-Emergence of 'Weberian' Public Administration after the Fall of the New Public Management: The Central and Eastern European Perspective." *Halduskultuur* 6, 94–108.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2009. "The Rise and Demise of the New Public Management: Lessons and Opportunities for South East Europe." *Uprava – Administration* (previously: *Central European Public Administration Review* 7(3), 7–27. doi: https://doi.org/10.17573/cepar. v7i3.131

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2013. "Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western, and Islamic." *Society and Economy* 35(3), 319–342. doi: https://doi.org/10.1556/ SocEc.35.2013.3.3

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2020. "ePostscript to the Second Edition: Philosophy in and of Public Administration Today, Global-Western and Non-Western." In Edoardo Ongaro (ed.). *Philosophy and Public Administration*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 296–302.

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Rainer Kattel and Salah Chafik. 2023. "Islamic Public Administration and Islamic Public Value: Towards a Research Agenda." *Public Policy & Administration*, 1–17. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767231201799

Drechsler, Wolfgang and Tiina Randma-Liiv. 2015. "The New Public Management Then and Now: Lessons from the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe." In Michiel de Vries and JurajNemec (eds.). *Implementation of New Public Management Tools. Experiences from transition and emerging countries*. Brussels: Bruylant, 33–49.

Drechsler, Wolfgang and Tiina Randma-Liiv. 2016. "In Some Central and Eastern Countries, Some NPM Tools Sometimes Work: A Reply to Dan and Pollitt's 'NPM Can Work'." *Public Management Review* 18(10), 1559–1565. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2015.1114137

Ebner, Alexander. 2010. "Max Weber, the Protestant Ethics, and the Sociology of Capitalist Development." In Jurgen Backhaus (ed.). *The Reformation: As a Pre-condition for Modern Capitalism*. Lberlin: LIT Verlag, 231–255.

Eisenstadt, Samuel. 1967. "The Protestant Ethic Thesis in Analytical and Comparative Context." *Diogenes* 15 (59), 25–46. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/039219216701505902

ElKaleh, Eman. 2023. "A Model of Balanced Leadership from an Islamic Perspective: What Makes a Balanced and Effective Muslim Leader." In Noha El-Bassiouny, Ahmed Amin, and Jonathan Wilson (eds). *What Makes a Balanced Leader: An Islamic Perspective*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 45–62.

El Madaniya, Nadiya. 2024. "Peran Pesantren Dalam Mendukung Tercapainya Sustainable Development Goals Dengan Pengelolaan Sampah Berbasis Bank Sampah (Studi Pondok Pesantren Darussalam Blokagung Banyuwangi)." *Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi Islam* 10(1), 483–489. doi: https://doi.org/10.29040/jiei.v10i1.12211

Habibi, Debi Fajrin, et al. 2022. "Pesantren Dan Pengembangan Kesadaran Lingkungan: Upaya Mitigasi Perubahan Iklim." *Risalah, Jurnal Pendidikan Dan Studi Islam* 8(4),1375–1385. doi: https://doi.org/10.31943/jurnal_risalah.v8i4.411

Haque, Shamsul. 2007. "Theory and Practice of Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Traditions, Directions, and Impacts." *International Journal of Public Administration* 30(12-14), 1297–1326. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690701229434

Haque, Shamsul. 2013. "Public Administration in a Globalized Asia: Intellectual Identities, Challenges, and Prospects." *Public Administration and Development* 33(4), 262–274. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1658

Haque, Shamsul. 2022. "Paradoxes of Universal Knowledge in Public Administration: Exploring the Contexts of Africa and Asia." *Asia Journal of Political Science* 30(1), 19–34. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2022.2063148

Haque, Shamsul, Zeger van der Waal and Caspar van der Berg. 2021. "Comparative Studies in Public Administration: Intellectual Challenges and Alternative Perspectives." *Public Administration Review* 81(2), 344–348. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13349

Haque, Shamsul, Wilson Wong and Kilkon Ko. 2023. "Why Public Administration in Asia? An Introduction." In Shamsul Haque, Wilson Wong and Kilkon Ko (eds). *Handbook on Asian Public Administration*. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1–8.

Hassan, Hemin Ali and Ahmed Bayiz Ahmad. 2021. "The Relationship between Islamic Work Ethic and Public Service Motivation." *Administration & Society* 53(9), 1390–1417. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399721998335

Herdiansyah, Herdis, Hadid Sukmana and Ratih Lestarini. 2018. "Eco-Pesantren as a Basic Forming of Environmental Moral and Theology." *Kalam* 12(2), 303–326. doi: https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.v12i2.2834

Holidin, Defny. 2022. "The Compatibility of Islam and Pancasila in Indonesia's Declining Democracy." *Politics and Religion Journal* 16(2), 179–202. doi: https://doi.org/10.54561/prj1602179h

Hudaefi, Fahmi Ali and Neni Heryani. 2019. "The Practice of Local Economic Development and Maqasid al-Sharī'ah: Evidence from a Pesantren in West Java, Indonesia." *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management* 12(5), 625–642. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-08-2018-0279

Hummel, Daniel. 2019. "Public Administration in the Islamic World: Considering the Importance of Religion, its Values and Culture." *Halduskultuur: The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance* 19(2), 23–38.

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Irmawanty, Irmawanty, Riza Hayati and Haerul Syam. 2024. "Pengolahan Air Limbah Wudhu Menjadi Air Siap Pakai Non Konsumtif di Lingkungan Pondok Pesantren Darul Aman Gombara." *Jurnal Abdimas Indonesia* 4(3), 985–993. doi: https://doi.org/10.53769/jai.v4i3.817

Isbah, Falikul. 2021. "Pengaruh dan Dukungan Eksternal bagi Aktivisme Sosial-Ekonomi Pesantre." In Endy Saputroand Zainal Anwar. (eds). *Metodologi Penelitian Keagamaan-Interdisipliner: Kajian Sosial Masyarakat dan Pesantren* Surakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat (LP2M) UIN Raden Mas Said Surakarta, 1–38.

Jackson, Joshua Conrad and Danila Medvedev. 2024. "Worldwide Divergence of Values." *Nature Communications* 15(2650), 1–14. doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-46581-5

Kay, Adrian. 2023. "The Changing Traditions of Islamic Public Administration: Observing Processes of Collision, Absorption and Adaptation." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 46(1), 13–30. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2023.2275283

Khamdan, Moh and W. Wiharyani. 2018. "Islam Nusantara in Political Contestation Identity Religion in Indonesia." *ADDIN* 12(2), 491–520. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/addin.v12i2.4774

Kostadinova, Tatiana and Milena Neshkova. 2013. "Explaining the Incidence of Administrative Reform in Eastern Europe." In Mirko Vintar, et al. (eds). *The Past, Present and the Future of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bratislava: NISPAcee Press, 91–107.

Kuran, Timur. 2011. *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kuru, Ahmet. 2014. "Authoritarianism and Democracy in Muslim Countries: rentier States and Regional Diffusion." *Political Science Quarterly* 129(3), 399–427. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12215

Lubangsa. 2021. "Panitia Akhir Sanah laksanakan Pelatihan Pengelolaan Sampah." Available online: https://www.lubangsa.org/lubangsa_v2/berita/panitia-akhir-sanah-laksanakan-pelatihan-pengolahan-sampah (Last accessed 16/11/2024).

Lukens-Bull, Ronald. 2010. "Madrasa by any Other Name: Pondok, Pesantren, and Islamic Schools in Indonesia and Larger Southeast Asian Region." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4(1), 1–21. doi: https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2010.4.1.1-21

Lukens-Bull, Ronald. 2019. "Pesantren, Madrasa, and the Future of Islamic Education in Indonesia." *Kawalu: Journal of Local Culture* 6(1), 29–48. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.32678/kawalu.v6i1.2044

Lutfiani, Lutfiani. 2022. *Strategi Komunikasi Bank Sampah Nusantara (Bsn) Pondok Pesantren Al-Ihya 'Ulumaddin Dalam Meningkatkan Ekonomi Masyarakat Desa Kesugihan Kidul*

Kecamatan Kesugihan Kabupaten Cilacap. Doctoral dissertation. Cilacap: Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Al Ghazali.

Malik, Imam and Nafi' M. Zidni. 2019. *Menuju Pesantren Hijau*. LPBI Press: Jakarta.

Mangunjaya, Fachruddin Majeri and Jeanne Elizabeth McKay. 2012. "Reviving an Islamic Approach for Environmental Conservation in Indonesia." *Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology* 16(3), 286-305. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685357-01603006

Maula, Inayatul. 2022. "Pondok Pesantren Ekologi At Thoriq: Dari Sustainability Alam Menuju Kemandirian Ekonomi." *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 12(2), 9-16. doi: https://doi.org/10.38073/jpi.v12i2.934

Media Indonesia. 2022. "Pengelolaan sampah di Pesantren Agar Menjadi Emas." Available online: https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/538217/pengelolaan-sampah-di-pesantren-agar-menjadi-emas (Last accessed 1/11/2024).

Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik. 2010. "In Search of the Shadow of the Past: Legacy Explanations and Administrative Reform in Post-Communist East Central Europe." In Martin Painter and Guy Peters. (eds). *Tradition and Public Administration.* Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 203-216.

Mihidayatulislam. 2024. "Pemanfaatan limbah air wudhu ikan dan konservasi air". Available online: https://mihidayatulislam.sch.id/2024/06/21/pemanfaatan-limbah-air-wudhu-untuk-budidaya-ikan-nila-sebagai-wadah-konservasi-air/ (Last accessed 5/11/2024).

Moloney, Kim et al. 2022. "Methodological Americanism: Disciplinary Senility and Intellectual Hegemonies in (American) Public Administration." *Administrative Theory & Practice* 44(4), 261-276. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2022.2140387

Mufid, Moh. 2020. "Green Fatwas in Bahtsul Masā'il: Nahdlatul Ulama's Response to the Discourse of Environmental Crisis in Indonesia". *Al-Ihkam: Jurnal Hukum dan Pranata Sosial* 15(2), 173-200. doi: https://doi.org/10.19105/al-Ihkam.v15i2.3956

Muhardi, M, N. Nurdin and A. Irfani. 2020. "The Role of Knowledge-Based Ecological Pesantren in Environmental Conservation." In *Journal of Physics: Conference Series* 1469(1), 012126. doi: 10.1088/1742-6596/1469/1/012126

Nakamura, Akira. 2022. "East Asian Models of Public Administration: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects". In Peters, Guy B and Ian Thynne, *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Public Administration.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ongaro, Edoardo. 2021. "Non-Western Philosophies and Public Administration." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration* 43(1), 6-10. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2020.1844027

Opop.jatimprov.co.id. 2021. "Pesantren Darussalam Ubah Sampah Plastik Jadi Hiasan Bunga." Available online: https://opop.jatimprov.go.id/detail/427/pesantren-darussalam-ubah-sampah-plastik-jadi-hiasan-bunga (Last accessed 17/11/2024).

Painter, Martin and Guy Peters. 2010. "The Analysis of Administrative Tradition." In Martin Painter and Guy Peters (eds). *Tradition and Public Administration*. Basingstoke; Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 3-16.

Pcnucilacap.com. 2023. "Biokonservasi Sampah Al-Ihya, dari Sampah menjadi Rupiah." Available online: https://pcnucilacap.com/biokonservasi-bank-sampah-al-ihya-dari-sampah-jadi-rupiah/ (last accessed 18/11/2024).

PP Al Ihya. 2024. Maggot Merubah Sampah Jadi Rupiah. Youtube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcoxsT0mInM (Last accessed 18/11/2024).

Randma-Liiv, Tiina and Wolfgang Drechsler. 2017. "Three Decades, Four Phases: Public Administration Development in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989-2017." *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 30(6-7), 595-605. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-06-2017-0175

Ricklefs, Merle Calvin. 2012. *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to Present.* Honolulu: Hawaii/University of Hawaii Press.

Rosenbloom, David. 1983. "Public Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers". *Public Administration Review* 43(3), 219-227. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074013483167

Samier, Eugenie. 2017. Islamic Public Administration Tradition: Historical, Theoretical and Practical Dimensions. *Halduskultuur*,*18*(1), 53-71.

Saputro, Endy and Zainal Anwar. 2021. *Metodologi Penelitian Keagamaan-Interdisipliner: Kajian Sosial Masyarakat dan Pesantren*. Surakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat (LP2M) UIN Raden Mas Said Surakarta.

Sobirin, Mohamad and Karimatul Khasanah. 2023. "The Pesantren Scholars' Fatwa on Global Warming and Climate Change: An Integrative Analysis of Islamic Law, Theology, and Environmental Sciences on the Practice of Multidisciplinary Ijtihad." *Cogent Arts and Humanities, 10*, 2193023, 1-16. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2023.2193023

Steenbrink, Karel. 2014. *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts, 1596-1950*. Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi.

Sterling, Joyce and Wilbert Moore. 1987. "Weber's Analysis of Legal Rationalization: A Critique and Constructive Modification." *Sociological Forum* 2(1), 67-89. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01107894

Turnbull, Elle. 2021. "What Islamic Contributions Have Been Made to Climate Change Action and How Useful Are They in Promoting Environmental Justice?" *Journal of Financial Crime* 28(4), 1032-1042. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-10-2020-0208

Ulinnuha, Muhammad. 2023. "Pesantren dan Tanggung Jawab Masalah Sampah." Available online: https://annurngrukem.com/pesantren-dan-tanggung-jawab-masalah-sampah/ (last accessed 18/11/2024).

Velasufah, Whasfi and Adib Rifqi Setiawan. 2020. *Nilai Pesantren sebagai dasar pendidikan karakter*. Thesis Commons. https://osf.io/preprints/thesiscommons/hq6kz_v1

Viva.co.id. 2016. "Pesantren Daur Ulang Limbah Air Wudhu." Available online: https://www.viva.co.id/arsip/786175-pesantren-ini-daur-ulang-limbah-air-wudu (last accessed 18/11/2024).

Weber, Florence. 2005. *Le sang, le nom, le quotidien. Une sociologie de la parenté pratique.* París: Aux Lieux D'être.

Wescott, Clay, Bidhya Bowornwathana and Lawrence. 2009. *The Many Faces of Public Management Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region*. London: Emerald Group Publishing.

Yesilkagit, Kutsul. 2010. "The Future of Administrative Tradition: Tradition as Ideas and Structure." In Martin Painter and Guy Peters (eds). *Tradition and Public Administration*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 145-157.

Julyan Ferdiansyah is a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration and serves as Deputy Director of Center for Study of Governance and Administrative Reform (UI-CSGAR) at Universitas Indonesia. His research interests include public policy, public sector reform, digital transformation, and institutions. Email: julyanf@ui.ac.id

Debie Puspasari is a lecturer and researcher at the Faculty of Administrative Science, Universitas Indonesia. Her research areas include non-western public administration, public value, public policy, governance and strategic management, and digital transformation. Email: debiepuspasari@ui.ac.id

Eko Prasojo is a professor of public administration and former dean of Faculty of Administrative Science at Universitas Indonesia. He is now the executive secretary of Steering Committee for National Bureaucratic Reform the Republic of Indonesia and President of Asian Group of Public Administration (AGPA). He served as vice minister of administrative reform from 2011 to 2014 and member of the United Nations Committee of Experts in Public Administration. Email: prasojo1@ui.ac.id

Zuliansyah Putra Zulkarnain is a lecturer at the Department of Public Administration and serves as Executive Director of Center for Study of Governance and Administrative Reform (UI-CSGAR) at Universitas Indonesia. His expertise and research area encompass public policy, institutions, and multilevel governance. He also serves as an Expert at the Steering Committee for National Bureaucratic Reform in the Republic of Indonesia. Email: zuliansyah.putra@ui.ac.id

Defny Holidin is a lecturer in public policy and administration at Universitas Indonesia. He also researches the postmodern approach to non-Western government system reform at Universität Osnabrück while serving as a country expert for the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. Email: defny@ui.ac.id

The Role of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences at the Prince of Songkla University Building of Islamic Public Value of Multicultural Citizenship in southern Thailand

IMTIYAZ YUSUF, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILISATION, INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA (ISTAC-IIUM), MALAYSIA AND CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC WORLD (CICW) SHENANDOAH UNIVERSITY, WINCHESTER, VA, USA

ARTHIT THONGIN, SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SUKHOTHAI THAMMATHIRAT OPEN UNIVERSITY, NONTHABURI, THAILAND

Abstract

Religion-based value administration has been an integral part of all societies since ancient historical periods. This article explores the intersection of Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) and Islamic Public Value (IPV) within the socio-political and educational framework of southern Thailand, focusing on the Faculty of Islamic Sciences (FIS) at Prince of Songkla University. Amidst a century-long conflict and challenges to multicultural citizenship, the FIS has emerged as a vital institution for fostering self-reliant Pattani Muslim citizens. By aligning Thailand's development policies with Islamic values, the faculty addresses the dual imperatives of preserving ethno-religious identity and promoting social cohesion. The historical evolution of the FIS, its role in higher education, and its alignment with national policies underscore its transformative impact on local communities and its contribution to peace-building and integration in a diverse society.

Keywords: Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP), Islamic Public Value (IPV), Faculty of Islamic Sciences (FIS), Multicultural Citizenship, southern Thailand.

Introduction

This article is of an odd type among others in this Special Issue about Islamic public administration in Southeast Asia. The main reason is that the ongoing, century-old violent conflict in Thailand's four Muslim-majority southern provinces has hindered the development of multicultural citizenship in the Thai political space.

This article examines the co-relation between Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) and Islamic Public Value (IPV) about the role of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences or FIS, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani campus in the deep south Malay Muslim majority provinces of

Thailand. The establishment of the first tertiary-level educational institution, viz., the College of Islamic Studies College (now known as the Faculty of Islamic Science) in 1981 and its gradual development over decades into a full faculty is playing an important role in the forming and development of the local Muslim youth in becoming self-reliant Pattani Muslim citizens in multicultural Thailand.

Sufficiency Economy Philosophy: The Role of Tertiary Education in the Deep South in creating Islamic Public Value

Political Context

Thailand is a semi-secular constitutional monarchy that has undergone 19 coups since 1932, with brief interludes of democratic rule (Farrelly, Nicholas 2013; Keyes, Charles F 2015; Samudavanija, Chai-Anan 1987). The functional defect of not recognizing the ethno-religious difference of the Deep South is one of the main obstacles to building an inclusive and peaceful multicultural citizenship that comprises both the Thai Buddhist majority and the Malay Muslim minority, respecting their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identities. The challenge dates back to 1892 when the independent kingdom of Patani had a tributary relationship with the kingdom of Siam, followed by the era of establishing modern bureaucracies in 1906, which abolished the structure of traditional local elites; democratization after 1932; the assimilationist policies of the Thai state beginning with Prime Minister Phibulsongkhram's regime in the 1930s; and the open hostilities of the government and military between 2004 and 2009 (Baker, Chris, 2022). The struggle of local Patani people (i.e. residents of the three southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) centers on resistance to full assimilation and oppression, and their desire to exercise greater control over the region's resources and their own culture and religion (Poocharoen, Ora-Orn 2010).

In 1980, General Prem Tinsulanond, who at the time served as the Prime Minister of Thailand, initiated a series of democratically inclined policy reforms under the umbrella policy of "Politics Leading Military" (Che Man, Wan Kadir 2003, p. 16). Notably, he initiated the "Peaceful South" policy, designed specifically to coordinate various government agencies in the deep South to work for peace and stability in the area. In 1981, General Prem also set up the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) as an agency to coordinate and open up a space for dialogue between the security forces, the civilian government agencies, and the general public. Concurrently, a joint force known as "Civilian-Police-Military 43" was organized to function as a security force against separatist activities in the Muslim-majority region.

The next elected government of General Chatichai Choonhavan between 1988 and 1991 implemented the "Peaceful South" policy, which was meant to promote social harmony by allowing the religious and cultural customs of the Muslims to be practiced more freely On 31 December 1989, the Chatichai government finally approved   the long-term demand of southern Malay Muslims to establish the first College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkla University. The government of General Chatichai Choonhavan was overthrown a decade later by a military coup, which subsequently resulted in large protests known as Black May and the

intervention of HM King Bhumibol Adulyadej (reign 9 June 1946–13 October 2016). This paved the way for the first democratically elected government of Chuan Leekphai, who twice served as the Prime Minister of Thailand, from 1992 to 1995 and from 1997 to 2001. The Chuan Leekphai era also led to the framing of the 1997 constitution, known as the "People's Constitution" (Maisrikrod, Surin 1992; Che Man, Wan Kadir 2003, p. 24).

The purpose of presenting the above survey of contemporary Thai political history sets the background for addressing the focus of this article, namely, how, in light of the ongoing insurgency in the Deep South, Thai state development policy constructively engaged the local Islamic tradition, in the form of tertiary education, and in so doing helped address the pressing need to construct an authentic path of multicultural citizenship. As such, the following section delves into the compatibility between Thailand's development plan of SEP in the Deep South with IPV.

Sufficiency Economy Philosophy and Islamic Public Value in the Deep South of Thailand

King Bhumibol Adulyadej or Rama IX (d. 2016), the longest-reigning monarch of Thailand, reigned for a total period of just over 70 years. In his accession speech, he proclaimed: "I shall reign with righteousness for the benefits and happiness of the Siamese people" (Promchertchoo, 2016)

Nearly 30 years into his reign, King Adulyadej introduced SEP (Thai: เศรษฐกิจพอเพียง, *Setthakit Phophiang*) at a speech at Kasetsart University in 1974 as Thailand's plan for development. Being largely an agricultural country, agro-economics was to form the foundation of Thailand's development plan, and only thereafter industrial development:

> Development of the country must proceed in stages. First of all, there must be a foundation with the majority of the people having enough to live on by using methods and equipment which are economical but technically correct as well. When such a secure foundation is adequately ready and operational, then it can be gradually expanded and developed to raise prosperity and the economic standard to a higher level by stages. (*Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy*, 2017, pp. 26–27)

The prominence of the SEP became more relevant during the 1997 economic crisis that hit all of the ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – countries. In his annual nationwide televised address on the occasion of his birthday on 4 December 1997, the King Bhumibol Adulyadej remarked that:

> Recently, so many projects have been implemented, so many factories have been built, that it was thought Thailand would become a little tiger, and then a big tiger. People were crazy about becoming a tiger…

> Being a tiger is not important. The important thing for us is to have a sufficient economy. A sufficient economy means to have enough to support ourselves…

It doesn't have to be complete, not even half, perhaps just a quarter, then we can survive…

Those who like modern economics may not appreciate this. But we have to take a careful step backwards. (*Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy*, 2017, p. 20)

While proposing SEP, the King was also well aware of the ethno-religious diversity that required special attention in addressing the development of the country's deep south Muslim majority provinces (Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2003, 2022b). The King proposed that the implementation of SEP in developing the deep south should in essence be to "understand, reach out, and develop" (*Policy Guidelines for Peacebuilding in the Deep South for the 2025 Fiscal Year*, 2024).

He believed that development should consider the local culture, traditions, and way of life. He also believed that people's attitudes could not be forced and that it was important to understand what the people wanted and explain the principles of development to them in a language they understood when implementing governmental development projects. Although there is a religious or a Buddhist dimension of SEP, it does not conflict with the religious dimension of IPV.

His Majesty's sufficiency economy comprises four dimensions. Sufficiency economy in *economic dimension*   focuses on adequacy to one's needs, diligence, working for self-reliance, being free from poverty, and the implementation of the new theory. For the *mind dimension*, it involves the mind that thinks over moderation, modesty, and less craving. Sufficiency economy in *social dimension* aims to create peaceful society and generous people who care for each other, while the *cultural dimension* focuses on the life with simplicity and frugality (EGAT, p. 41).

IPV as a policy of public administration and management is rooted in extant institutions that base themselves on the teachings of the Qur'an and modeled on the *Sunnah* – the practice of the Prophet. It contains four basic theological concepts: *Ilah* – Allah the One and the Almighty; *Rabb* – the Lord who does not share with anyone else His qualities and attributes; *Deen* – religion as a way of life is exclusively for Him; and *Ibadah* – the human being should worship and Him and Him alone, and not anyone else.

These are expressed in the Allah's attributes of *rahmah* – compassion; *ihsan* – benevolence; *'adl* – justice; and *hikmah* – wisdom for building equality, justice, and freedom modeled on examples from the life of the prophet Muhammad including engaging in interreligious dialogue and most and peaceful coexistence with followers of different religions. The goal and the purpose of human life is to worship Allah and practice the attributes of Allah in his personal and social engagement (Engineer, Asghar Ali 2003, 2007, 2011; Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala, 2007; Morrow, John Andrew & Upton, Charles 2013; Rahman, Fazlur 2009; Vajda, Georges; Zein, Ibrahim Mohamed and Ahmed, El-Wakil 2022).

Second, Islam is a religion that triumphs in seeking of knowledge and also promotes social engagement in different aspects of human life:

The roots of current political, economic and social imbalance and inequality are behavioral. Institutional reforms alone cannot improve the situation. The pursuit by each individual of his or her self-interest must be moderated by a concern for others

resulting in caring and sharing. This ingredient is best supplied by religions, but reason too affirms that in view of humanity's shared habitat and the interdependencies in the human situation in general (Kenny, Jim and Khan, Irfan Ahmad 2008).

Islamic Public Value in Deep South Thailand

The concept and the application of religious-based administration and management, referred to as IPV in the modern age, have a long historical antecedent (Drechsler, Wolfgang 2015). In fact, one can say that engagement in Islamic public administration or for that matter religious public administration and public management has been a missing dimension of the modern age post-Westphalian education and scholarship in Anglo-American and Western statecraft (Drechsler, Wolfgang 2015, p. 63).

The currently implemented models of public administration and management in the global South are largely a continuation of the colonial legacy, and therefore there is no reason to believe that if one transfers what works in Liverpool (if it works) to Dhaka, it will work there as well. In fact, the track record of PM transfer – rather than PM learning, often pushed by the international organizations – has at least been mixed; histories of failures abound, and it may even well be that there are more of these than successes (Drechsler, Wolfgang 2015, p. 63).

Wolfgang Drechsler (2015) therefore posited that contemporary study and practice of public administration have to suspend the assertion that the global model should be solely based on or equated to the Western model. Otherwise, research and policy will be counterproductive because there are many varied, good models of non-Western public administration implemented around the world, including the Islamic (Vintar et al., 2013, pp. 58–70). Hence, there is an urgent need to recognize the obvious: that both the past European and non-Western models of Public administration such as Kautilya or Chanakya's (375–283 BCE) *Arthashastra* in India and also Buddhist, Confucian, and Islamic treatises on public administration, which are rich in terms of theoretical literature and long histories of practice, have an enduring relevance and potential to translate to sound policy and practice even today (Drechsler, Wolfgang 2013; Peters, B. Guy 2021; Stanley Jeyaraja, Tambiah 1977; Yang, Lijing and Rutgers, Mark R 2017). In this case, Rama V (reigned 1868–1910 CE), known as modernizer of Siam, embarked on administrative reform of Thailand without abolishing or removing Theravada Buddhist roots of the kingdom (Baker, Chris and Phongpaichit, Pasuk 2016; Engel, David 1975; Jory, Patrick 2021; Keyes, Charles F 2019; Peleggi, Maurizio 2002; Rhum, Michael R1996).

As shown by Loos (Loos, Tamara 2005), uncolonized Siam, despite having its sovereignty qualified by imperial nations, pursued European colonial strategies of juridical control in the Muslim south. . The creation of family law and courts in that region and in Siam proper most clearly manifests Siam's dualistic position. The language of modernity was not associated with a foreign, colonial overlord in this way its elites' favored continuation of existing domestic hierarchies and by those advocating political and social change (Loos, Tamara 2005).

Nearly all of the countries of the modern Southeast Asia which are largely semi-secular states in which religions and cultures form the basis of their public administration and management are secular in terms of their bureaucratic functioning while being religious in terms of public

values and political cultures based on Buddhism and Islam. The majority of their constitutions either mention an official religion or mention the prominent status of one religion over the others or imply it by reference to religious demography. For *Melayu*-speaking communities of Buddhist-majority Thailand, a longstanding challenge for both the state and the public has been how to construct and preserve the notion of genuine citizenship in a nuanced way without compromising ethno-religious identity.

The State of Conflict and Violence in southern Thailand as of 2024

Discussion about the role of SEP and IPV in relation to public administration as well as the development of tertiary educational development in the deep south of Thailand cannot be separated from understanding the state of conflict and violence in the region since the 1960s (Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2006).

After a period of lull in the early 1990s, the unrest remerged 2004, due to the change at the level of the central government after the institution of the new "Peoples Constitution" and the coming of the first Thaksin Shinawatra government following the parliamentary election of 6 January 2001. It marked the rise of the first strong populist party, viz., Thai Rak Thai party of Thaksin Shinawatra.(Kongkirati, Prajak 2014; Kuhonta, Erik Martinez and Sinpeng, Aim 2014; Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2007b, 2009). One outcome of this was the resurgence of unrest in Thailand's far South has been beset by violence until now. Individual killings, arson, or bombings occur on an almost daily basis. The three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have long been among the poorest provinces in Thailand. Over recent years, they have been slipping backward against the national average (UNDP, 2007, p. 15).

Between January and June 2024, the death toll exceeds 7,581 people and 14,082 injured. In spite of this the politics around issues concerning the challenge of citizenship and public value creation through the medium of tertiary education from an Islamic context is an ongoing activity (Chalermsripinyorat, Rungrawee 2020, 2021, 2022; Jamjuree, Soraya and Holt, John Clifford 2022; Jitpiromsri et al., 2024; Pathan et al., 2018; *Thailand, Muslim Separatists Agree on New Plan to End Violence*, 2024; *Thailand Population (2024) - Worldometer*, 2024)

The Ethno-Religious Characteristics of Southeast Asian Societies

Southeast Asia consists of 11 countries divided into "mainland" and "maritime" zones. The mainland comprises Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The maritime zone includes Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, and East Timor. The political profile of Southeast Asian states comprises constitutional monarchies, military dictatorships, and native forms of democracies which are neither totally liberal nor illiberal as per the Western political classifications (Syed Muhammad Khairudin, Aljunied 2022; Bowring, Philip 2020; Christie, Clive J. 1996; Zakaria, Fareed 1997; Zhouxiang, Lu 2023). Ethnicity and religion are important   identity markers of Southeast Asian people: Catholicism in the Philippines; Islam in Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia; Buddhism in Thailand and Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos; and Confucianism and Buddhism in Singapore and Vietnam. The church, mosque, or

wat (Thai: วัด – Buddhist temple) play an important role in the shaping of ethno-religious and political cultures by providing education and social meanings (Hefner, Robert W 2001; Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2016; Liu, Amy. H. and Ricks Jacob I, 2022; Ooi, Keat Gin and Volker, Grabowsky, 2017; Smith, Bradwell L 1978; Tarling, Nicholas 1998; Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2018). Beyond ritual worship, various religious organizations play important roles in the areas of education, social welfare activities and even influence political policies (Bonura, Carlo 2023; Cheng, Tun-jen and Brown, Deborah A 2006).

The unique politico-religious character of Southeast Asia is that the world religions more or less operate along ethnic lines (Turner, Bryan S and Salemink, Oscar 2014). Therefore, a Malay is a Muslim; a Thai is a Buddhist; a Filipino is a Catholic, and the immigrant Chinese can be Taoist/Confucian/Buddhist or a Christian. One not familiar with the region will find difficulty imagining things to be otherwise. Therefore, religious labels such as: a Malay Buddhist or Malay Christian; a Filipino Muslim or Filipino Buddhist; a Thai Muslim or Thai Christian are seen as strange labels or misnomers. Despite political problems, Southeast Asians are culturally and also religiously more inclusive, although this is changing with the rise of religious nationalisms largely due to the rise of globalization (Aljunied, Syed Muhammad Khairudin 2019; Berlie, Jean A 2008; Donoso, Issac 2024; McCargo, Duncan 2008). This distinguishes them from the Western-Judeo-Christian worldview, which is often quite linear in orientation (Arrighi, Giovanni 2010; Gaston, K. Healan 2019; Wallerstein, Immanuel 2004).

Southeast Asian states have not yet fully crystallized into nations, rather, they are semi-secular where religions are important identity markers (Goh, Robbie B. H 2005; Hefner, Robert W 2001; Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2016; Mutalib, Hussin 2008; Samudavanija, Chai-Anan 1987; Swearer, Donald K 2010). Even political cultures are religion based: Buddhist political culture in Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia – where the kings and political leaders aspire to be models of *Dhammarajah* or good Buddhist leaders by respecting the *Sangha* and the *Dasa-rājādhamma* / 10 Royal Virtues (Baker, Chris & Phongpaichit Pasuk, 2005, 2016, 2017; Brons, Lajos L. 2024; *Dasa-Rājādhamma / 10 Royal Virtues*, 2024; Ishii, Yoneo 1986; Keyes, Charles F 2019; Simpson et al., 2017; Steinberg, David, I 2001; Stanley Jeyaraja, Tambiah 1977, 1977); Muslim political culture in Malaysia and Brunei – sultans are custodians of Islam (Allers, Charles 2013; Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2016; Mohamad, Mahathir Bin 1970; Mutalib, Hussin 1990; Roff, William 1967; Schottmann, Sven 2019); Catholic values inspire social and political developments in the Philippines (United States Congress House Committee (2023); Cornelio, Jayeel Serrano 2016; Howell, Brian M 2008; Lee, Christina H. 2021; Moxham, Christopher 2022); Indonesia operates on the ideology of *Pancasila* – in which belief in God is the first principle. The national motto of Indonesia is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* – "Unity in Diversity" without which Indonesia would not have survived as a united country (Azra, Azyumardi 2004; Hefner, Robert W 2000, 2023; Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2022; Ricklefs, M. C. 2007, 2008, 2008, 2012). The minority conflicts with the states in the region are ethno-religious – Karennis of Burma are Baptists or Roman Catholics; Rohingya of Myanmar, Pattani Malays, and Mindanao Moros are Muslims; and the civil rights of the Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian minorities (Christie, Clive J. 1996; Che Man, Wan Kadir 1990; South, Ashley 2008; Yegar, Moshe 2002; Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2017b).

In Singapore, state-religion relations are governed by the 1990 "Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act" (*Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990 - Singapore Statutes Online*, 2021),

whereby religions are identified with race, for example, Islam with the Malays and Buddhism, Taoism, and traditional Chinese practices with the Chinese. Therefore, Christianity is seen as an "outsider" or "Western cultural influence" and the Christian community has to constantly rationalize and adapt its processes on two fronts: simultaneously to locate itself within the nation as a rooted aspect of the national community, and also to capitalize on its global networks and its affinities to capitalist modernity (Goh, Robbie B. H 2009, p. 1).

Islam in Thailand

As for Islam in Thailand, a Theravada Buddhist majority country with a constitutional monarchy political system, the population of Thai Muslims stands between five and seven million out of Thailand's total population of about 71 million (Thailand Population (2024) – Worldometer 2024). The mono-ethnic and mono-lingua Malay Muslims of the Deep South Thailand which in the past were independent Malay sultanates constitute approximately 44% of the total rural Thai Muslim population (Selway, Joel 2007, 61).

Islam in Thailand is generally divided into three configurations defined by history and locations. The first type of Islam in Thailand is made of ethnic Malay-speaking Muslims residing provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces in the deep south, they have been largely resistant to integration within the Thai polity. The majority Malay Muslims of the deep south refer to themselves as *orae nayu* (Malay Muslim) who *kecek nayu* (speak local Jawi–Malay) distinguishing themselves from the *orae siye,* that is, ethnic Siamese Buddhists who are the minority in the south. The *orae nayu* feel offended if referred to as "Thai Muslim," a term often interpreted ethnically because the common understanding is that a Malay cannot be anything other than a Muslim and a Siamese/Thai is always Buddhist, therefore, they also see the term "Thai Muslim" as a sign of forced assimilation by the Thai state (Jory, Patrick 2007; Selway, Joel 2007;(Tsukamoto, 2021a, 2021b). However, the rest of the Thai Muslims belonging to diverse multiethnic identities residing in the different parts of Thailand do not feel any offense to the term "Thai Muslim," but rather, they see themselves as a part of a Buddhist multi-religious country where Islam is a minority religion (Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2007a, 2022b).

The second and third configurations are more open to integration. They comprise ethnically Malay but Thai-speaking Muslims of the upper southern provinces of Satun, Krabi, Nakorn Si Thammarat, Phangnga, Phuket, and Songkla. They are mostly migrants from the Malaysian states of Kedah and Perlis(Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2007a). Last but no less significant are the multi-ethnic Thai-speaking integrated Muslims of the central Thai provinces of Bangkok and Ayudhya and also those residing in the north and northeast parts of Thailand comprising Muslims of Bengali, Cham, Chinese, Indian, Indonesian, Malay, Pathan, and Persian ethnicities. These Muslims from neighboring and faraway countries settled in Thailand after fleeing religious persecution at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in Myanmar. There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious conversion (Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2022b).

Ethno-Religious and Historical-Political Background of Thailand's Deep South – Ethno-Religious Islam in southern Thailand

In 1906, Siam annexed the Malay Muslim provinces of Nong Chik, Ra-ngae, Raman, Sai Buri, Yala, and Yaring, which were parts of the independent Malay Muslim vassal states of Patani. The annexation was formalized through the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The former *negara* of Patani state was divided into three provinces – Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala – which now make up the three Malay Muslim majority provinces of the southern Thailand. Siam relinquished its claims to sovereignty over the Malay Sultanates of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu to Great Britain. The British colonial logic for sanctioning the continued Siamese occupation of the northern half of the Malaya was its perceived notion of Siam being a friendly buffer kingdom against the French in Indochina. The currently named province of "Pattani" is the Thai spelling of the newly constituted province an outcome of Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The original Malay-Jawi refers to the region as "Patani" which is still current among the local Malays and the native separatist movements in their reference to the region (Che Mohd Aziz Yaacob, 2013; Klein Ira, 1969; Koch, Margaret L 1977; Che Man,Wan Kadir 1990; Manan et al., 2022; Numnonda, Thamsook 1969; Pitsuwan, Surin 1985).

Since incorporation, there has been an ongoing cultural clash between the Malay Muslims and the Siamese/Thai Buddhists. Initially, the Thai state had adopted the policy of assimilation nested within a larger process of statism led by the then military strongmen Major General Plaek Pibulsongkram, who ruled between 1938–1944 and 1948–1957, and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who held power between 1958 and 1963. This situation lasted until the 1973 students' revolt, which marked the beginning of the democratic process of party politics and constitutionalism. Military strongmen like Pibulsongkram and Thanarat imposed the policy of cultural nationalism, that is, *Thaiisation* across the entire country (Baker, Chris, 2022; Haberkorn, Tyrell, and Winichakul, Thongchai 2011; Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua 1995, 2014).

The southern Muslims being mono-ethnic, mono-lingual, mono-cultural and mono-religious Malay community felt the brunt of it. Thai official bureaucracy was accused of being culturally insensitive to the local Malay Muslim culture. Indeed, the Malay Muslims of the deep south did not welcome the Thaiisation policy for it sought to remove their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identity (Che Man, Wan Kadir, 1990; Surin Pitsuwan, 1985). Contemporarily, Asian Islamophobia remains a reality in the Buddhist-majority countries of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and especially Myanmar in relation to Buddhist-Muslim-Christian relations in these countries (Pathan et al., 2018; DeVotta, Neil 2007; 2020; Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2017b).

In his 1981 study of Islam in Thailand, Omar Farouk distinguished between two types of Muslims in Thailand namely the "assimilated" and the "unassimilated." The former constitutes, "a whole diversity   of ethnic groups such as tfhe Muslim Siamese, the Thai-Malays, the Haw Chinese, the Bengalis, the Arabs, the Pathans, the Punjabis, and the Samsams." The "unassimilated" are predominantly "Malay" who reside in the deep southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. (Farouk, Omar 1988, p. 5)

Since 1980s, the Thai government has undertaken several efforts to accommodate its Muslim population into the mainstream and also succeeded in this effort as seen through those who identify themselves as "Thai Muslims," but there are still sections who see themselves

differently in ethno-religious terms (Pitsuwan, Surin 1985, 13). The unassimilated are inspired by contemporary politicization of religion, they engage in "politicization of ethnicity" or "ethno-religious nationalism" or what is referred to as, "regional or subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an over centralised and hegemonic state. . . to achieve their own regional and local sociopolitical formations" (Stanley Jeyaraja, Tambiah 1997, p. 16).

The year 2004 saw with the return of unrest and violence in the deep south, the International Crisis Group had clearly described the southern Thailand conflict as "insurgency and not a *jihad*" (Narongraksakhet, Ibrahem and Kaba, Abdulai M. 2023; *Southern Thailand*, 2005). This stance holds true until today because the southern conflict since the annexation of Patani in 1909 had always been about Patani nationalism and not a religious war. Currently, despite seven rounds of talks between the Thai state and Patani nationalists (led by BRN) about the conflict and different attempts to bring peace in the region, the conflict remains unresolved and peace is still not at hand. Largely, because of the lack of political will and willingness to budge by both the Patani nationalists and the Thai state (*Thai Negotiators Agree Joint Roadmap for Peace in Insurgency-Hit Deep South*, 2024). Although Islamic politico-religious rhetoric is employed for nationalist motivations, the insurgents remain steadfast against their political struggle becoming religious. This is because distinct ethnic identity, language, and culture are the main forces superseding religion and driving the Patani Malays to contest the Thai state (Munirah, Y, 2018).

At the time of writing, Thaksin Shinawatra has returned to Thailand in February 2024 after living in exile for 15 years. He has received Royal Pardon marking the end of his jail term (Reporters, 2024; *Thaksin Now 'a Free Man' after Receiving Royal Clemency*, 2024). In the cabinet shuffle of his ruling Phue Thai party, his 37-year-old daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra was elected as the new 31st Prime Minister of Thailand through a parliamentary ballot replacing the former prime minister Srettha Thavisin, a Thaksin nominee, who was ousted by court order (*Paetongtarn Shinawatra's Nomination for Thai PM Reopens Family Dynasty*, 2024; *Thaksin's Daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra to Become New Thai PM*, 2024).

This new development at the Center will have implications for the insurgency in the deep south and the political dynamics there. Meanwhile, Malaysia in its role as the facilitator of talks between Patani separatists and the Thai government has appointed its former national security chief Mohd Rabin Basir to broker the peace talks between the two groups. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, "has characterized the conflict as a humanitarian concern and tactfully urged the two sides to reconcile" (*Being a Good Neighbor?*, 2024; *Malaysia Appoints Former National Security Chief to Broker Thai Peace Talks*, 2024). Furthermore, as Malaysia under the prime ministership of Anwar Ibrahim assumes the Chairmanship of ASEAN group of nations in 2025, it will be interesting to observe what role will it play in addressing and alleviating the 100-plus-year-old Pattani conflict on its northern border.

Islamic Public Value and Ethnicity in Thailand

Public value can be thought of as achieving what the public wants (Meynhardt, Timo 2009, p. 201). Its integrated meaning covers various dimensions, that is, governance, education, and civil society organizations in a networked manner (O'Flynn 2021). In the context of southern

Thailand, public value in an Islamic context plays a significant role in helping the Malay-speaking Muslim minority contribute toward the common good, and in doing so, realize their distinct native identity in all spheres of life and practice. This is both a legal and normative case for the Thai state to address since constitutionally, "Thailand is one and indivisible Kingdom" in which "Human dignity, rights, liberties and equality of the people shall be protected" (Thailand 2017, 3–4). The 2017 Constitution of Thailand also states in "Chapter II, Section 7. The King is a Buddhist and Upholder of religions." And in "Chapter VI, Section 67. "The State should support and protect Buddhism and other religions" – as one of the directive principles of state policies. In supporting and protecting Buddhism, which is the religion observed by the majority of Thai people, the State should promote and support education and dissemination of dharmic principles of Theravada Buddhism for the development of mind and wisdom development and shall have measures and mechanisms to prevent Buddhism from being undermined in any form. The State should also encourage Buddhists to participate in implementing such measures or mechanisms" (Thailand 2017, 21). In this sense, public value as a non-Western governance policy in the context of Thailand can be summarized as the duty of the Thai people, "to protect and uphold the Nation, religions, the King and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State" (Thailand 2017, 16).

This means that public value creation in the case of Thai Muslims has to be understood, analyzed, and evaluated in light of the ethno-religious makeup of their communal identity with special reference to the role of tertiary education in its construction.

In the case of Thailand in particular, and Southeast Asia in general, there is a need to address the relationship between ethnicity, race, and religious denomination. In the present context, the connection between the Shafii school of *fiqh* – jurisprudence adhered to by Malays and it is tied with their ethno-religious identification. It is important to note here the difference between *Sharia* and *Fiqh*: the former constitutes the broad principles of law mentioned in the Qur'an and the latter constitutes schools of Muslim jurisprudence formulated upon and drawn from the principles of *Sharia*. *Sharia* is macro in orientation, while by contrast, *fiqh* is micro in that it is determined by space, time, and context (Hasan, Ahmad 2013; Rahman, Fazlur 1979, pp. 100–116). Furthermore, the Southeast Asian societies operate along ethno-religious nationalist lines which is a neglected factor in the majority of the social scientific, security, and terrorism studies about Islam in Southeast Asia.

Ethno-religious heterogeneity as an identity marker affects the shaping of policy in relation to interpretations about what constitutes state identity, namely, whether it is monist or pluralist. "Monists claim that there is only one ultimate value. Pluralists argue that there really are several different values, and that these values are not reducible to each other or to a supervalue"(Mason, Elinor 2023). However, this binary may perhaps be too reductionist:

> Ethnographic research demonstrates that both monist and pluralist tendencies exist in the value relations of all societies and that the key analytic task thus becomes not determining whether a society is monist or pluralist, but rather documenting which kinds of configurations of monist and pluralist relations we tend to find in actually existing societies (Robbins, Joel 2013, p. 99).

Therefore, the increasingly studied approach to public value cannot escape addressing the dynamics of ethnic heterogeneity and its implications for societies in which multiple religions

play a significant role. Indeed, non-recognition of ethnic heterogeneity is an effective course for corruption, political instability, slower economic growth, lack of cooperation across the world (Bhargava, Rajeev 2005; Christie, Clive J 1996; Goodman, John 2021; Haynes, Jeffrey 2020; Munirah, Y, 2018; Prabhakar, Parakala 2023). The broad question becomes whether the application of Islamic, Buddhist, Confucianist, and Christian approaches to public value can assist in bringing about conflict resolution in heterogeneous ethno-religious countries? Specifically for southern Thailand, what role can public and private Islamic schools play in contributing toward building the common good in a multicultural country (Tuntivivat, Sudarat 2016).

Methodology

This article is based on qualitative research about the application of IPV as a political activity in the demand for the establishment of the first tertiary-level educational institution viz., the College of Islamic Studies (CIS) now known as the Faculty of Islamic Science (FIS) in 1981 and its gradual developmental role in the forming and training of the local Muslim youth in becoming self-reliant Pattani Muslim citizens in multicultural Thailand.

Types of Muslim Educational Institutions in Southern Thailand

There are four types of Muslim educational institutions in southern Thailand established by the southern Malay-speaking Muslims:

(1) *Pondok* – the traditional religious madrasa-type schools that are registered or not registered with the government, Pondoks are residential religious schools in Malay Muslim communities. Pondok teachers are known as *ustaz*, and the head teacher as *tok guru*. *Pondoks* have played a formative role in the preservation and educational development of the Malay Muslim identity in the deep south. During the 1930s and 1940s, the government of Phibun Songkram decreed that the *pondoks* should offer instructions in Thai instead of Malay and Arabic. This brought about a resistance from the local Muslims who saw it as a threat to their ethno-religious identity.

The *Pondok* curriculum teaches predominately religious subjects and is therefore not recognized by the Thai government. Thus, after completion, many of its graduates go to the Middle East to further their education and upon return set up their own *pondoks*. In 2004, the Thaksin government initiated the policy that all *pondoks* should register themselves with the government, which was met with resistance by some who preferred to dissolve themselves or retreat (*Thailand to Probe Islamic Schools*, 2004). While it is difficult to determine the exact number of *pondoks*, estimates suggest there are approximately 500. It is also projected that around 300–400 of them have registered with the government, and the remaining 100 remaining autonomous and informal (Melvin, Neil John 2007; Porath, Nathan 2014; Tuntivivat, Sudarat 2016).

As per the 2017 Education in Thailand report published by the Office of the Education Council, Ministry of Education:

As of the academic year 2015, 410 private Islamic boarding schools focusing on the teaching of Islam (or *Pondok* schools) situated in five southern border provinces were registered as *Pondok* Institutes under the supervision of the Office of the Private Education Commission, Ministry of Education. There were 41,012 students and 1,589 teachers in these *Pondok* Institutes.

Non-formal education, focusing on vocational training and the teaching of Islam, is also provided in some schools. Muslims of all ages embrace Islamic doctrine as their way of life, and religious education is provided informally from childhood by families and nearby Islamic religious institutions. (Ministry of Education, 2017, pp. 43–44)

(2) *Tadika* – Islamic kindergartens, which initially started as mosques attachments, are now under the Department of Local Administration in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.

(3) *Rong Rian Ekkachon Son Sasana* - Islamic Private School – historically the Malay Muslims preferred to send their children to the traditional *pondoks* to obtain religious education only and not the government schools because they implement a curriculum in the Thai language along with the study of Buddhism. Thus, the Pattani Muslims refrained from sending their children to study in the government schools. They feared that future generations of Malay Muslims would not learn about their ethnic identity, language, culture, and religion. Thus, the Malay Muslims of the deep south appealed to the government that they be allowed to build their own *Rong Rian Ekkachon Son Sasana* – Islamic Private Schools. The government eventually agreed to the proposal and in its policy of implementing universal education offered financial subsidies and aid for the development of the school infrastructure, teachers' salaries, etc. It is estimated that today, there are about 400 such schools in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and the government offers subsidy of approximately 15,000 Thai Baht per student per year for Islamic Private Schools which offer an integrated   curriculum whereby students study religious subjects during the morning and general subjects such as English, Mathematics, Science, etc., in the afternoon. (Adulyadej, 2008) The teachers who teach the general subjects are mainly Thai Buddhists because of lack of such teachers in the Muslim community. The government expects that by offering financial aid to teachers in Islamic Private Schools, it will be possible to ward off the spread of separatist mentality and ideology among the youth (Croissant 2007). However, it is not an easy task to erase entrenched ethno-religious identity, especially with the rise of religious resurgence around the world (Aslan, Reza 2009; Juergensmeyer, Mark 2009, 2020, 2022; Juergensmeyer, Mark et al., 2015).

(4) Public and Private Universities

There are two public universities that cater to the educational advancement of the southern Malay Muslims. The first is the Faculty of Islamic Science (FIS) at Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus (*Faculty of Islamic Science, Prince of Songkla University*, 2024). The second is Princess of Naradhiwas University, a government-sponsored institution established in 2003 in Narathiwat, southern Thailand. It offers degrees in both modern disciplines and Islamic and Arabic studies (*PNU - Princess of Naradhiwas University*, 2003). Additionally, there is a private Islamic university, Fathoni University, located in Yarang District, Pattani Province. It specializes in Islamic higher education and receives financial support from benefactors in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and other countries (*Fatoni University*, 2022).

Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus – Establishment and Contribution to Islamic Public Value Formation

The Malay Muslims have been demanding an educational space at Thailand's public universities since the 1932 democratic revolution (Pitsuwan, Surin 1988). The contemporary notion of IPV was not the foundational principle nor the mission and objective behind the establishment of the full-fledged College of Islamic Studies (also known as the Faculty of Islamic Sciences) at Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, in 1982. Its creation was aligned with the 5th National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982 – 1986) during the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1982, p. 143) . Yet, one can say that at the primitive stage idea of IPV was in operation in the minds of the Malay Muslim elites of Thailand without being conscious of it.

Professor Joseph Chinyong Liow, currently the Dean of College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, a scholar of Malaysian studies in his book, *Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand* (Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2009) written in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks commonly known as 9/11 and the 2004 resurgence of southern Thailand insurgency opines that the decision to establish was the College was a political decision taken by the National Security Council in 1982. It stemmed from Thai authorities concerns about the influence of the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East and also the influence of the young Thai-Malay speaking students returning after graduation from especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt who brought with them the religiously puritanical influence of Wahhabism.

> The College was envisaged to fulfil this role in two ways. First, by providing the means for tertiary education in religious studies for Islamic private school graduates, the founding of the College served as a gesture to the Muslim community of the government's consideration for their interests and aspirations. Second, through its short-term programmes catering to non-Muslim government officials posted to the south, it was also an attempt to facilitate interaction and mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims in southern Thailand. Instruction at the College is in three languages — English, Arabic, and Thai. The Islamic studies programme consists of two streams, one in Arabic and the other in Thai (Liow, Joseph Chinyong 2009, 2010).

While the late Dr. Hasan Madmarn (1941–2012) who played an important role in the establishment of the College of Islamic along with other Thai Muslim academics and politicians such as the late Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (1949– 017) and also the late Prof. Chaiwat Satha-Anand (1955-2024) and others have a different perspective. Dr. Hasan Madmarn, a local Pattani scholar and academic was first affiliated with the Faculty of Humanities at the Prince of Songkla University before the establishment of the College of Islamic Studies. After the establishment of the College, he first became the Associate Director and later on the Director of the College. His famous book, *The Pondok & Madrasah in Patani* (Madmarn, Hasan1999) published in 1999 discusses the history of the Thai government's policy of educational reform in the region since 1970. The main objective of which is to encourage the Muslim student graduates from the private Islamic high schools to further their education at the public Prince of Songkla University (PSU). Hence, the university first offered Islamic Studies and Arabic language were

offered as minor subjects at its Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Madmarn, 1999, p. 103). In 1982, PSU started offering Islamic Studies as a major subject for Bachelor degree program.

In fact, Madmarn mentions that the demand for the establishment of a College of Islamic Studies was first made to the Thai government as early as 1974. The purpose was to sustain and promote the ethno-linguistic-cultural and Islamic religious background amidst the many local socio-economic and political problems. While at the same time serving   the interest of national security policy; unity and integration of Thai nation; creating mutual understanding and cooperation among the local communities; serving as the center for Islamic education; developing the ethical and moral standards of the local to become social asset based on the guideline of the Qur'an (Madmarn, 1999, p. 115). The purpose of the College was to serve the interest of local Muslims as well as the state in the arenas of socio-political development and also the needs of national security. The College received its final cabinet approval in 1988 during the prime ministership of Chatichai Choonhavan. Since 1974, the proposal for the establishment of the College for the developmental needs of the Malay Muslims of the deep south also received international moral and financial support first from Mr. Mohammad Tawfiq Uwaida, the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, Cairo, Egypt and also the Muslim World League, Jeddah, the Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, International Islamic Charitable Fund, Kuwait, the World Assembly of years of his primiership (1957-1970) Muslim Youth (WAMY) including Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia in capacity as the president of the Regional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and Pacific (RISEAP) (Madmarn, Hasan 1999, pp. 115–122).

The demand for and the establishment of the College of Islamic Studies were both particularist and integrationist at the same time. It aimed to foster peaceful coexistence with the Buddhist majority   while also aligning with broader religious developments in the Muslim world. This dual purpose sought to address the challenges faced by Thai-Malay Muslims, recognizing both their indigenous identity and their role as an integral part of the Thai nation (Gilquin, Michel 2005, p. 121).

Educational Development – Faculty of Islamic Sciences, PSU and IPV

In view of the 36 years existence of the Faculty of Social Sciences, PSU from which have graduated several successful batches of graduates and its own progression from being a bachelor degree to doctoral degrees offering institution in Thai, Arabic and English languages, it can be claimed that it has been a successful institution in meeting the educational and the societal needs of the Thai-Malay community in the Deep South.

When viewed from the theoretical perspective of IPV as defined and described by Deschler that neglect of the religious public administration and public management has been a missing dimension of the modern age post-Westphalian model of public administration (Krasner, Stephen D 2001). Thus, making the Western model the sole basis for public administration globally is counterproductive because there are many varied, good and successful models of non-Western public administration implemented around the world, including the Islamic.

In light of this, it can be said that the establishment of the FIS at PSU by Thailand's public administration, which is a semi-secular, has been a successful experiment that has contributed to sustaining the societal development of the native Thai-Malay Muslim community in the deep south. It has also contributed to the achievement of a certain level for conflict resolution of political integration despite the continuing state of insurgency, which needs a political will from the contesting parties.

The trajectory of the academic and socially contributive aspects of the FIS, PSU can be traced as follows. It started in 1981 by offering undergraduate programs in Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. After receiving cabinet approval in 1988, the College of Islamic Studies (CIS) was established by Royal Decree on 31 December 1989, to be a center for academic studies, research, and studies in Islamic arts and sciences at the bachelor level and to provide academic services to society, including the production of human resources in general Islamic Studies in all fields.

The CIS has systematically broadened its academic offerings since 1994, introducing a range of undergraduate and postgraduate programs in Islamic Education, Law, Economics, and Management (Wae-u-seng et al., 2019, p. 10). In 2019, it was re-designated as the FIS, further expanding its curriculum with the launch of a Business Administration program specializing in Islamic Business Innovation in 2021, followed by a combined Bachelor of Arts in Islamic Studies and Islamic Law in 2022. In 2023, the faculty underwent administrative restructuring, creating four distinct divisions: Faculty Administration, Academic Affairs, Research and Innovation, and Social Services (*Faculty of Islamic Science, Prince of Songkla University*, 2024).

Over the period of around four decades, first as CIS and now as FIS, the institution has produced hundreds of graduates who serve society, conduct research, and develop new knowledge. They also provide academic services to the community and play an active role in the preservation of local arts and culture in accordance with vision and mission of the Prince of Songkla University:

1. Vision – A valuable university for driving sustainable development at the forefront of the world.

2. Mission:

a)Building academic and innovation leadership with research as a basis for the development of the southern region and the country, linking it to society and international networks.

B)Building human resources with academic and professional competence, integrity, discipline, pursuit of wisdom, social engagement, and skills in the 21st century based on practical experience.

c)Developing the university into a knowledge-based society based on cultural diversity and the principle of sufficiency economy, to foster development towards sustainability and a society of opportunity and fairness (*Prince of Songkla University*, 2021).

The mention of the SEP in the mission goal of the university located in a Muslim-majority region dovetails with the building of IPV for multiculturalism, as mentioned above, "developing the university into a knowledge-based society based on cultural diversity" (ibid).

Conclusion

The establishment of the College of Islamic Studies or the FIS, Prince of Songkla University is an example of collaboration between the Thai-Malay Muslim community and the state in addressing the development issues facing the Deep South Thailand. It also demonstrates an alignment between the Buddhist economics philosophy of SEP and the IPV. Its achievements despite shortcomings over the decades have shown that the public administration model does not have to be modeled on the Western paradigm and that the Western is not universal. This is especially important in cases where there are issues of development and administration where ethno-religious identities lie at the bottom of conflict as in the case of Pattani.

The Deep South Thailand still faces several issues of development and administration for the human resources development of the people in the Muslim majority provinces of Thailand and resolution of the one hundred years plus ethno-religious insurgency which remains unresolved. The case of the establishment of FIS over the last three-plus decades is the result of unconscious amalgamation of SEP and IPV made possible where a unitary state despite long resistance gave in to the demand of its minority community which is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously different from the majority that too is a citizenry part of multicultural Thailand. The credit for this goes to accommodation on the part of both the Buddhist majority and Muslim minority in Thailand despite largely instable political history of Thailand (Scupin, Raymond 1998).

In view of the accommodative types of ethno-religious political cultures of Southeast Asia that differ from other parts of the world, there is more space for accommodation despite conflict, violence, and protests in Thailand. One of the main reasons for this is the historical character and nature of the Thai monarchy that often intervenes in the political arena to protect and maintain both intra-Buddhist and Muslim-Buddhist harmony. This is the legacy of the late King Rama IX and continued by Rama X as witnessed through their personal participation in matters of religion such as the appointments of the Buddhist Supreme Patriarch, the Muslim Chularajmontri (*Shaikh al-Islam*) of Thailand, and also the annual celebration of the *Maulid* – the birthday of the Prophet at the national level. And also visiting and implementing development projects in southern Thailand (Kasetsiri, Charnvit 2022, pp. 69–114; Niyomyat, Aukkarapon and Tanakasempipat, Patpicha 2017; Yusuf, Imtiyaz 1998, 2017a, 2022a).

Despite the efforts to develop an integral and multicultural Thailand, there still remain many education and youth-related issues in the case of the deep south which have been addressed by different scholars (Azizah, Lailiyatul and Raya, Moch. Khafidz Fuad 2021; *Fatoni University*, 2022; Panjor, Fareeda 2024; Salaeh, Fatonah 2023; Wekke et al., 2018, 2019). For example, in the case of the administration, the contribution and challenges faced in implementing the Islamic Educational Administration and Management Program at FIS in relation to the Teachers' Council of Thailand and Office of the Higher Commission of Thailand are directed toward the objective of producing Islamic administrative professional capable of leading and

developing Malay Muslim society, in particular, Thai society, in general (Wae-u-seng et al., 2019, p. 10).

> The graduates of this program would obtain academic transcript and administrative professional license recognised by the Teachers' Council of Thailand. With their professional license, they can make a greater contribution towards transforming Islamic integrated knowledge into practice and applied the Islamic approach to their schools so that curriculum management becomes holistic and gives due regard not only to spiritual matters but also temporal ones. It is strongly believed that the hardship endured by the program to achieve holistic and spiritual approach in educational administration that are, somehow, being permeated to the Islamic traditional institutions would make the institution survived and well-prepared to take on the greater responsibilities and better cope with the present competitive environment and challenges of globalisation. As a consequence, Islam and Malay education identity which have been a long-established emphasis in Muslim society would be persistently preserved without neglecting the significant contributions of modern approach of education (Wae-u-seng et al., 2019, p. 10).

It can be concluded that from the perspectives of both SEP and IPV, FIS is playing a transformative role in forming and shaping the present and future of the Thai-Malay Muslim community in the deep south. It is reflected in the socio-political reform and emergence of new interpretation of Melayu Islam and its ethnic-linguistic-cultural and political face on the landscape of Thailand.

Arguably, IPV in Thailand is a critical policy goal within the framework of Thailand's constitutional principle that the Thailand's Buddhist monarch is also the patron of all religions within the kingdom. Over the years, this has made the Thai state recognize the existence of the multicultural diversity within the country. As many Thai Muslims are proud of the religious freedom they enjoy in Thailand, which is not available even in many Muslim-majority countries (Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2007b).

Over the decades, it has been observed that Thailand, with its on-and-off political shifting between military rules and experiments in democracy, has been progressively moving toward understanding and recognizing the internal multicultural diversity present within it, especially regarding the case of its Malay-speaking populace in the three provinces in the deep south. Indeed, promoting the concept of multiculturalism – *lak lai wathanatam* (Thai: หลากหลาย วัฒนธรรม) (Yusuf, Imtiyaz and Atilgan, Canan 2008; Yusuf, Imtiyaz and Schmidt, Peter Lars 2006, Yusuf, Imtiyaz 2014, 2021, 2004) has positive implications for Thailand's own flourishing in the competitive world of ASEAN political economies. On a positive note, the contributory role being played by a university-level FIS at the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani campus over decades in a majority Buddhist country in terms of shaping and contributing toward multicultural citizenship of the Thai-Malay Muslims of the deep south is no less important.

References

Adulyadej, Bhumiphol. (2008, January 11). PRIVATE SCHOOL ACT B.E. 2550 (2007) (As Amended by the Private School Act (No. 2) B.E. 2554). (C. a. THONG-EK, Ed.) *125*(7), 1-42.

Aljunied, Syed Muhammad Khairudin. (2019). *Islam in Malaysia: An Entwined History* (Illustrated edition). Oxford University Press.

Aljunied, Syed Muhammad Khairudin. (Ed.). (2022). *Routledge Handbook of Islam in Southeast Asia*. Routledge.

Allers, Charles. (2013). *The Evolution of a Muslim Democrat: The Life of Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim*. New York: Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers.

Arrighi, Giovanni. (2010). *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. New York: Verso.

Aslan, Reza. (2009). *How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror*. New York: Random House.

Azizah, Lailiyatul & Raya, Moch. Khafidz Fuad. (2021). Islamic Education Leadership In Conflict State: Case Study in Southern Thailand. *Jurnal Tatsqif*, *19*(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.20414/jtq.v19i1.3540

Azra, Azyumardi. (2004). *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian & Middle Eastern "Ulama" in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Baker, Chris. (2022). *A History of Thailand* (4th edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, Chris, & Phongpaichit, Pasuk. (2005). *A History of Thailand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, Chris., & Phongpaichit, Pasuk. (2016). *The Palace Law of Ayutthaya and the Thammasat: Law and Kingship in Siam*. New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Baker, C., & Phongpaichit, P. (2017). *A History of Ayutthaya: Siam in the Early Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Being a Good Neighbor? Charting Malaysia's Evolving Views on Thailand's "Deep South" Conflict | New Perspectives on Asia | CSIS. (2024, May 30). Available online: https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/being-good-neighbor-charting-malaysias-evolving-views-thailands-deep (last visited 18/04/2025)

Berlie, Jean A (2008). *The Burmanization of Myanmar's Muslims*. Chon Buri: White Lotus Co Ltd.

Bhargava, Rajeev. (Ed.). (2005). *Secularism and Its Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonura, Carlo. (2023). Religion and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. In *Routledge Handbook of Civil and Uncivil Society in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.

Bowring, Philip. (2020). *Empire of the Winds: The Global Role of Asia's Great Archipelago*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Brons, Lajos L. (2024). Buddhism and the State: Rājadhamma after the Sattelzeit. *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, *31*, 501–521. doi: https://doi.org/10.17613/yx3y-5d68

Chalermsripinyorat, Rungrawee. (2020). Dialogue without negotiation: Illiberal peace-building in Southern Thailand. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *20*(1), 71–95. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1705069

Chalermsripinyorat, Rungrawee. (2021). Islam and the BRN's armed separatist movement in Southern Thailand. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1915679

Chalermsripinyorat, Rungrawee. (2022). *Thailand's deep south conflict is approaching a critical point*. Nikkei Asia. Available online: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Thailand-s-deep-south-conflict-is-approaching-a-critical-point (last visited 30/03/2025).

Che Man, Wan Kadir. (1990). *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Che Man, Wan Kadir. (2003). Democratization and National Integration: Malay Muslim Community in Southern Thailand. *Intellectual Discourse*, *11*(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.31436/id.v11i1.244

Che Mohd Aziz Yaacob. (2013). Aggressive conflict in Southern Thailand: Roots of hostility and aggression. *Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics and Strategic Studies*, *40*(2). Available online: http://journalarticle.ukm.my/8250/1/Che_Mohd_Aziz_Yaacob_Jebat_2_December_2013no_2.pdf (last visited 18/04/2025).

Cheng, Tun-jen., and Brown, Deborah A. (2006). *Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia*. London: Routledge.

Christie, Clive J. (1996). *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism*. London: I B Tauris & Co Ltd.

Cornelio, Jayeel Serrano. (2016). *Being Catholic in the Contemporary Philippines: Young People Reinterpreting Religion* (1st edition). London: Routledge.

Dasa-rājādhamma / 10 Royal Virtues. (2024, May 3). Suttas.com. Available online: https://www.suttas.com/dasa-r257j257dhamma--10-royal-virtues.html (last visited 18/04/2025)

DeVotta, Neil. (2007). *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka*. Washington: East-West Center.

Donoso, Issac. (2024). *Bichara: Moro Chanceries and Jawi Legacy in the Philippines*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. (2013). Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic. *Society and Economy*, *35*(3), 319–342.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. (2015). Debate: Islamic PA—does it exist, what is it, and why and how should we study it? *Public Money & Management*, *35*(1), 63–64.

Engel, David. (1975). *Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn*. Michigan: University of Michigan Center for South East Asian Studies.

Engineer, Ashgar Ali (2003). *On Developing Theology of Peace in Islam*. New York: Sterling Publishers Pvt.Ltd.

Engineer, Asghar Ali (2007). Maulana Azad and His Concept of Wahdat-e-Din. *Islam and Modern Age*. Available online: https://csss-isla.com/institute-of-islamic-studies-iis/manulana-azad-and-his-concept-of-wahdat-e-din/ (last accessed 30/03/2025).

Engineer, Asghar Ali. (2011). *The Prophet of Non-Violence: Spirit of Peace, Compassion & Universality in Islam*. New Delhi: Vitasta Publishing.

Faculty of Islamic Science, Prince of Songkla University. (2024). Available online: https://fais.psu.ac.th (last accessed 30/03/2025)

Farrelly, Nicholas. (2013). Why Democracy Struggles: Thailand's Elite Coup Culture. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *67*(3), 281–296. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788123

Fatoni University. (2022). มหาวิทยาลัยฟาฏอนี. Available online: https://ftu.ac.th/ (last accessed 30/03/2025).

Frydenlund, Iselin., & Jerryson, Michael. (Eds.). (2020). *Buddhist-Muslim Relations in a Theravada World*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gaston, K. Healan. (2019). *Imagining Judeo-Christian America: Religion, Secularism, and the Redefinition of Democracy* (First Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gilquin, Michel. (2005). *The Muslims of Thailand* (M. Smithies, Trans.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Goh, Robbie B. H. (2005). *Christianity in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

Goh, Robbie B. H. (2009). Christian Identities in Singapore: Religion, Race and Culture between State Controls and Transnational flows. *Journal of Cultural Geography*, *26*(1), 1–23. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/08873630802617135

Goodman, John. (2021). *The Minority Muslim Experience in Mainland Southeast Asia: A Different Path* (1st edition). New York: Routledge.

Haberkorn, Tyrell., and Winichakul, Thongchai. (2011). *Revolution Interrupted: Farmers, Students, Law, and Violence in Northern Thailand.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hasan, Ahmad. (2013). *The early development of Islamic jurisprudence.* Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors.

Haynes, Jeffrey. (Ed.). (2020). *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics* (2nd edition). New York: Routledge.

Hefner, Robert W. (2000). *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hefner, Robert W. (Ed.). (2001). *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Hefner, Robert W. (2023). *Islam and Citizenship in Indonesia* (1st edition). New York: Routledge.

Howell, Brian M. (2008). *Christianity in the Local Context: Southern Baptists in the Philippines* (2008th edition). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ishii, Yoneo. (1986). *Sangha, State, and Society: Thai Buddhism in History* (P. Hawkes, Trans.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Jamjuree, Soraya., and Holt, John Clifford. (Eds.) (2022). *In Search of Justice in Thailand's Deep South: Malay Muslim and Thai Buddhist Women's Narratives* (H. Shintaro, Trans.). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Jitpiromsri, Srisompob, Waitoolkiat, Napisah, and Chambers, P Paul Wesley. (2024). Introduction: Thailand's Deep South–the dynamics of conflict and ethnicity. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, *51*(4), 209–231. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2024.2366562

Jory, Patrick. (2021). *A History of Manners and Civility in Thailand.* Cambridge University Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108868006

Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2009). *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qæda* (Rev Upd Ex edition). Oakland: University of California Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2020). *God at War: A Meditation on Religion and Warfare.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2022). *When God Stops Fighting: How Religious Violence Ends.* Oakland: University of California Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark., Kitts, Margo, & Jerryson, Michael. (2015). *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (Reprint edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kenny, Jim and Khan, Irfan Ahmad (2008). Vision to Action: Statements on Interreligious Engagement Project (IEP21): Muslim Statement. *Interreligious Insight*, *6*(2), 61.

Keyes, Charles F. (2015). *Democracy Thwarted: The Crisis of Political Authority in Thailand* (First Edition). Singapore: ISEAS.

Keyes, Charles F. (2019). *Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom As Modern Nation State.* New York: Routledge.

Klein, Ira. (1969). Britain, Siam and the Malay Peninsula, 1906-1909. *The Historical Journal*, *12*(1), 119–136.

Koch, Margaret L. (1977). Patani and the Development of a Thai State. *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, *50*(2 (232), 69–88 http://www.jstor.org/stable/41492172 .

Kongkirati, Prajak. (2014). The Rise and Fall of Electoral Violence in Thailand: Changing Rules, Structures and Power Landscapes, 1997-2011. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *36*(3), 386–416.

Krasner, Stephen. D. (2001). Rethinking the sovereign state model. *Review of International Studies*, *27*(5), 17–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210501008014

Kuhonta, Erik Martinez and Sinpeng, Aim., (2014). Democratic Regression in Thailand: The Ambivalent Role of Civil Society and Political Institutions. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *36*(3), 333–355.

Lee, Christina H. (2021). *Saints of Resistance: Devotions in the Philippines under Early Spanish Rule*. Oxford University Press.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. (2009). *Islam, Education and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition and Transformation*. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. (2010). Religious Education and Reformist Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces: The Roles of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lutfi Japakiya. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, *21*(1), 29–58. https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etp026

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. (2016). *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press.

Liow, Joseph Chinyong. (2022). *Islam and Political Power in Indonesia and Malaysia*. Cambridge University Press.

Liu, Amy. H. and Jacob I. Ricks. (2022). *Ethnicity and Politics in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press.

Loos, Tamara. (2005). *Subject Siam: Family, Law, and Colonial Modernity in Thailand*. Cornell University Press.

Madmarn, Hasan. (1999). *The Pondok & Madrasah in Patani*. Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990—Singapore Statutes Online. (2021, December 31). https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/Act/MRHA1990

Maisrikrod, Surin. (1992). *Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992: Democracy Sustained*. ISEAS.

Malaysia appoints former national security chief to broker Thai peace talks. (2024, May 7). Benar News. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/peace-negotiator-07052024115241.html

Manan, A., Armi, F. R., & Amri, W. Y. (2022). The Expansion of Islam in Pattani, South Thailand: A Historical Analysis. *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, *17*(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol17no1.7

Mason, Elinor. (2023). Value Pluralism. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2023). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/value-pluralism/

Mawdudi, Syed Abul Ala (2007). *Four Key Concepts of the Qur'an*. Islamic Foundation.

McCargo, Duncan. (2008). *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand* (1st edition). Cornell University Press.

Melvin, Neil John. (2007). *Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency*. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2007/sipri-policy-papers/conflict-southern-thailand-islamism-violence-and-state-patani-insurgency

Meynhardt, Timo. (2009). Public Value Inside: What is Public Value Creation? *International Journal of Public Administration*, *32*(3–4), 192–219. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690902732632

Ministry of Education, O. of the E. C. (2017). *Education in Thailand*. Office of the Education Council Ministry of Education.

Mohamad, Mahathir Bin. (1970). *The Malay Dilemma*. Times Books International.

Morrow, John. Andrew, & Upton, Charles (2013). *The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of the World*. Sophia Perennis.

Moxham, Christopher. (2022). *Christianity and Radical Democracy in the Philippines*. New York: Routledge.

Munirah, Y. (2018). Preserving Ethnic Identity through Native Language and Religion: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand. *Global Journal al Thaqafah*, *8*(1), 57–71. doi: https://doi.org/10.7187/GJAT072018-5

Mutalib, Hussin. (1990). *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*. Oxfor: Oxford University Press.

Mutalib, Hussin. (2008). *Islam in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Narongraksakhet, I., & Kaba, A. M. (2023). Precipitating Causal Factors And Solutions For The Conflicts For Southern Border Provinces Of Thailand. *Journal of Namibian Studies*, *35*, 330–340.

Niyomyat, Aukkarapon, & Tanakasempipat, Patpicha. (2017, February 7). Thailand's king appoints new Buddhist patriarch. *Reuters*. Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/thailands-king-appoints-new-buddhist-patriarch-idUSKBN15M159/ (last accessed 30/03/2025).

Numnonda, Thamsook. (1969). "Anglo-Siamese Negotiations 1900-1909," *Journal of Letters* 5(5).

Office of the Prime Minister, The National Economic and Social Development Council. (1982). *The Fifth Plan National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982—1986)*. The National Economic and Social Development Council. Available online: https://www.nesdc.go.th/nesdb_en/main.php?filename=develop_issue (last accessed 30/11/2025)

Ooi, Keat Gin., and Grabowsky, Volker. (Eds.). (2017). *Ethnic and Religious Identities and Integration in Southeast Asia*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Paetongtarn Shinawatra's nomination for Thai PM reopens family dynasty. (2024, August 15). Benar News. Available online: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/pm-candidate-08152024133428.html (last accessed 30/11/2025)

Panjor, Fareeda. (2024). National security and political space for youth in Thailand's Deep South. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, *51*(3), 177–205. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2024.2336864

Pathan, Don, Tuansiri, E Tuansiri, and Koma, Anwar. (2018). *Understanding Anti-Islam Sentiment in Thailand*. Pattani: Samilan Press.

Peleggi, Maurizio. (2002). *Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy's Modern Image*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Peters, B. Guy. (2021). *Administrative Traditions: Understanding the Roots of Contemporary Administrative Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy. (2017). Available online: https://www.chaipat.or.th/eng/concepts-theories/sufficiency-economy-new-theory.html (last accessed 10/04/2025)

Pitsuwan, Surin. (1985). *Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand*. Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University.

Pitsuwan, S. (1988). The Lotus and the Crescent: Clashes of Religious Symbolisms in Souther. In K. M. De Silva et al. (Ed.), *Ethnic Conflict In Buddhist Societies Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma* (pp. 187–201). Boulder: Westview Press.

PNU - Princess of Naradhiwas University. (2003). PNU. Available online: https://www.pnu.ac.th/language/en/ (last accessed 10/04/2025)

Policy Guidelines for Peacebuilding in the Deep South for the 2025 Fiscal Year. (2024, June 10). Available online: https://thailand.prd.go.th/en/content/category/detail/id/50/iid/329918 (last accessed: 18/04/2025)

Poocharoen, Ora-Orn. (2010). The Bureaucracy: Problem or Solution to Thailand's Far South Flames? *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, *32*(2), 184–207. doi: https://doi.org/10.1355/cs32-2c

Porath, Nathan. (2014). Muslim Schools (Pondok) in the South of Thailand: Balancing Piety on a Tightrope of National Civility, Prejudice and Violence. *South East Asia Research*, *22*(3), 303–319. doi: https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0217

EGAT (2019). *Power of the Land*. Nonthaburi: Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

Prabhakar, Parakala. (2023). *The Crooked Timber of New India Essays on a Republic in Crisis*. New Delhi: Speaking Tiger Books.

Prince of Songkla University. (2021). Available online: https://www.psu.ac.th/hatyai/en/?page=introduce2 (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Promchertchoo, P. (2016, October 13). *King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1927—2016)*. CNA. Available online: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/king-bhumibol-adulyadej-1927-2016-1038001 (last accessed 18/04/2025).

Rahman, Fazlur. (1979). *Islam* (2nd edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rahman, Fazlur. (2009). *Major Themes of the Qur'an*: *Second Edition* (2nd ed. edition). Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

Reporters, O. (2024, February 18). After 15 years, Thaksin returns home. *Bangkok Post*. Available online: https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2744104/after-15-years-thaksin-returns-home (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Rhum, Michael R. (1996). "Modernity" and "Tradition" in "Thailand." *Modern Asian Studies*, *30*(2), 325–355.

Ricklefs, M. C. (2007). *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Ricklefs, M. C. (2008). *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*: *Fourth Edition* (4th edition). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ricklefs, M. C. (2012). *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*: *A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Robbins, Joel. (2013). Monism, pluralism, and the structure of value relations: A Dumontian contribution to the contemporary study of value. *HAU*: *Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, *3*(1), 99–115. doi: https://doi.org/10.14318/hau3.1.008

Roff, William. (1967). *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (First Edition). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Salaeh, Fatonah. (2023). Reviving The Legacy: The Role of Islamic Education in Patani, South Thailand | SYAMIL: Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam (Journal of Islamic Education). *SYAMIL: Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam*, *11*(1), 39–59.

Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. (1987). Democracy in Thailand: A Case of a Stable Semi-democratic Regime. *World Affairs*, *150*(1), 31–41.

Schottmann, Sven. (2019). *Mahathir's Islam*: *Mahathir Mohamad on Religion and Modernity in Malaysia* (Reprint edition). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Scupin, Raymond. (1998). Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society. *Journal of Islamic Studies*, *9*(2), 229–258.

Selway, Joel. (2007). Turning Malays into Thai-Men: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Economic Inequality in Thailand. *South East Asia Research*, 15(1), 53–87.

Smith, Bardwell L. (Ed.). (1978). *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos, Burma*. Chambersburg: Anima Books.

South, Ashley. (2008). *Ethnic Politics in Burma*: *States of Conflict* (1st edition). New York: Routledge.

Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. (2005, May 18). Crisis Group. Available online: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/southern-thailand-insurgency-not-jihad (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Steinberg, David, I. (2001). *Burma, the State of Myanmar*. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua. (1995). *Thailand's Durable Premier*: *Phibun through Three Decades, 1932-1957*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua. (2014). *Kings, Country and Constitutions*. New York: Routledge.

Swearer, Donald K. (2010). *The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia: Second Edition* (2nd edition). New York: State University of New York Press.

Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. (1977). *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* (1st Edition Thus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. (1997). *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Tarling, Nicholas. (1998). *Nations and States in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thai negotiators agree Joint roadmap for peace in insurgency-hit deep South. (2024, February 8). Available online: https://www.nationthailand.com/thailand/general/40035395 (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Thailand, Muslim separatists agree on new plan to end violence. (2024, July 2). Al Jazeera. Available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/7/thailand-muslim-separatists-agree-on-new-plan-to-end-insurgency (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Thailand Population (2024)—Worldometer. (2024, February 13). Available online: https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/thailand-population/ (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Thailand to probe Islamic schools. (2004, January 11). Al Jazeera. Available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/1/11/thailand-to-probe-islamic-schools (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Thaksin now 'a free man' after receiving royal clemency. (2024, August 18). Nationthailand. Available online: https://www.nationthailand.com/news/politics/40040673 (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Thaksin's daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra to become new Thai PM. (2024, August 16). South China Morning Post. Available online: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3274716/thaksins-daughter-paetongtarn-shinawatra-become-new-thai-pm (last accessed 18/04/2025)

Tuntivivat, Sudarat. (2016). The inter-relationship between violence and education amidst armed conflict in Southern Thailand. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, *8*(4), 269–278. doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/JACPR-04-2016-0222

Turner, Bryan S and Salemink, Oscar. (Eds.). (2014). *Routledge Handbook of Religions in Asia*. London: Routledge.

UNDP, U. N. D. P. (2007). Thailand Human Development Report 2007. In *Human Development Reports*. United Nations. Available online: https://hdr.undp.org/content/thailand-human-development-report-2007 (last accessed 18/04/2025).

United States Congress House Committee (2023). *Catholic Church Claims in The Philippine Islands*. New York: Legare Street Press.

Vajda, Georges (1986). Ahl al-Kitāb. In *Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition Online (EI-2 English)*. Leiden: Brill. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0383

Vintar, Mirko., Rosenbaum, Alan., Jenei, György., & Drechsler, Wolfgang. (2013). *The Past, Present and the Future of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bratislava: NISPAcee Press.

Wae-u-seng, N., Henpiya, A., & Sa-U, S. (2019). Islamic Educational Administration and Management Program, Prince of Songkla University (PSU): Contributions and Challenges for Malay Muslim Community in Thailand. *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 5(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.15575/jpi.v5i1.2487

Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2004). *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Wekke, Ismail Suardi, Ashrori, Muhammad & Hamuddin, Budianto. (2018). Institutional Transformation of Madrasa of Muslim Minority in Thailand. *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, *4*(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.15575/jpi.v4i1.1961

Wekke, Ismail Suardi, Siddin, and Langputeh, Sukree. (2019). Islamic Education in Thailand Pattani Muslim Minority: What are the Institutional Continuity and Change? *Tadris*: *Jurnal Keguruan Dan Ilmu Tarbiyah*, *4*(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.24042/tadris.v4i1.3753

Yang, Lijing and Rutgers, Mark R. (2017). Against the rule of man: The Confucian and Western traditions of good administration. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, *83*(4), 789–805. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315596213

Yegar, Moshe. (2002). *Between Integration and Secession*: *The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (1998). Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of "Chularajmontri/Shaikh Al-Islām." *Journal of Islamic Studies*, *9*(2), 277–298.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2003). Religious Diversity in a Buddhist Majority Country: The Case of Islam in Thailand. *International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture*, *3*, 131–143.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz and Schmidt, Peter Lars. (Eds.) (2006). *Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand*. Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2007a). *Faces of Islam in southern Thailand*. Washington: East-West Center.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2007b). The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *27*(2), 319–339.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz and Atilgan, Canan. (2008). *Religion and Democracy in Thailand*. Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2009). The Thai Muslims and Participation in the Democratic Process: The Case of 2007 Elections. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, *29*(3), 325–336. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000903166598

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (Ed.). (2014). *ASEAN Religious Pluralism: The Challenges of Building A Socio-Cultural Community*. Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2017a). Celebrating Muhammad's Birthday In Buddha's Land—Managing Religious Relations through Religious Festival. In D. Sofjan (Ed.), *Religion, Public Policy and Social Transformation in Southeast Asia: Religion, Identity and Gender Vol. 2* (pp. 126–154). Globethics.net.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2017b). Nationalist Ethnicities as Religious Identities: Islam, Buddhism, and Citizenship in Myanmar by Imtiyaz Yusuf. *American Journal of Islam and Society*, *34*(4), 100–119. doi: https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v34i4.808

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2018). *Multiculturalism in Asia*: *Peace and Harmony*. College of Religious Studies, CRS International Center for Buddhist-Muslim Understanding, Mahidol University.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2021). Islamic Theology of Religious Pluralism: Building Islam-Buddhism Understanding. In M, Hashas (Ed.), *Pluralism in Islamic Contexts—Ethics, Politics and Modern Challenges* (pp. 201–219). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2022a). Chularajmontri (Shaikh al-Islam) and Islamic Administrative Committees in Thailand. In *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*: *Digital Collection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (2022b). Muslims as Thailand's Largest Religious Minority in Aljunied, Syed Muhammad Khairudin. (Ed.). (2022). *Routledge Handbook of Islam in Southeast Asia* (pp. 234–249). New York: Routledge.

Yusuf, Imtiyaz. (Ed.). (2004). *The Role of Civic Religions in Emerging Thai Civil Society*. Assumption University, Worcester.

Zakaria, Fareed. (1997, November 1). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, *76*(6).

Zein, Ibrahim Mohamed and Ahmed, El-Wakil. (2022). *The Covenants of the Prophet Muḥammad*. New York: Routledge.

Zhouxiang, Lu. (Ed.). (2023). *The Routledge Handbook of Nationalism in East and Southeast Asia* (1st edition). New York: Routledge.

Imtiyaz Yusuf is Professor of Islam and Dialogical Studies at International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, International Islamic University Malaysia (ISTAC-IIUM). He previously served as Assistant Professor and Director of the Center for Buddhist-Muslim Understanding at Mahidol University, Salaya, Thailand. He specializes in Religion and Social Sciences, Comparative Religion with a focus on Muslim-Buddhist relations and dialogue, Islam in Thailand and Southeast Asia. Email: imtiyaz@iium.edu.my

Arthit Thongin is an Assistant Professor at the School of Political Science, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, Thailand. He serves as a Permanent Expert for the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand and a Permanent Advisor to the Committee on the Armed Forces in the House of Representatives. Formerly, he worked as a policy analyst specializing in issues related to the southern border provinces of Thailand at the Office of the National Security Council. Most of his scholarly contributions are published in Thai, reflecting his deep engagement with regional political and social issues.

The Cambodian Cham Community: From Genocide to Resurgence

PULLA PEAT, BOPHANA AUDIOVISUAL RESOURCE CENTER AND CHAM CULTURE IN CAMBODIA GROUP, PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA

Abstract

Drawing on participant observations, desk research, and ethnographic fieldwork in Kroch Chhmar and Chhlong districts, this note explores the Cham Muslim community of Cambodia and their journey over the last half-century, focusing on their self-administration through Islamic principles and traditional institutions. The Cham endured devastating losses during the Khmer Rouge regime, which targeted their religious and cultural identity, resulting in over half the population perishing. Centered in Kroch Chhmar, survivors began rebuilding their community post-1979, reviving language, traditions, and religious practices. Key institutions such as the *ahl-mushawara* and the *hakem* have been instrumental in their governance and resilience, fostering community service, education, and cultural preservation. This remarkable resurgence underscores the Cham's strength and commitment to their heritage.

Keywords: Cham Muslim Community, Islamic Governance, Khmer Rouge Genocide, Resurgence, Islamic Institutions, *Hakem*, *Ahl-mushawara.*

The Kroch Chhmar and Chhlong districts along the Mekong River has long been considered the heartland of the Cham people of Cambodia. According to legends, it was the first place the Cham settled after emigrating from present-day Vietnam, which had been the center of the ancient Champa kingdom – a nearly two millennia old civilization that initially followed Hinduism, with later influences from Buddhism (see Lockhart and Tran 2011; Eng 2013). Today, the Cham (i.e, the ethnic group descended from the Champa polity; see Abdul Hamid 2008) are overwhelmingly Muslim, and the Kroch Chhmar district is home to a high concentration of the community as well as its leadership (Killean et al. 2018, 19). This, however, was certainly not the case several decades ago when the Cambodian genocide of the 1970s saw a quarter of the country's overall population killed, and as much one third (Williams and Keo 2024) to over half (Tyner 2017) of the Cham population.

This exploratory note addresses the relatively little-known story of the Cham Muslim community of Cambodia over the last half-century, with the aim to arrive at a first outline of how the Cham communities self-administer, then and now, along Islamic principles and via traditional institutions, and how they contribute to Islamic Public Value (Drechsler et al. 2024; Drechsler and Chafik 2022). As such, The immediately following sections-based on participant observations over the years, augmented by desk research and ethnographic fieldwork in the Kroch Chhmar and Chhlong districts - provide some background of the tragic events in

the early part of this period, this is followed by a summary of the steady resurgence of the community since the aftermath of the genocide, with emphasis on the forms of village-level organization and service delivery that are imbued with the local Islamic tradition.

The Cham and the genocide

In 1973, the Khmer Rouge began forging their policies toward the Cham Muslim population of Cambodia, who ultimately did not fit into their vision of a homogenous, agrarian society (Thun and Keo 2021). In that year, six wealthy people of a prominent village of the Kroch Chhmar district known as Svay Khleang were called to a "meeting" and subsequently disappeared. This was followed by hundreds of more arrests in early 1974 (Osman 2006). To be clear, religious leaders, such as the wise elders (*hakem*), teachers (*tuons*), and assistant clerics (*me chum-ah*), along with former Royal government officials were all already singled out under the American-backed military dictatorship rule of the Khmer Republic from 1970 to 1975 under suspicion of aiding the Viet Cong (Bruckmayr 2006). Arrests occurred almost every night in Svay Khleang (Okawa 2014).

In early 1975, however, the year the Khmer Rouge ascended to rule Cambodia, the nature of repression qualitatively shifted. Cham religious leaders were among the first to be summarily executed as they were seen as influential figures who could inspire resistance or dissent against Khmer Rouge policies (Mowell 2021). In one incident in Svay Khleang, the government-appointed village chairman called villagers to prepare a plot of land for rice cultivation – a typical tactic the Khmer Rouge employed region-wide along the Mekong River (Kiernan 1988). The villagers were told to take along food for their lunch. While they were at work, the Khmer Rouge surrounded them and accused them of bringing food to the enemy. Only a few of those arrested were ever released (Osman 2006).

Along with the arrests during this period, the Khmer Rouge government began openly restricting religious practice and expression. For instance, in late 1975, around the time that a rebellion was brewing on the Cham island of Koh Phal on the Mekong, the Khmer Rouge went to Svay Khleang to confiscate the Quran and other Islamic texts, as well as any knives, swords, and other potential weapons (Osman 2006). Some youths buried their swords and Qurans. When the rebellion exploded at Koh Phal, the villagers of Svay Khleang were not aware of what was happening only 10 kilometers away. Some of them later reported that they had wondered about the sounds of artillery they heard from a distance, which made them think that perhaps a war had started somewhere. Some said they saw corpses floating in the river – surely the bodies of Cham people (Eng 2013).

Photo 1: Present-day graveyard adjacent to an abandoned mosque in a Cham village in the Kroch Chhmar district (Source: Salah Chafik).

Two weeks after the Koh Phal rebellion and subsequent massacre, a day before the end of Ramadan i.e. *Idul Fitri* or *Hari Raya*, a group of observant Muslims from Svay Khleang asked the subdistrict chairman for permission to conduct the obligatory prayer in the mosque on the following holy day. It had been about a year since any prayers had been said in the mosque at all (Eng 2013). The sub district chairman did not respond to the request. The next morning, about a hundred Muslims conducted dawn prayer in the mosque, assuming that it had been permitted. They did not know that the chairman had sent his assistants to record the names of the worshipers that morning.

The Khmer Rouge cadres responsible for recording the names stayed at the home of a Svay Khleang villager, who managed to see the names on the list, which included the names of his relatives there. He whispered this news to his family members so they could flee to safety. The news of the list spread until the entire village knew about it, which led to a general state of confusion and alarm.

According to accounts, some youths beat a drum, calling for action. Trenches were dug around the village to serve as fighting positions. The people ransacked the village chief's house in an attempt to retrieve confiscated Qurans that had not yet been destroyed. Others slaughtered livestock and took food out of the cooperative warehouses. The elderly gathered and prayed together. Before dawn, the villagers began standing guard in their trenches, armed with knives, swords, and hatchets (Eng 2013).

That morning, troops from all levels of the Khmer Rouge military hierarchy (subdistrict militiamen, district soldiers, and regional troops) attacked Svay Khleang. Boats ran up and

down the river, firing into the village from all directions. The villagers, fighting with whatever they could find, had only two firearms with which to return fire. At first, the villagers carried bodies from the battlefield to observe their proper Muslim burial, but as the casualties mounted, there were not enough people to recover the bodies. Hundreds were killed and wounded.

The ground shook with explosions and houses burned down quickly with no one to douse the fires (Osman 2006).

Photo 2: Sword used by the Cham Muslim minority in their rebellion against the Khmer Rouge during Democratic Kampuchea (1975 – 1979). Photo: Jim Mizerski/Source: DC-Cam.

A Hakem's perspective

The following account is from an interview[1] with a village *hakem* (community elder and religious leader; see more below), and serves to illustrate the extreme and devastating repression the Cham faced regarding their culture, language, and, ultimately, right to exist.

> This story, if we talk about it, is a long one, because it happened many years from the beginning and to the peak of the rebellion. The Khmer Rouge arrived in this community in 1973. At first, things were normal, but a few months later, they began to change the community by forcing Cham Muslim women to cut their hair short, not to cover their hair, to force them to eat pork, not to speak in Cham, and eventually not to practice religion at all. In the following years, their policy became to take people out of the

1 Author's interview with *Hakem*, Male, age 67, at Village 5, Say Khleang subdistrict, Kroch Chhmar district, October 2023.

village one by one. *Hakems*, religious teachers, leaders, scholars, and wealthy people disappeared and were not seen up to this day. Others we saw killed in front of us.

This situation got worse day by day until 1975, when the Khmer Rouge won complete control of Cambodia. Our lives reached a very difficult level. We could not use the Cham language; we could not practice religion. The Quran and religious books were collected and burned. Now that we cannot live without religion, without language, we cannot remain silent anymore, because if we remain silent, we will die. So, I, a young man, and four other friends secretly met to talk about this without anyone knowing, because at that time gatherings were completely forbidden to prevent any village solidarity or coordination.

We were able to meet the night after *Idul Fitri* (Eid) in 1975, after hearing the news of the Cham Muslim uprising against the Khmer Rouge on the island of Koh Phal two weeks earlier. That night, Khmer Rouge soldiers came to arrest two of my uncles, including my name Sos Ponyamin, who were accused of being wealthy people in the old regime (before the Khmer Rouge regime). That night, my two aunts and I were patrolling the village with swords in our hands, and we knew that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we would die because they had already written down our names. We had to take action so that the villagers could gather and unite. After *Isha* prayer, we met, and the Khmer Rouge secret police arrived, shining flashlights on us. We ran, and they reported to their commander that the village was in trouble and not safe.

We went to get the drums on the *surau* (prayer hall). Their soldiers came with guns pointed at us. We drew our swords and attacked them. We each carried our drums and fought until one of them was killed. They brought a large army and fired guns at our village all night long and continued to fight until sunrise. They used guns, while our villagers only used swords, but we fought back and attacked as well by hiding in the sugarcane fields behind the village and attacking them. The sugarcane fields were full of blood. Some of us died, and we also killed their commander, Meng Hun, who was famous. After sunset, when we were defeated, they took us out of the village and evacuated us to different areas, but some of them refused to go and continued to fight some of them died in the village.

After the evacuation, we lived in misery as prisoners of war. What I am saying is a truthful account that the younger generation will find hard to believe. We sacrificed our lives to protect our religion and our village. This village was a large village with nearly 2,000 families and 2 mosques. When the Khmer Rouge regime finally ended, we only had just under 200 families remaining.

The aftermath of the genocide

In 1979, after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, only 600 people survived to return to the village of Svay Khleang; most of them were women and children. When the Khmer Rouge first took control of Svay Khleang in 1970, the village held 6,200 people (Eng 2013). Homes, several *surao* (small prayer hall), and the village mosque had been destroyed.

Photo 3: Svay Khleang Minaret in the Kroch Chhmar district; likely the oldest standing structure found in any Cambodian Cham village. Visible burn marks from Khmer Rouge era pillaging. (Source: Salah Chafik)

The bodies of those killed during the rebellion had been thrown into wells or buried in graves scattered around the village. Years after the rebellion at Svay Khleang, villagers were still discovering buried prayer books (*keitap*) and Qurans along with human remains when they dug or plowed the land around their homes (Osman 2006). Perhaps, the only fortunate aspect of these discoveries is that they reflect the fact that many Cham began moving back into Svay Khleang, along with other villages that were either partially destroyed or even entirely abandoned, as early as the 1980s (Eng 2013).

Skipping to the present, the Cham community has proved to be a resilient community and is recognized to be a thriving minority (Bruckmayr 2006). However, in the aftermath of the genocide, Cham Muslims faced the formidable task of recovering their entire identity, the most critical source of which was the embodied knowledge of survivors, many of which, in particular women, took on not open rebellion but rather everyday forms of resistance to the genocide (Killean 2021; Scott 1985). This legacy of everyday resistance translated into both momentum and hope for the Cham in post-genocide Cambodia, in terms of making everything from their language to familial and religious institutions and practices thrive once again. The latter was particularly essential: Much of the post-genocide trauma recovery and psychological healing of the community was performed through and because of the reconstruction of religious institutions (Van Schaack et al. 2011).

The following sections, based on ethnographic fieldwork in the Kroch Chhmar district in Fall 2023, briefly introduce two such institutions that remain pivotal to Cham community life today.

Ahl-Mushawara

Originating from the Arabic "people of mutual consultation" the institution of *ahl-mushawara* is essentially an autonomous village-level administrative body that frequents the mosque, *surau*, or *markaz* (Islamic cultural center) but is distinct from them. The group sees to the everyday affairs of locals, in the sense that it sees itself – and by eye-witness and oral account has a manifest, broad legitimacy – as responsible for ensuring or at least striving to establish a communal good life.

Ahl-mushawara is a hierarchical institution internally and does not operate on voluntary membership. Rather, to be a member, one must fit the following qualifications:

- 30 – 50 years old,

- married (and perhaps have children)

- studied traditional Islam either in Cambodia or internationally

These qualifications may appear to be discriminatory from a Western vantage point – in fact, they are. Unpacking them, however, helps bring to light some of the underlying values and strengths of the institution, which is an important exercise in itself. First, restricting membership based on that age range means that *ahl-mushawara* targets a certain level of mental and emotional maturity for its members. At the same time, the nature of the work – for example, continuously meeting and discussing with villagers to have a finger to the pulse of the community's status and needs as well as, planning and on-the-ground implementation of services and events – is such that an elderly person would likely struggle, and at the same time, in the context of Cham culture (and certainly elsewhere), should be, out of respect, on the receiving end of service delivery. The purpose of the second qualification is to ensure that a person is physically rooted and emotionally invested in a community's well-being. The third qualification confirms that membership is not a hereditary position, but rather, the result of a significant time studying and implementing the normative injunctions of Islam.

Photo 4: The *ahl-mushawara* in action at the village mosque after Friday prayer. (Source: Salah Chafik)

The typical gathering point for *ahl-mushawara* is in the local mosque, and on occasion for those villages that have one, a *markaz* (Islamic cultural center); they are responsible for the smooth operation of each institution. However, the *ahl-mushawara* are not simply mosque administrators.

Take, for instance, the Friday midday prayer in the village, which is an obligatory prayer for all adult male Muslims to attend at a mosque, provided they are healthy and physically able (barring emergencies). This practice is widely observed in Cham villages, and as such, *ahl-mushawara* utilizes the pre-*khutba* (sermon) time as an informal but extremely effective public service platform. For example, if there is a community member in need, financial or otherwise, this is an occasion to make their situation publicly known and to organize broad support. Other examples include assembling volunteers for some type of village matter, such as public works or service delivery, and announcing important community events.

Women also have their own, separate *ahl-mushawara* equivalent known as *Janum mai mai* or *ahl-mushawara kamei* in Cham language: it means Grandma or women meeting. The women's group does not have as many meetings as the men's group, they only meet in the area where they live in different parts of the community and are brought together by the representatives of each group before the decision is made to inform the men's group.They continue to seek solutions until they reach the same decision as the men.

Hakem

The second institution shares the name of the key individual at its core: *hakem*. The word is derived from the Arabic root, which can signify either to rule over/decide something or wisdom, although most Cham would likely say it is both, that is, wise leadership. Each village has a *hakem*, who is an elder of good character (based on the ethical standards of Islam) selected by the community, and in turn, is responsible to them. A *hakem* can and often is associated with *ahl-mushawara*, although his role and physical presence go beyond the four walls of the mosque/*markaz* to quite literally be one among the villagers.

Photo 5: Typical Cham house. (Source: Salah Chafik)

The vernacular architecture of Cham villages, often in close proximity or just at the bank of rivers, heavily features stilt or pile dwellings with a lower section functionally used for social gatherings. This architectural feature facilitates spontaneous or planned gatherings between villagers and wandering *hakems* doing their rounds, or, in modern governance terms, co-designing grassroots services.

A village *hakem* usually has around five personnel who are there for support on implementation, that is street-level bureaucrats. It is important to note that a *hakem* is the most local part of a wider system of religious administration:

- mufti – a leader capable of giving religious rulings (i.e., fatwa) that is applicable to the entire Muslim community of Cambodia; voted in for a life-term;

- imam iqlimi (imam khaet) – a provincial imam or leader; selected by the mufti;

- imam srok – a district imam; selected by the imam iqlimi; and

- hakem – community imam/village leader; selected by community election and confirmed by the imam srok.

This structure aligns with the official administrative divisions of Cambodia, which include *khaet* (provinces) and *srok* (districts), which reflects the fact the *hakem*, *imam*, and *mufti* system is both recognized and supported by the government of Cambodia.

Notably, the *hakem* is the paramount point of contact for the central state within this system. Although informal, the *hakem* serves as the bridge for communication, delegation, and consent between the villagers and the government. The latter is aware that the *hakem* is how one is able to get genuine buy-in and support from locals.

An example of how this dynamic plays out in practice is in the domain of education, specifically elementary to secondary Islamic schools, which in Cham villages are often part of or run by the local mosque. At least a portion of the land surrounding schools is often purposed as agricultural farmland. This policy, coordinated and overseen by the *hakem*, empowers the community financially: Local farmers can earn a living alongside teachers, and the mosque has a source of income in addition to voluntary (*sadaqa*) and obligatory (*zakat*) donations to continue to fund the school system.

The schools are officially sanctioned by and sometimes even funded by the government. Other times, transnational Islamic networks, whether official agencies/governments of Muslim-majority countries or informal private individuals, provide funding. In all scenarios, ensuring that the sources align with the local community's objectives and effective implementation happens is something that the *hakem* once again is the focal point for.

There are no school fees, and students are typically required only to pay for food fees (equivalent to 12 EUR per month) and are given a place to stay. Students attend from all over Cambodia and top performers go on to study Islam abroad regionally, for example, Indonesia or Malaysia, or internationally, for example, Egypt or Medina, and eventually return home to teach in Cham villages – likely to become a *hakem* one day.

Conclusion

The Cham Muslim community of Cambodia serves as a salient testament to resilience in the face of unimaginable repression and suffering. As this brief paper outlined, the Cham socio-cultural resurgence is largely a story of restoring traditional forms of organizing and administration based around and upon religion, in this context Islam. The institutions of *ahl-mushawara* and *hakem* are two distinct parts of and represent an informal yet officially recognized and relied upon village-level governance system. What the *hakem* and *ahl-mushawara* do share in common is the fact that individuals involved are not salaried, but rather, operate on a voluntary basis, specifically the concept of *fi sabilillah* (literally: "in the way of God"), which is a belief that divine rewards will result from assuming the responsibility of community leadership and service. Thus, the Cham and their spiritual traditions march on.

References

Abdul Hamid, Mohammed Effendy Bin. 2006. "Understanding the Cham Identity in Mainland Southeast Asia: Contending Views." *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 21(2), 230-253. doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/soj.2007.0002

Bruckmayr, Philipp. 2006. "The Cham Muslims of Cambodia: From Forgotten Minority to Focal Point of Islamic Internationalism." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 23(3), 1-23. doi: https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v23i3.441

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Salah Chafik and Rainer Kattel. 2024. "Islamic Public Administration and Islamic Public Value: Towards a Research Agenda." *Public Policy and Administration* 39(4), 608-624. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767231201799

Drechsler, Wolfgand and Salah Chafik. 2022. "Islamic Public Administration in Sunlight and Shadow: Theory and Practice." *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy* 15(2), 52-70. doi: https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2022-0013

Eng, Kok-Thay. 2013. *From the Khmer Rouge to Hambali. Cham Identities in a Global Age*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Global Affairs, Rutgers University, Graduate School – Newark, NJ. At https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/39444/

Kiernan, Ben. 1988. "Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 20(4), 2-33. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1988.10412580

Killean, Rachel. 2021. "Religion, Resistance, and Responding to Genocide: The Cham in Cambodia." In Sara E. Brown and Stephen D. Smith (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Mass Atrocity, and Genocide*. London: Routledge, 227-236.

Killean, Rachel et al. 2018. *Cham Culture and History Story*. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Lockhart, Bruce and Tran Ky Phuong (eds). 2011. *The Cham of Vietnam: History, Society and Art*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Mowell, Barry D. 2021. "Religious Communities as Targets of the Khmer Rouge Genocide." In Sara E. Brown and Stephen D. Smith (eds). *The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Mass Atrocity, and Genocide*. London: Routledge, 195-204.

Okawa, Reiko. 2014. "Hidden Islamic Literature in a Cambodian Village: The Cham in the Khmer Rouge Period." *International & Regional Studies, Meiji Gakuin University* 45, 1-12.

Osman, Ysa. 2006. *The Cham Rebellion*: *Survivors' Stories from the Villages*. Phnom Penh: Documenter Center of Cambodia.

Scott, James. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak*: *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Thun, Theara and Duong Keo. 2021. "Ethnic Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge: The Genocide and Race Debate." *Critical Asian Studies* 53(3), 325-341. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1894959

Tyner, James. 2017. *From Rice Fields to Killing Fields*: *Nature, Life, and Labor Under the Khmer Rouge.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Van Schaack, Beth, Daryn Reicherter and Youk Chhang. 2011. "Cambodia's Hidden Scars: Trauma Psychology in the Wake of the Khmer Rouge." *Stanford Public Law Working Paper* 2758130. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758130

Williams, Timothy and Duong Keo. 2024. "Counting Tigers: Estimating the number of Khmer Rouge during Democratic Kampuchea." *Journal of Genocide Research* 26(3), 307-327. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2023.2234180

Willoughby, Jay. 2006. "The Cham Rebellion: Survivors' Stories from the Villages, Ysa Osman." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 24(3), 126-128. doi: https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v24i3.1535

Pulla Peat, known as Fiila, is a documentary filmmaker working for Bophana Audiovisual Resource Center and Cham Culture in Cambodia Group. Growing up as a Cham Muslim in Cambodia ignited his lifelong passion for his culture, leading him to research its history, traditions, and language through independent study and community involvement. This includes documenting Khmer Rouge survivors and leading cultural projects, alongside his background as a documentary filmmaker and Cambodian Muslim community researcher.

Southeast Asia and Islamic Public Value: A Postscript

WOLFGANG DRECHSLER, RAGNAR NURKSE DEPARTMENT OF INNOVATION AND GOVERNANCE, TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY (TALTECH), ESTONIA, INSTITUTE OF INNOVATION AND PUBLIC PURPOSE, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, UK AND FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE, UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA, DEPOK.

1. Islamic Public Value[1]

The current theme issue of *Halduskultuur* is one of the publications emerging from "Islamic Public Value," a John Templeton Foundation grant based at University College London's Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), of which the three co-editors, and the authors, are members. The project aims to uncover, and present as legitimate, the perspectives of otherwise underrepresented and underexplored Islamic institutions undertaking polycentric governance and administration and creating public value to better the lives of their constituents and neighbors.

The authors of the case studies presented here investigate, to this end, sometimes centuries-old autonomous indigenous institutions "still" operating across the Islamic world, and in this case, particularly in Southeast Asia. What is specific about them, and what thus makes this pursuit special, is that they are not NGOs – a common-enough model – but institutions that are, to various degrees, part of the state sphere – some as *Ersatz*, some as a secondary government, some semi-integrated with central administration, that is, governing in the shadows (Peters 2019), and some fully part of the government of the day. They therefore dovetail with the more community-based approach to state service provision that is often at the core of the reinvention of the state in the 21st century (Mazzucato et al. 2021), something all the more important when that reinvention is facing serious obstacles since 2024 (Buchsteiner 2025). They form what we call Indigenous Cooperative Institutions (ICIs), and they do so in an Islamic, and in particular in a Sufi, way (Drechsler et al. 2024).

Exploring these ICIs as such has an important dual effect: It helps us to reflect on the Western aspect of global "best-practice" governance and administration, to recognize its framing power, and to notice its bias. But even more important for the current project and special issue, at the same time, it shows and showcases working Islamic models of cooperation and public value creation that could serve as models to learn from, but at the very least contribute positively to the rich fabric of integrated living-together (even of the West) in both state and society (Chafik and Drechsler 2022).

The overall project does so along three poles: In time and space, in theory and practice, and in governance and faith. That is, we look at the rich, diverse group of successful Islamic institutions, generally with a contemporary and future orientation, but also including highly successful examples from – often relatively recent – history that fell by the wayside during the colonial period of Western ascendancy. The current special issue focuses on the governance

---

1 This section is based on Drechsler et al. (2025b).

and public service provision aspects, and a little less on how precisely they are anchored in, and express, Islamic values and principles of faith – both in a philological sense (the teachings of Islam as such) and in a sociological one (Islam as practiced).

2. Southeast Asia

When we commenced planning the Islamic Public Value (IPV) project, which Rainer Kattel later joined as Co-PI, we tried to have samples from all relevant geographical spheres, without aiming at completeness. It was only via the development of the project, which thus proved to be truly iterative, that Southeast Asia emerged as a, indeed the, particular regional focus, which is now well-displayed by the present theme issue of *Halduskultuur*. In fact, even both the kick-on workshop of the conference, still somewhat limited because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the central Governance conference in mid-2024 took place in Bangkok, mostly for logistics reasons, but also because of the project center of gravity having veered to there. Once again, this issue does not aim at covering all Islamic areas in the Southeast Asian sphere, but it does give, we hope, a meaningful sample and thus survey in several respects.

Southeast Asia is special because here, quite uniquely, we find countries whose dominating administrative systems belong to the three spheres of Non-Western Public Administration (NWPA), that is, Buddhist, Confucian, and indeed Islamic – Mainland SEA is mostly Buddhist and Maritime SEA Islamic, with Singapore and Vietnam encompassing strong Confucian elements-and some more or less Western systems (particularly the Philippines), with most of them, of course, being hybrid (see Drechsler 2013, 2015). We therefore have countries with Islamic dominance, with good Islamic representation, those where Islam is a minority, and even a persecuted one, in a relatively cohesive space. Arguably, we have all kinds of government models as well, from vile dictatorships via competitive authoritarian systems to democracies that are at least not more challenged and deficient than some of the leading Western ones today.[2]

Southeast Asia is dominated, economically, geographically, and demographically, but also in other respects by Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and one of the four largest countries overall – we used to call it one of the three largest democracies, but that has become a difficult label to apply, not least because of the democratic qualities of the other two contenders. From a social-scientific perspective, which the IPV project necessarily takes, Indonesia is therefore the *primus inter pares* of Islamic nations, something that is often not readily present in the minds of non-SEA experts. The apparent overrepresentation of Indonesia in the project and especially in this issue is therefore no such thing: We do have three essays dealing with Indonesia, but this is as it should be, given the importance and eminence of the country, both for Islamic Public Value and otherwise.

---

2 Mahbubani and Sng (2017) is far too positive on ASEAN, *a fortiori* from the 2025 perspective, but it nutshells the region in an excellent way.

3. The Issue

This brings us to the specifics of this theme issue. We chose *Halduskultuur*, the in-house journal of the Ragnar Nurkse Department at TalTech, which has served as a kind of "second home" of the IPV project, because its specific orientation, both as regards NWPA and an explicit non-emphasis of "method" as a guarantor of validity (Gadamer 1990). Thus, we were able to include more experimental and narrative content than mainstream journals would have permitted – especially regarding an uphill-battle topic as this, or any Islamic one (see Drechsler et al. 2025b). We believe the journal's open-access policy, strong quality control, and indexing more than compensate for the disadvantages of not choosing a more distant venue.

The issue overlaps to some extent with the project's *omnibus* Governance publication, a comprehensive Edward Elgar volume (Drechsler et al. 2025a), but only in parts. Although two essays on Indonesia and the one on Thailand also appear in the latter, if in substantially different forms, one Indonesia contribution and the essential Philippines and Cambodia ones are completely new. They appear here mostly for reasons of timing, as not all research teams joined the project from the beginning and emerged only later. What the Elgar volume entails and this issue does not are the theoretical pieces – the project's aim was always to create a basis for theorizing on Islamic Public Value, but as we went along, very substantial theory reflections emerged, especially by members of the Advisory Board. Here, we have the cases pure and simple, and those interested in further theory are directed to the book.

With case studies of Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we are missing several important SEA countries. In Laos and Timor-Leste, Islam is arguably quite marginal, but even in such cases, we would have had fascinating case studies, and Vietnam's Cham community would have been important to cover. Brunei is an Islamic country, but the omission of Malaysia, a Muslim-majority country with significant elements of Islamic Public Administration especially as regards its unique, rotating Monarchy (see Noh 2014, in this journal), is particularly regrettable. Although we had a planned work package and essay in progress, the project did not materialize.

The case with Singapore is a little different: while it is a Confucian-Western hybrid (Drechsler 2018), Singapore takes great pains to emphasize that it is multicultural and that Islam and the Muslim-Malay population are a key part of it. However, when a Singapore case study was explored, it soon became apparent that there are, in fact, no Islamic institutions in Singapore that match the IPV criteria, only those that deal with religion itself (see Steiner 2015).

4. Myanmar

What is particularly regrettable, however, is that we were not able to include a case study of Myanmar, or better, of the Rohingya community. Victims of genocide and expulsion in waves from their homeland by the terrorist military junta of their homeland, masquerading as a government since a coup in 2021 (Drechsler 2021), they have (been) settled in giant camps in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, which, with a million inhabitants, is the largest such camp system in the world (Hussein and Duggal 2023). Although the Bangladesh government, both before

and after the 2024 revolution, has accommodated the camps (Islam et al. 2022), there is very little hope, and not even a serious plan, of how to solve this giant humanitarian crisis, something quite off the global agenda today, as is the catastrophe in Myanmar itself.

Refugee crises seem to be set to become more, not less, in the immediate future, and many if not most victims of mass expulsion and catastrophes that create camp life might be Muslims (see UNHRC 2024). It is therefore particularly important, and in fact promising, to look at how inmates in such camps, and Cox's Bazaar is the best, that is, worst, example, administer themselves and gain some agency. Islamic culture and structure are all that is left to the Rohingya, and one would intuitively assume that with or even against Bangladeshi and United Nations administration (see Islam 2024), this is the *locus* of some autonomy and self-governance, even self-empowerment, such as is possible.

This seems indeed to be the case. It is particularly difficult to investigate Cox's Bazaar, because both the powers that be clearly do not welcome either journalists or scholars to the camp, and there is very scant literature so far. However, the IPV project was able to start some investigation in the camp itself, including by local Rohingya researchers, although the prohibition of higher education and the forced reduction of internet access there make this very difficult (participant observation and interviews).

Based on such research, and here we thank especially our project assistant M. Ayeas, we have indeed been able to ascertain, for now, that any autonomous administration of the camp, government truly in the shadow, is based on earlier Islamic structures from the Myanmar communities. This includes the provision of *moktob* (Islamic kindergarten) taught by Muslim scholars who are hired via a general assembly in the local mosque and financed from community donations.

Perhaps the best example is the institution of *mazhi*, a community leader position that seems actually to be an IPV innovation from the camp in that it is based on the earlier Islamic village mayor position close to the *hakem* in the Cham community in Cambodia (Van Schaack et al. 2011) but specifically transformed to serve camp needs. The *mazhi* is a reputable elder elected also in the mosque under the supervision of the *Imam* who, among other obligations, deals with the community communications with Bengali and other authorities and groups of power, including armed bandit groups allowed, somehow, to enter the camp (but see Rahman 2024), and who is also paid via community donations (All of this information is based on internal fieldwork.)

Although it was, again, not possible to develop this in time for the current issue, we hope to have a separate publication about Islamic Public Value among and by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh sometime soon. Deplorably, the aforementioned expected rise of refugee numbers and their tendency to victimize Muslims makes research about the possibility of their self-administration, if at a minimum, particularly significant. It also shows, if against a truly dark background, how existentially important scholarship about Islamic Public Value can be.

References

Buchsteiner, Jochen. 2025. "Krise des Westens. Ist der Liberalismus am Ende?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 January.

Chafik, Salah and Wolfgang Drechsler. 2022. "In the Semi-Shadow of the Global West: Moroccan zawāyā as Good Public Administration." *Public Administration Review* 82(4), 747-755. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13475

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2021. "Myanmar's Civil Service: Responsible Disobedience During the 2021 Military Coup." *Public Money and Management* 41(7), 577-580. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2021.1928948

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2018. "Beyond the Western Paradigm: Confucian Public Administration." In Sara Bice et al. (eds). *Public Policy in the 'Asian Century' Concepts, Cases and Futures*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 19-40.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2015. "Paradigms of Non-Western PA and Governance." In Andrew Massey and Karen Johnston (eds). *The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 104-131.

Drechsler, Wolfgang. 2013. "Three Paradigms of Governance and Administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic." *Society and Economy* 35(3), 319-342. doi: https://doi.org/10.1556/SocEc.35.2013.3.3

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Salah Chafik and Rainer Kattel (eds). 2025a. *Islamic Public Value: Theory, Practice, and Administration of Indigenous Cooperative Institutions*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, in press.

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Salah Chafik and Rainer Kattel. 2025b. "What is and why do we study Islamic Public Value? An Introduction." In 2025a, in press.

Drechsler, Wolfgang, Rainer Kattel and Salah Chafik. 2024. "Islamic Public Administration and Islamic Public Value: A Research Agenda". *Public Public Policy and Administration* 39(4), 603-624. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767231201799

Gadamer, Hans.-Georg. 1990. *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik Gesammelte Werke* 1. 6th edn. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Hussein, Mohammed and Hanna Duggal. 2023. "What is life like inside the world's biggest refugee camp?" *Al Jazeera*, 25 August. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/8/25/what-is-life-like-inside-the-worlds-largest-refugee-camp.

Islam, Md Rafiqul. 2024. "The Continuing History of Rohingya Settlement in Bangladesh." In Kawser Ahmed and Md Rafiqul Islam(eds). *Understanding the Rohingya Displacement. Security, Media, and Humanitarian Perspectives*. Singapore: Springer, 37-45.

Islam, Md Rafiqul, et al. 2022. "An Assessment of the Sustainability of Living for Rohingya Displaced People in Cox's Bazar Camps in Bangladesh." *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work* 7, 331-345. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-022-00212-5

Rahman, Md Zillur. 2024. "Displaced Rohingya Management in Bangladesh and Law Enforcement Agencies' Role." In Kawser Ahmed and Md Rafiqul Islam (eds). *Understanding the Rohingya Displacement. Security, Media, and Humanitarian Perspectives*. Singapore: Springer, 227-240.

Mahbubani, Kishore and Jeffery Sng. 2017. *The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace*. Singapore: NUS Press. Also available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1xz0m3.

Mazzucato, Mariana, et al. 2021. *COVID-19 and the Need for Dynamic State Capabilities: An International Comparison*. UNDP Development Futures Series Working Papers. New York: UNDP. Available at https://www.undp.org/library/dfs-covid-19-and-need-dynamic-state-capabilities-international-comparison

Noh, Abdillah. 2014. "Islam, Public Policy and Public Administration in Malaysia: Negotiating Complexities." *Halduskultuur* 15(2), 204-221.

Peters, Guy. 2019. "Governing in the Shadows." *Journal of Chinese Governance* 4(2), 108-122. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2011.10779375